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ABSTRACT 
 Civil society is created and sustained through the relationships of interconnected 
organizations such as NGOs and donors. Social capital is created via these relationships, 
providing civil society actors with the tangible and intangible resources to accomplish 
objectives not easily accomplished alone. Public relations as a communication function 
dedicated to the management and maintenance of relationships is thus essential to the 
creation and preservation of a civil society. The purpose of this dissertation was to study 
the relationships in a sector of civil society to discover how relationship quality, as 
measured through variables of social capital and relationship management, affect the 
overall ability of civil society actors to gain influence and engage in collective action. In so 
doing, the research examined the case of the media development sector in Peru. Through 
expert interviews, organizational profiles, and a social network analysis survey, the 
research identified that while the existing relationships may be strong from a social capital 
and public relations perspective, the outcome of these relationships are not necessarily 
indicative of a thriving civil society. The research also determined that quality 
organization–public relationships are associated with positions of network centrality and 
facilitators of information flow. In so doing, it has helped to position network centrality 
and other measures as key metrics for the evaluation of the outcomes of organization–
public relationships. From these results, the study makes contributions to the utilization 
of network analysis as an evaluative tool in public relations as well as the role of public 
relations in facilitating a civil society.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 For some time, a steady stream of public relations research has advocated that 
public relations can help to improve communities and societies. For example, a number 
of works have focused on the ability of public relations to serve a community building 
function (Kruckeberg & Stark, 1988; Stark & Kruckeberg, 2001; Tsetsura & Kruckeberg, 
2009). Such literature has argued that public relations can help to create, rebuild, or 
strengthen local and global communities. Similarly, public relations scholars have 
suggested that public relations can help to create a fully functioning society, wherein 
organizations work to build relationships, shape meaning, and collectively manage risk 
and uncertainty (Heath, 2006). Lastly, and most importantly for this study, researchers 
have studied the role public relations can play in creating the relationships that help to 
establish a civil society and enact social capital (Doerfel & Taylor, 2004; Sommerfeldt & 
Taylor, in press; Taylor, 2000, 2009; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003).  
 However, the body of literature that examines public relations, its role, processes, 
and outcomes at a societal level remains small. Most of the research in public relations 
pertains to the practice as related to business (Holtzhauzen, 2000; Pal & Dutta, 2008). 
Despite the emphasis on for-profit communication, public relations theory and research 
has made a considerable progression from functionalist or operational approaches that 
largely concerned the one-way dissemination of persuasive messages to cocreational or 
relational approaches that place relationships at the locus of inquiry and theory 
development (Botan & Taylor, 2004). Literature that has studied relationship 
management (Broom, Casey, & Ritchey, 1997; Ledingham & Bruning, 1998) and 
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organization–public relationships (Grunig & Huang, 2000; Hon & Grunig, 1999; 
Huang, 2001)—while it has focused specifically on the relationship between a single 
organization and public—has nonetheless opened the door for the study of public 
relations and the relationships its strives to build at a macro, or societal level. 
 As researchers who have studied the role of public relations in civil society have 
suggested, it is the relationships among civil society actors such as NGOs that are central 
to the continued vitality of civil society movements and the accomplishment of goals 
(Doerfel & Taylor, 2004; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003). These relationships provide 
individual civil society actors with social capital—the resources that help organizations to 
accomplish goals that would not be as easily accomplished without such relationships. 
Further, public relations can help to facilitate the network of relationships among civil 
society actors that provide social capital or benefit to the communities in which they 
operate (Taylor, 2009). Given the inherent importance of relationships in civil society 
and social capital research, a natural extension of such research from a public relations 
perspective is to examine the quality of relationships that exist in a civil society network, 
and how these relationships affect both individual actors and the network of organizations 
at large.  
 The purpose of this research was to describe the network of relationships among 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a civil society effort to develop and reform 
media—a central organizational actor in civil society (Shaw, 1996; Taylor & Doerfel, 
2003). The study focused on how the quality of relationships that exist among 
organizations, based on levels of social capital, affect their ability to come together and 
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collectively manage shared issues, and to examine the extent to which relationship 
measurements can serve as predictors of organizational influence.  
 To examine the aforementioned principles and advance public relations theory, 
the case of Peruvian civil society organizations dedicated to media development were 
studied. As Doerfel and Taylor (2004) and Taylor and Doerfel (2003) have noted, the 
best places in which to study the role of public relations in facilitating civil society and in 
building social capital is in environments that are transitioning to democracy. Democratic 
principles, press freedoms, and the rule of law in Peru were seriously weakened in the 
1990s under the authoritarian government of President Alberto Fujimori. While 
significant improvements have been made in the field of human rights and in press 
freedom, the state of Peruvian civil society remains weak and under threat (LaPlante & 
Phenicie, 2010a). Peru thus served as an ideal location in which to study how civil society 
partners can help to build the social capital that will preserve, advance, and protect free 
media. Moreover, the location helps to demonstrate the important role public relations 
may play in helping to sustain civil society. 
 The theoretical and methodological contributions of this dissertation are twofold. 
First, the study extends the relationship management and organization–public 
relationship literatures by proposing network centrality as another important relationship 
outcome that future public relations research should consider. In this process, the 
dissertation elaborated on social network analysis as an emerging research tool and 
method for public relations, especially in considerations of relationship structure and 
quality. Second, the study further contributed to the emerging body of literature that 
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integrates public relations and civil society theory, and demonstrated how relationship 
building is akin to the creation of social capital. 
 To clarify the importance of relationships in building civil society and creating 
social capital, the first chapter of this dissertation reviews the relationship management 
and organization–public literatures. Next, the discussion turns to civil society and the role 
of NGOs and how social capital is thought to be an important process and outcome of 
civil society efforts. Social network analysis is then presented as a means by which civil 
society and social capital can be measured, and also as a mechanism to assess the outcome 
of organization–public relationships in a network. The case of Peru, its civil society 
efforts, and the state of media development in the nation is then discussed. The 
manuscript then presents the methods by which the media development sector of 
Peruvian civil society was examined. The last section discusses the findings and offers 
insights into social network analysis as a metric for public relations, and the integration of 
civil society theory and public relations.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE AND THEORY 
Organization–Public Relationships 
 The first part of this literature review will discuss research that has considered 
relationships as the locus of public relations research and theory development. To begin 
with, this section will discuss the relationship management and organization–public 
relationship literature. As part of this discussion, I will explicate several dimensions of the 
relationship as a unit of analysis for research—dimensions that were utilized as 
instruments of research in this study. Secondly, the review turns to literature that 
perceives the organization as depending on linkages with the environment to acquire 
needed resources. In so doing, such literature is deemed to have lead to the recognition 
that public relations has the ability to—and arguably must—create and maintain 
relationships at a macro or society level. This point leads the discussion to the next 
substantial section of this manuscript, which considers civil society and the organizations 
by which it is comprised.  
 For many years, the practice of public relations was grounded in a journalistic 
approach that centered on the one-way dissemination of messages to publics, as evidenced 
in the press agentry and public information models of public relations (Grunig & Hunt, 
1984). Ledingham and Bruning (1998) and Botan and Taylor (2004) have labeled the 
early emphasis on the production and dissemination of strategic communication as a 
functional approach to public relations. However, Ferguson’s (1984) call for public 
relations research to shift its emphasis away from the study of communication efficiencies 
to the study of relationships has led to the development of perspectives such as 
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relationship management theory and a focus on assessing the quality of organization–
public relationships.  
 Ledingham and Bruning (1998) have defined relationships as the “state which 
exists between an organization and its key publics in which the actions of either entity 
impact the economic, social, political, and/or cultural well-being of the other entity” (p. 
62). They further noted that the ideal relationship between an organization and public is 
characterized by a mutual regard—that is, relationships are symmetrical or reciprocally 
positive in some respect. Relationship management theory (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998) 
thus holds that it is the relationship, not the organization or the publics that should be 
the center of public relations research and theory development. Further, the success of 
public relations is not to be measured in communication outputs or outcomes—as did 
functional research—but instead in the quality of relationships (Bruning & Ledingham, 
1999; Hon & Grunig, 1999). In relationship management theory, communication is the 
means by which relationships are maintained. Communication is inherent in positive 
long-term positive relationships with publics, and is not merely employed to enhance 
organizational image or alter public opinion (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998).  
Relationship Measurement 
 In one of the most fundamental articles in relationship management theory, 
Broom et al. (1997) pointed out the need for a clear definition of relationships in public 
relations theory. As part of their explication of relationships, they implied that 
organization–public relationships have measurable properties of their own. Broom et al. 
argued that these properties are independent of the parties in the relationship—distinct 
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from either the organization or the public(s)—and can instead be seen and studied as 
relational processes and outcomes. 
Resultantly, scholars have proposed any number of properties as measures of 
organization–public relationships and their outcomes. In one of the earliest works to 
suggest measures of relationship quality, Grunig et al. (1992) suggested the dimensions of 
reciprocity, trust, mutual legitimacy, openness, mutual satisfaction, and mutual 
understanding as indicators of positive relationships. Ledingham and Bruning (1998), 
however, quantified the dimensions of relationships as trust, openness, involvement, 
investment and commitment. Huang (2001) proposed trust, control mutuality, relational 
commitment, relational satisfaction, and an eastern dimension to relationships, face and 
favor. Hon and Grunig (1999) proposed five dimensions of relationship outcomes: trust, 
control mutuality, commitment, satisfaction, and communal relationship. As these are the 
measures and outcomes that were of concern to this study, the dimensions are discussed 
in greater detail below. 
 Trust. Trust is an important consideration in public relations theory. Trust has 
consistently been a part of efforts to measure relationships (Bruning & Ledingham, 1999; 
Grunig et al., 1992). Huang (2001) suggested that trust between an organization and 
publics can support public relations strategies on conflict resolution, and claimed that two 
way symmetrical communication can help to generate trust in OPR. Hon and Grunig 
(1999) have defined trust as “one party’s level of confidence in and willingness to open 
oneself to the other party” (p. 3). They suggested three dimensions that constitute trust: 
(1) integrity, the belief that an organization is just and fair; (2) dependability, the belief 
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that an organization will do what it says it will do; and (3) competence, the belief that an 
organization has the ability to do what it says it will do (p. 3). Any measures used to assess 
trust should therefore consider all three dimensions. 
 Control mutuality. Control mutuality concerns the extent to which parties agree 
on who has the rightful power to influence one another (Hon & Grunig, 1999). Stafford 
and Canary (1991) have defined control mutuality as “the degree to which partners agree 
about which of them should decide relational goals and behavioral routines” (p. 224). 
Control mutuality is similar to Bruning and Ledingham’s (1999) concept of mutual 
legitimacy, and Ferguson’s (1984) point regarding the distribution of power in a 
relationship. A sense of shared control or power in a relationship is necessary to maintain 
a sense of independence and stability (Stafford & Canary, 1991). While the power 
distribution in a relationship may not be equal—nor is it likely to ever be entirely 
feasible—Grunig (1992) has argued that real equality of power between actors in a 
relationship is not always necessary. Instead, a norm of reciprocity or mutual appreciation 
for control may produce a quality relationship without real equivalent power. As such, it 
is not the distribution of power that determines control mutuality, but the extent to 
which both parties in the relationship feel there is a mutual respect and appreciation for 
the sharing of control.  
 Commitment. Hon and Grunig (1999) defined relational commitment as the 
“extent to which each party believes and feels that the relationship is worth spending 
energy to maintain and promote” (p. 3). They suggested two dimensions of commitment: 
(1) continuance commitment, referring to a certain line of action; and (2), affective 
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commitment, which is an emotional orientation to another entity. Morgan and Hunt 
(1994) have written that relationship commitment can be perceived as “believing that an 
ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at 
maintaining it” (p. 23). Bruning and Ledingham (1999) also included commitment as a 
factor in their OPR scale. Both parties in a relationship having a sense of commitment 
towards one another is thus likely to ensure the continued existence of the association. 
 Satisfaction. Satisfaction has also been widely recognized as an essential part of a 
quality relationship (Ferguson, 1984; Grunig & Huang, 2000; Huang, 2001; Stafford & 
Canary, 2001). Huang (2001) posited that unlike control mutuality and trust, satisfaction 
encompasses affection and emotion for the other in a relationship. As such, Hon and 
Grunig (1999) have defined relational satisfaction as “the extent to which each party feels 
favorably toward the other because positive expectations about the relationship are 
reinforced” (p. 3). Satisfaction also concerns a cost vs. benefit analysis to the relationship. 
A relationship is considered satisfactory if the benefits of remaining in the relationship 
outweigh the costs (Stafford & Canary, 1991). Ferguson (1984) held that the extent to 
which both parties in a relationship were satisfied is of the best measures of public 
relations efficacy in engaging with publics. Stafford and Canary (1991) have concluded 
that relational satisfaction is probably the most important outcome of a successful 
relationship. 
 Communal relationship. Communal relationships can be identified when both 
parties provide benefits to the other due to a mutual concern for the welfare of the other, 
even when they may get nothing in return. Communal relationships can also be defined 
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in contrast to exchange relationships, wherein a party only gives benefits to the other 
because the other has provided benefits in the past, or is expected to do so in the future 
(Hon & Grunig, 1999). 
 Hon and Grunig (1999) suggested that the five aforementioned characteristics 
provide quantifiable evidence of the perceptions publics have regarding relationships. By 
measuring relationships by these dimensions, they surmised, organizations could better 
manage the strategic efforts of public relations in relationship building. They noted, 
however, that their intent was to measure relationship outcomes, not necessarily the quality 
of the relationship itself. Despite this caveat, their relationship scales are conceptually and 
textually similar to those of Huang (2001), whose acknowledged intent was to measure 
the quality of relationships themselves, not relationship outcomes.   
 In many of the conceptualizations of relationships outlined heretofore, there is the 
underlying idea that mutually beneficial, symmetrical, or reciprocal relationships are 
desirable for organizations. A relationship is considered symmetrical or reciprocal when 
both parties are perceived as providing benefit to the other (Hon & Grunig, 1999; 
Huang, 2001). In all of these works, it is thus more or less explicitly recognized that 
quality organization–public relationships are, at both the interpersonal and organizational 
levels, about the exchange of resources (Huang, 2001). In perceiving relationships as the 
exchange of benefits, or resources in their various forms, we are led to conceiving of 
relationships as the mechanisms by which organizations fulfill dependencies and as 
dictating the structural mechanisms through which it interacts with the environment. 
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Relationships and Resource Dependency 
 Broom et al. (1997), in their effort to create a fully explicated definition of 
organization–public relationships, drew upon the resource dependency perspective and 
the interorganizational relationships literature. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) is embedded in the larger construct of systems theory, for both theories 
propone that organizations are inextricably bound up with their environments. From the 
resource dependence perspective, no organization is completely self-contained or self-
sustaining. Key to the survival of an organization is the extent to which they are effective 
in their ability to acquire and maintain resources by establishing linkages with other 
entities in their environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The environment in which an 
organization exists and operates can consequently be viewed “as a network of 
interorganizational relationships” (Huber & Daft, 1987, p. 132) that controls access to 
resources critical to the survival of an organization. As Pfeffer and Salancik have described 
it, “organizations must transact with other elements in their environment to acquire 
needed resources” (p. 2).  
In keeping with the resource dependence perspective, Grunig et al. (1992) noted 
that organizations are faced with a reality of interdependence with their environments, 
writing “organizations have relationships with outside stakeholders—with publics and 
with other organizations—whether they want such relationships or not” (p. 69). 
Accordingly, an important organizational function becomes the management of resource 
dependencies through maintaining organizational linkages or relationships. 
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 Indeed, Broom (1977) suggested that the “the function of public relations is to 
establish and maintain communication linkages between an organization and its public in 
order to maintain mutually beneficial relationships” (p. 111). In this view, managing the 
interdependencies between an organization and its environment is the substance of public 
relations practice. Maintaining quality relationships help the organization manage these 
interdependencies. However, according to Broom et al. (1997), relationships also have 
antecedents and consequences. Broom et al. explained antecedents of relationships as the 
“perceptions, motives, needs, behaviors, and so forth, posited as contingencies or as causes 
in the formation of relationships” (p. 16). The antecedents are the sources of change, 
pressure, or tension resultant from the system or environment within which the 
relationship exists. On the other hand, consequences of relationships are the “outputs that 
have the effects of changing the environment and of achieving, maintaining, or changing 
goal states both inside and outside the organization” (p. 16). The role of communication 
is not found in the antecedents or consequences to relationships, but in the maintenance 
of the relationship itself.  
 Broom et al. (1997) pointed out that a resource dependence perspective is 
necessary to comprehension of the antecedents of relationships, writing “according to 
resource dependency theory, relationships form in response to an organization’s need for 
resources” (p. 91). Moreover, resource dependency helps to explain the consequences of 
relationships, in that “satisfying the need for resources allow an organization to survive, 
grow, and achieve other goals” (p. 91). The relationships, then, between organizations 
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and publics, can be conceived as the “exchange or transfer of information, energy, or 
resources” (p. 94).  
Broom et al. (1997) suggested that we can conceive of relationships, or the 
consequences of relationships, in terms of trust, control mutuality, satisfaction, or any 
other attribute or outcome. The focus on the content of the relationship and how to 
measure it becomes important, because it is thought that relationships constrain or 
enhance the ability of organizations to act (Grunig, 1992). The content of linkages or 
relationships, then, have consequences that affect the organizational outcomes, which 
Broom et al. suggested could include goal achievement, dependency or loss of autonomy, 
and routine and institutionalized behavior.  
 Broom et al. (1997) further equated organization–public relationships with 
organizational linkages, writing “relationships consist of patterns of linkages through 
which the parties in relationships pursue and service their independent needs” (p. 95). 
Public relations researchers have suggested that an organization has several types of 
linkages with stakeholders and publics in the environment (Dozier & Ehling, 1992). 
Dozier and Ehling  (1992) specified that organizations can have enabling linkages with 
regulatory and government agencies, functional linkages that provide needed resource 
inputs such as investors and labor, normative linkages such as professional associates that 
help organizations solve shared problems, and diffused linkages of groups of individuals 
who are not directly part of the organization but may coalesce into an active public or an 
enabling linkage. While Dozier and Ehling’s typology of organizational linkages is specific 
to public relations, Oliver (1990) noted that in a broader sense, interoraganizational 
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relationships are “the relatively enduring transactions, flows, and linkages that occur 
among or between an organization and one or more organizations in its environment” (p. 
241). Any form of transaction, transfer, or exchange can thus represent organizational 
linkages—organizational relationships. 
 Representing organizational relationships as linkages with others entities situated 
in a larger environment has in some ways helped to expand the focus of public relations 
inquiry. Research in public relations has traditionally been concerned with the practice as 
related to business (Holtzhausen, 2000; Karlberg, 1996). As such, much of the work in 
public relations is devoted more to understanding public relations as a functionalist 
practice that serves the interest of business. Functionalist or modernist perspectives on 
public relations focus on communication techniques, and “sees publics and 
communication as mere tools to achieve corporate interest” (Botan & Hazelton, 2006, p. 
7). Indeed, as Pal and Dutta (2008) pointed out, most public relations theory has been 
“developed within the context of public relations as a management function for 
organizations” (p. 162).  
Whereas the functional or dyadic approach to public relations is inherently 
concerned with the improvement of communication efficiencies between a organization 
and a public (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), relationship management and OPR 
indirectly paved the way to a recognition that public relations has the capacity to interact 
with and affect communities and society on a large scale. By shifting the unit of analysis 
to the transitive or fluid state of the relationship, as opposed to the unidirectional 
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communicative message and its effects, relationships can be studied as part of public 
relations theory regardless of their social scale. 
Macro-level Relationships and Society 
 The shift in public relations’ thinking from a micro focus on functional 
communication techniques to a more macro focus on managing organization–public 
relationships coincided with a broadening of the scope of inquiry in the discipline. Thus, 
the relationship management and OPR literature (albeit indirectly) lead to the expansion 
the study of public relations outside of the single organization–public dyad. That said, 
relationship management theory and OPR are still inherently concerned with managing 
communication with individual publics with the goal of producing certain outcomes 
beneficial to the organization—a goal associated with a management or functional 
paradigm of public relations.  
Many relationship quality indicators were developed to predict the likelihood of a 
public to remain satisfied with the organization (Bruning, 2002; Bruning & Ledingham, 
1998) or to measure the idea of relational commitment (Grunig & Huang, 2000). 
Similarly, practitioners of the two-way symmetrical model attempt to understand and 
cooperate with their “relevant” external publics. The symmetrical approach espouses that 
active publics are the only ones that generate consequences for the organization (Dozier & 
Ehling, 1992), and from a dyadic or managerial approach to public relations, this might 
be true.  
 Most studies of OPR have only considered the perception of one party in the 
relationship. For years, public relations research has concentrated on micro level 
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phenomenon, such as a dyadic relationship, while neglecting larger forms of social 
structure or macrophenomena. A focus on the quality of a relationship between two single 
actors, such as an organization and public, does not take a holistic view of the 
environment in which the organization exists, nor does it consider how the quality of the 
relationships among the organization and any number of publics may be affected by 
relationships among the publics themselves. Indeed, Hon and Grunig (1999) 
acknowledged that organizations must build relationships with many actors in the 
environment, and that these actors may themselves have relationships: 
Organizations typically face multiple publics with different interests and 
conflicting goals. These publics often organize into coalitions and organizations 
enter into similar coalitions. Sometimes, an organization and a public form a 
coalition to affect another organization. Or, an organization and a public form a 
coalition to affect another public. Still another possibility is when an organization 
affects another organization-public coalition. And, finally, multiple organizations 
can affect multiple publics. (p. 11) 
While Hon and Grunig (1999) implicitly acknowledged the networks of relationships in 
which an organization is embedded, they did not offer a systematic way to measure those 
relationships outside of the single organization–public dyadic interaction.  
Further, while Grunig and Huang (2000) suggested that conceiving of 
relationships as having antecedents and consequences (listing trust, control mutuality, 
commitment, satisfaction, and goal attainment as outcomes or consequences) expanded 
the focus from “single publics and single organizations to multiple publics and multiple 
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organizations that have consequences on each other” (p. 36), they too offered no 
comprehensive way to understand the consequences of multiple organization–public 
relationships on a focus organization or on a system of relationships as a whole. Extending 
the consequences of the relationship beyond the dyad requires expanding the focus of 
inquiry to how the quality and structure of relationships in a larger system, such as a 
community, nation or society, has an impact on an individual organization.   
 Some scholars have argued for the examination of the role of public relations in 
society. Kruckeberg and Stark (1988) proponed that public relations can be used to help 
recreate a sense of community. Others have positioned organizations as interacting with 
and affected by the public sphere of debate (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010). Drawing on 
resource dependency theory, Heath (2006) has suggested that public relations can add 
value to society through co-creating shared meaning and negotiating relationships among 
social actors to help manage risk and reduce uncertainty for the good of the whole 
community. Public relations and the relationships it builds can thus help to make a 
society more fully functional (Heath, 2006). Similarly, Taylor (2000) has posited that the 
development of relationships among social actors can positively affect social and political 
development. She noted that public relations can play a significant role in building a civil 
society through creating relationships. 
 Taylor and Kent (2006) suggested that if public relations can be used to rebuild 
communities, then it also can be used to help build and rebuild nations. They argued that 
public relations’ focus on relationship building and the quality of those relationships 
could be used in studies that concern the creation and maintenance of a civil society. Civil 
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society describes a “system whereby groups and organizations mediate the relationships 
between citizens and the government” (p. 355). In their view, public relations can be used 
to co-orient relationships and facilitate dialogue between publics and government 
officials. Taylor (2000) argued that public relations helps nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) to maintain a civil society through coordinating relationships with media 
relations techniques. Research in civil society and the organizations that comprise it is 
thus a promising area in which to investigate how relationship structure among a set of 
organizational actors may affect relationship outcomes. The next section more thoroughly 
introduces civil society and explicates how NGOs help to sustain its existence. 
Civil Society and NGOs 
 The previous section of this manuscript has delineated the concepts of 
relationships from a public relations perspective, and suggested that a focus on 
relationships expands the ability of research to consider public relations as a social actor. 
One of the best avenues through which to study the function of relationship building as a 
means to contribute to society is through the lens of civil society theory. This next part of 
the review will thus delineate the construct of civil society not only as constituted by 
organizational actors such as NGOs, but also as a relational construct in and of itself. 
Further, the idea that media play a central role in a thriving and generative civil society is 
introduced.  
 In his analysis of American culture more than 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville 
(1835/2003) observed high levels of participation in voluntary associations—independent 
of the state—by the American citizenry. Such engagement in civic culture struck de 
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Tocqueville as a mainstay of the democratic culture and economic vigor of the young 
American nation. Through Tocqueville and other theorists such as Hegel (1974) and 
Habermas (1981), the concept of civil society entered social theory as a way to describe 
the capacity of a community to organize itself without the direction or intervention of the 
state (Calhoun, 1993; Hauser, 1998). In other words, the people, organizations and 
systems of relationships that comprise civil society exist independently and freely operate 
in a realm outside of government.  
Dating to analyses of the political systems of antiquity, theories of civil society 
have espoused that a successfully functioning democracy requires a set of autonomous 
organizations and institutions that work to check the power of the state and build social 
infrastructure (Gibson, 2001; Hauser, 1998). Civil society is enhanced by the levels of 
individual participation in civic organizations and political engagement (Putnam, 1993). 
Civil society has thus been perceived by many scholars as an essential precondition of 
successful democratization (Badescu & Uslaner, 2003; Calhoun, 1993; Gibson, 2001; 
Hadenius & Uggla, 1996; Taylor, 2000; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003).  
 Succinctly put, civil society can be described as “the realm of organized social life 
that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (Diamond, 1994, p. 4). Civil society 
may encompass a wide variety of organizations, both formal and informal. Diamond 
(1994) suggested that civil society organizations include groups that are: (1) economic 
(commercial associations and networks), (2) cultural (religious, ethnic, or other groups 
that defend collective rights or beliefs), (3) informational and educational (production and 
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dissemination of public knowledge), (4) interest-based (advance the interests of the group’s 
members), (5) developmental (improving the infrastructure or quality of life of a 
community), (6) issue-oriented (activists), and (7) civic (improve the political system 
through human rights monitoring, voter education, anti-corruption, etc.)(p. 6). A list 
such as this may easily be confused with a simple categorization of types of private social 
actors or organizations. However, all of the above organization types are concerned with 
public as opposed to private interests, and as such their role is not just to aggregate and 
represent private interests, but also to “create citizens, to shape consciousness, and to help 
define what is public and political” (Brysk, 2000, p. 153). Given this, civil society is a key 
site for the fomentation of democratic transitions. 
 Taylor (2009), in another work that attempted to codify the types of 
organizations that embody civil society, identified seven organizational partners that 
create the building blocks of civil society: (1) the public, (2) societal institutions (such as 
religious organizations, professional groups, universities, unions, and political parties), (3) 
the media, (4) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social cause/social 
movement groups, (5) the business community, (6) governance, the local, regional, and 
national leaders that participate in policy formation and (7) international organizations. 
Of these organization types, both as defined by Diamond (1994) and Taylor (2009), it is 
NGOs who have perhaps become the most studied in civil society literature. 
 Wiktorowicz (2002) described NGOs as the institutional manifestation of civil 
society due to their efficacy in facilitating “political transformation and the consolidation 
of democracy” (p. 79). NGOs are formal organizations that are almost always related to 
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issues of economic, social or cultural development (Antrobus, 1987; Franz, 1987). Mercer 
(2002) described NGOs as being run by paid staff (often urban professionals or 
expatriates), as relatively large, and as well supported and resourced by domestic or 
international funding. She further noted that when NGOs are a part of civil society, they 
strengthen it through their development activities that support democratic advances. 
According to Mercer, NGOs perform three major functions that abet civil society: (1) 
they pluralize and strengthen the institutional arena by providing a voice for interest 
groups and by performing a “watchdog” role vis-à-vis the state; (2) they work with 
grassroots organizations that are constituted by the poor and marginalized segments of 
society; and (3) they check state power by pressing for change and developing a set of 
alternative policies or perspectives. As civil society is a vital instrument for containing and 
questioning the power of governments, NGOs are thus a “crucial source of democratic 
change” (Diamond, 1994, p. 5).  
 Bratton (1989) argued that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are 
significant players in creating civil society because of their civic and democratic approach. 
The importance of the presence of NGOs in civil society has been reinforced through 
research on the political changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Wiktorowicz (2002) labeled NGOs as “agents of political development” (p. 77) and 
scholars have argued that civil society institutions were influential in democratic 
revolutions of the 1980s in Europe and Latin America (e.g. Badescu & Uslaner, 2003; 
Bernhard, 1996; Brysk, 2000). Others have touted the role of NGOs and civil society in 
development communication in war-torn nations (Kraidy, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Taylor & 
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Doerfel, 2003). However, it is the state of media development, media sustainability, and 
press freedom that are among the best indicators of a thriving civil society (Shaw, 1996). 
Civil Society and Media 
 While the composition of civil society is multifaceted (Hadenious & Uggla, 
1996), according to Shaw (1996), the development of a media system that affords 
communication among groups is “the most critical of all civil society institutions” (p. 13). 
Communication scholars have long positioned media as a primary institution of a liberal 
democracy. Media insures a marketplace of free ideas while acting as a watchdog to hold 
governments accountable (LaPlante & Phenecie, 2010a). Shaw (1996) seemingly placed 
media at the very heart of civil society, suggesting, “The central institutions of civil society 
are those which define the meaning and significance of events, representing social interests 
and articulating widely held viewpoints in relation to them” (p. 13). Media development 
assistance is thus necessary to help foster a successful democracy. 
 The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), has also placed significant value on the development of media to strengthen 
democratic processes. UNESCO has suggested that the extent to which civil society 
organizations exist that actively support media are also an indicator of media 
development. The UNESCO Media Development Indicators (2008) noted that civil 
society organizations are a “vital part of a healthy media ecology, providing both support 
and scrutiny” (p. 53). Civil society organizations help to monitor media content and 
ownership, provide critical analysis of media, promote freedom of expression, and help to 
train journalists and build media capacity, both in terms of expertise and infrastructure. 
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No doubt the existence of independent, nongovernmental organizations that support 
media are an important indication of media development. However, it is the relationships 
among them that may truly demonstrate a civil society that is capable of supporting an 
independent, transparent and accountable media that in turn helps to ensure a stable 
democratic society. 
Civil Society as a Relational Construct 
 While the presence of free media is a key component of civil society (Taylor, 
2000), Renshaw (1994) has argued that civil society is, above all else, a relational 
construct. In her view, civil society is defined by the relationships that exist among the 
actors that comprise civil society, and only when these actors are joined together can they 
become a force for development and democratization. In a similar vein, Hadenius and 
Uggla (1996) understood civil society as groups arranged in networks engaged in 
cooperative behavior aimed at accomplishing common objectives. As such, while 
considerations of the presence of a free and developed media are important, relationships 
between media and NGOs are of significant concern to civil society in terms of producing 
positive outcomes. 
 Relationships or linkages between organizations are recognized to be essential in 
coping with social change, helping with problem solving, and accomplishing shared goals 
or tasks (Brown, 1998). Relationship building is consequently seen as a key component of 
civil society (Taylor, 2000). Taylor (2009) defined civil society as “the process of 
interactions that lead to relationships, build trust and create social capital” (p. 77). 
Renshaw (1994) argued that civil society organizations are merely the “bricks” of civil 
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society. Only when these organizations are joined together in action do they become a 
force for development or change. From this perspective, quality relationships among civil 
organizations with similar goals seems paramount to the efficacy of civil society.  
 Indeed, Hadenius and Uggla (1996) posited that civil society only manifests itself 
when groups are arranged in reasonably fixed social networks, and characterized by 
relationships of affinity and cooperation. When such bonds of established civil 
cooperation are lacking, they surmised, society becomes but a mass of unconnected, 
atomized individuals incapable of accomplishing shared objectives. As an example, 
Renshaw (1994) observed that a lack of collaborative relationships among civil 
organizations contributed to a failing Philippine civil society.  
 Civil society is also known to go through developmental stages of its own before it 
reaches high levels of stability. Giffen, Earle, and Buxton (2006) described three stages of 
the evolution of civil society based on their case study of several nations in central Asia. 
Civil society emerges around issues when there is a growing awareness of problems. The 
first stage of development often coincides with periods of mass political movements and 
by the concurrent emergence of organizations that act as pressure groups focused on these 
issues (Giffen et al., 2006). The second stage is heralded by the arrival of international 
donor agencies interested in the promotion of civil society sustainability and democratic 
ideals. Along with these donors come grants, training, and discussions with international 
organizations about how to become self-sustaining. However, in order to accommodate 
the interests of donors, many NGOs adjust their missions or programs based on donor 
expectations. NGOs may begin to lose their relationships with other similarly minded 
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groups when they must shift their focus to retain funding, and break up preexisting 
networks of cooperation (Taylor & Doerfel, 2011). A certain level of independence and 
maturity on the part of NGOs characterizes the third stage of development. They become 
able to undertake advocacy and lobbying roles and interact with the state. NGOs thus 
progress from disorganized, fluid, or life-world organizations to professionalized 
institutions with the capacity to function efficaciously with reduced donor support. 
Drabek (1987) wrote that when civil society organizations work together their 
relationship networks can “be a valuable tool for strengthening the NGO movement . . . 
[and that] increasing exchange of experience and expertise will have great benefits” (p. 
xiv). However, the intensity of relational exchanges may depend on the stage of evolution 
in which a particular civil society community inhabits. For example, Doerfel and Taylor 
(2004) expected that the strength and density of the relationship network among civil 
society groups in Croatia would actually decrease from their initial study of the civil 
society there (Taylor & Doerfel, 2003) as the tumultuous times of the first measurement 
required more cooperation. They suspected, however, that these civil society groups 
would retain their relationships at the second measurement for required information and 
potential future collaboration. When relationship networks facilitate cooperation and 
provide a mutual benefit, such networks are thought to be evidence of social capital.  
Social Capital  
 In the second major section of this review, the construct of civil society was 
explained, and the roles that NGOs, media and relationships play in civil society’s efficacy 
were detailed. The discussion presented the idea that the relationships in which civil 
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society actors engage provide them with social capital, or the ability to accomplish that 
which would be more difficult without such relationships. In continuation of that 
thought, this next section further interrogates social capital as a relational construct both 
for civil society and for public relations theory. Different perspectives and approaches to 
research in social capital are outlined, and common measures by which social capital is 
gauged are explicated. Finally, the idea that social capital should be studied via 
consideration of networks is introduced, leading to the next major section of the literature 
review.  
 In an efficacious civil society, civic organizations such as NGOs must not be 
isolated or atomized. Their networks of association and support must be well developed 
so that they may accomplish their work with less physical capital. Most forms or work are 
more easily accomplished with the support of others. In other words, NGOs, and civil 
society in general, should be engaged in networks of cooperation to deal with problems 
too large or complex for a single organization to accomplish alone (Brown & Ashman, 
1996). A civil society thus requires social capital.  
 Social capital is distinct from, but related to, other forms of capital, such as 
financial, physical, or interpersonal capital (Ihlen, 2005). While these forms of capital 
contribute to the ability for one to acquire goods and advance one’s status and personal 
welfare, social capital has the ability to contribute to one’s welfare through social relations. 
According to Putnam (1994), social capital refers to:  
the collective value of all social networks and the inclinations that arise from these 
networks to do things for each other. . . . social capital refers to features of social 
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organizations such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit. (pp. 664–665)  
Like Putnam and Bourdieu, Coleman (1988) has interpreted social capital as a group level 
phenomenon that is located in the “structure of relations between actors . . . it is not 
lodged in the actors themselves” (p. 98). The benefits that emerge from these structural 
relationships are not necessarily limited to those who participate in the network. Social 
capital produces returns for network members and the community in which it resides. 
“Social capital makes us smarter, healthier, safer, richer, and better able to govern a just 
and stable democracy” (Putnam, 2000, p. 290). 
 From a public relations perspective, scholars such as Ihlen (2005) have noted that 
as public relations theory has become more relationship-centered, the number and quality 
of relationships an organization possesses should be considered as the total social capital of 
organizations. As relationships provide organizations with resources, support, and 
credibility (Dozier & Ehling, 1992), they are, in essence, the social capital of the 
organization. Found within these relationships are the sum of resources, both tangible and 
intangible, an organization can bring to bear when it attempts to act. As linkages with 
other actors can provide powerful resources from which to drawn upon, relationships thus 
have short-term and long-term consequences for organizations (Ihlen, 2005). It is the 
responsibility of public relations to maintain these relationships so that social capital is 
preserved. Indeed, as Kennan and Hazleton (2006) have noted: “public relations 
practitioners are those with the capacity to cultivate, maintain and expend social capital 
on behalf of their organization” (p. 325). Fostering social capital is the purview of public 
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relations because the function is best positioned within the organization to interact and 
exchange with the environment—exchanges that are comprised by resources, knowledge 
and coordination of activities.  
 At the very center of the social capital perspective is the question of activity 
coordination. High levels of social capital in the form of networks of association, mutual 
trust, and norms of reciprocity, provide the institutional context for cooperation and 
solving collective problems (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993). In contrast, low levels of 
social capital are associated with a Hobbesian state of nature, characterized by 
competition, and where problems are resolved through struggles or a centralized authority 
(Brown, 1998; Newton, 1997). Social capital encourages productivity, fosters cooperation 
and provides a framework to achieve social, political and economic goals that in its 
absence would not be possible. There are, however a range of differing perspectives on the 
nature, causes and consequences of social capital and how it is to be analyzed.  
Perspectives on Social Capital 
 Social capital has been conceptualized and studied from many different 
perspectives. Kennan and Hazelton (2006) have warned that the clarity of social capital as 
a perspective and research tool is limited by “gaps in treatment, method, and theoretical 
development” (p. 321). Social scientists have offered many definitions of social capital, 
and while the general thrust of these definitions is conceptually similar, there are some 
ontological and directional differences in terms of where the locus of social capital resides.  
 Adler and Kwon (2002) proposed three general views of what social capital is, or 
where the locus of social capital resides. Bordieu and Wacquant (1992), for instance take 
	   29 
an external view of social capital by defining it as “the sum of the resources, actual or 
virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network 
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (p. 
119). This focus on external relations has been called “bridging” social capital, and views 
social capital as a resource that is inherent in a social network that ties one actor to 
another (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
 Secondly, and in contrast, Brehm and Rahn (1997) defined social capital as “the 
web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitate resolution of collective 
action problems” (p. 999). In this internal or “bonding” view of social capital, the focus is 
not so much on the external ties of a group of actors, but on the internal structure of the 
group, the “features that give the collectivity cohesiveness and thereby facilitate the 
pursuit of collective goals” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 21). This perspective differs from 
“bridging” social capital in that social capital not only provides benefit to individuals via 
bridges to other actors, but considers social capital as a group outcome that abets 
successful collective action, bonding individuals together to accomplish that which could 
not be accomplished alone. 
 Finally, there are views that combine the two perspectives, and do not view 
internal and external capital as mutually exclusive, as evidenced in the definition of social 
capital as: 
The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual 
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or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that 
may be mobilized through that network. (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243)  
This perspective does not view social capital as exclusive either to the individual or the 
collectivity, but as a resource and benefit to both. 
 Providing another system of categorization for social capital, Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer (2002) noted there are two broad forms of social capital: structural and 
cognitive. Structural social capital refers to the tangible or visible social structures such as 
networks, associations and institutions. On the other hand, cognitive social capital is 
consisted of intangible elements such as trust, norms of behavior and reciprocity. They 
note that while the two forms of social capital are mutually reinforcing, one may exist 
without the other. 
 While there are differing views about the constitution of social capital, there are 
also a number of approaches to the measurement of social capital. Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000) suggested three major perspectives by which social capital has been assessed and 
measured. The first is a communitarian perspective that equates social capital with the 
sheer number of voluntary associations, clubs, or civil groups such as NGOs. This 
perspective has also been described as a communitarian or institutional approach to social 
capital by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002). The institutional view espouses that the 
existence of formal legal, political and nonprofit organizations in the environment are the 
main determinants of the ability of social groups to act. Indeed, some scholars have 
argued that the mere presence of NGOs reflects the levels of social capital in a civil society 
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because they often emerge from informal associations that were organized to respond to 
collective problems (Brown, 1998).  
 Similar to Adler and Kwon’s (1998) bridging and bonding social capital and 
Grootaert and van Bastelaer’s (2002) networks view of social capital, Woolcock and 
Narayan’s (2000) second perspective stresses that the kinds of associations between 
entities provide higher or lower levels of social capital. This perspective builds on 
Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) strength of weak ties theory. The theory suggests that while 
strong intracommunity ties can provide support, without weak ties to external entities 
across social divides, strong ties can insulate from outside resources and support. The 
perspective draws attention to the benefits that social capital can provide to members of a 
community. However, it also points out that exclusion from a community or networks of 
interaction can have detrimental effects on nonmembers (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 
2002).  
 Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) also note that social capital may also be 
distinguished by its scope of unit of analysis. Social capital is a macro, meso, and micro 
level construct, in terms of level of analysis and effects. At a macro or societal level, high 
levels of social capital have been found to be associated with more effective government, 
economic development, and higher levels of citizen well being (Putnam, 1993; Raiser, 
2008). Observing the institutional and political environment serves as the social backdrop 
for the other levels of social capital. The meso level of analysis looks at horizontal or 
vertical relationships among groups—a level situated somewhere between individuals and 
society as a whole. At the meso or organizational level, high levels of social capital reduces 
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organizational turnover (Dess & Shaw, 2001), helps to mange uncertainty and ambiguity 
(Chung & Gibbons, 1997), and improves an organization’s ability to act (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Finally, social capital can be observed in the form of interpersonal 
networks and the values that underlie those networks. At this micro level, social capital 
has been shown to influence career success (Burt, 1992) and helps individuals to find jobs 
(Granovetter, 1973).  
 The many similarities and conceptual overlaps between the sets of definitions and 
concepts in the previous discussion underscore the unique multidisciplinary aspects of 
social capital research. Yet, unanswered in all of these definitions and in all previously 
discussed levels of analysis is: what exactly is social capital and how can it be measured? 
Common “Measures” of Social Capital 
 A common criticism of social capital is how exactly it is to be measured. Finding a 
single measure of social capital is not possible. This problem arises from the differing 
perspectives on social capital: whether it is to be viewed by the number of resources 
possessed by an actor, by an actor’s relationship network, or by the structure of society as 
a whole. Different definitions of social capital lead to differing strategies for measuring its 
presence or effects. The following sections discuss common measures or outcomes of 
social capital as relevant to NGOs and the maintenance of civil society at the meso level 
analysis, as it is at this level this study intends to examine social capital in civil society.   
 Trust. As Simmel (1950) wrote, trust is “one of the most important synthetic 
forces within society” (p. 326). Unsurprisingly, then, trust has proven to be a reliable 
measure or indicator of social capital over time and across the world (Halpern, 2005). 
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Trust is a precondition of any form of behavior (Rossteutscher, 2008). Without trust 
there are low levels of civic engagement (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Thus, trust as a social 
norm is essential to reciprocity and social support—trust begets trust.  This suggests that 
generalized reciprocity involves risk and uncertainty; such risks are deemed acceptable 
based on the premise that others will not let us down. Consequently, a group that has 
high levels of trust embedded within its network is able to accomplish much more than a 
comparable group without such trust (Coleman, 1988). Trust can thus be conceived of as 
a precondition for social capital and as its outcome. 
 Fukuyama (1995) has claimed that trust is at very basis of social order, writing 
that “communities depend on mutual trust and will not arise spontaneously without it” 
(p. 70). Indeed, some authors have equated social capital with trust—or at least as a 
precondition for social capital. Fukuyama wrote “social capital is a capability that arises 
from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 
26). Coleman (1988) saw trust as but a form of social capital, resulting from positive 
relations. Regardless of the specific relationship trust takes with social capital, trust has 
been employed as a component or an indicator of social capital in many studies (i.e. 
Fukuyama, 1995; Kawachi, Kennedy, & Glass, 1999; Lochner, Kawachi, & Kennedy, 
1999). 
  The mass media may also be of importance to the generation of abstract trust in 
society and in government (Newton, 1997). Trust is of crucial importance to civil society 
and democracy, particularly in environments emerging from dramatic social change and 
in emerging democracies (Rose, 1994; Sztompka, 1996). Some scholars have discussed 
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the capacity of media to integrate society, increase levels of political knowledge and 
competence (e.g. Dalton, 1988; Inglehart, 1990; Sartori, 1989).  
In contrast, Putnam (1994) has argued that while mass media can enlighten, it 
can also induce fear, apathy, isolation and political ignorance. Indeed, as Tsetsura and 
Luoma-aho (2010) have noted, in countries where high levels of generalized social trust 
do not exist “the nature of journalism becomes distorted” (p. 2). They further implied 
that societies with poorly functioning social institutions, such as government and media, 
are more likely to have lower levels of generalized trust. That said, the ideal role for media 
in environments characterized by long periods of distrust in government and in others is 
to help restore the ability of individuals to trust one another, their representative 
institutions, democratic processes, and government (Rose, 1994).  
 Trust is thus a key resource to democratic politics and civil society. Levels of social 
trust appear to help stabilize governments, no matter what form (Rossteutscher, 2008). 
However, levels of generalized social trust—generally thought of as confidence in 
strangers—are lower in transitional states because there is less tolerance for others and a 
greater perception of corruption (Badescu & Uslaner, 2003). Indeed, trust in government 
can help to generate trust in people: “the trustworthiness of the state influences its 
capacity to generate interpersonal trust” (Levi, 1998, p. 87). Conversely, low levels of 
interpersonal trust reduce levels of civic participation that might affect democratization. 
Iglic (2003) has written that a lack of trust in Eastern European societies was the main 
obstacle to mass democratic resistance of authoritarian and communist regimes. In sum, 
general social trust in people, government, and public officials are “integral components 
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of social capital directly linked to its beneficial impact on participation and civic 
engagement and democracy in general" (Foley & Edwards, 1998, p. 13). Trust is said to 
make cooperation between actors possible.  
 Cooperation and conflict. In addition to trust, cooperation is one of the central 
positive manifestations of social capital. Cooperation, however, is generally manifested in 
receiving support to accomplish individual initiatives or to solve collective problems. 
Several definitions of social capital are associated with receiving support from other actors 
to accomplish goals (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 1994). Support is often a passive 
result of being within a network of individuals or organizations with similar functions or 
goals. Portes (1998) noted that workers who are in a common situation will learn to 
identify with one another and support each other’s initiatives. Scholars such as Coleman 
(1988) and McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) focused on the role of family support, 
noting that single parent families are not able to provide the same levels of support as 
two-parent families. Social capital promotes more effective cooperation and social 
problem solving at the interpersonal and interorganizational levels (Tendler & Freedheim, 
1994; Waddock, 1993).  
 High levels of social capital may support the cooperation between the state and 
civil society (Woolcock, 1998), helping to forge a path for development. Similarly, 
cooperation is thought to be a central issue for the efficacy of NGOs. NGOs play a role in 
fostering cooperation among unequally powerful parties in solving social problems 
(Brown, 1998). There can, however, be problems in establishing cooperative relationships 
among NGOs, given the competition for scarce resources and funding that exist in the 
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non-profit sector (Doerfel & Taylor, 2004). Doerfel and Taylor (2004) noted that while 
the ideal civil society is comprised by cooperative relationships, the practical 
considerations of NGOs may undermine truly collaborative relationships. Framing their 
study of relationships among NGOs in Croatia from a resource dependency approach 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), Doerfel and Taylor suggested that organizations that are more 
dependent on others for resources will be more cooperative.  
 Collaborative relationships between NGOs (or any entity) is, normatively 
speaking, thought to provide an actor with access to social capital. However, it is thought 
that network structure is a vehicle for inducing cooperation through the development of 
social capital (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). Cooperation requires some degree of 
mutual influence (Brown & Ashman, 1996). Cooperation is merely a “benefit” that arises 
from particular combinations of social relationships (Woolcock, 1998).  
 Information exchange. Coleman (1988) noted that information is essential to 
action but it difficult to gather. However, one’s social relations, often established for 
purposes other than information exchange, constitute channels by which information can 
be gained (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Indeed, one of the central themes of social capital 
can be described as “who you know affects what you know.” New knowledge creation 
often results from social interaction and coactivity. Relationships provide the channels for 
information transmission, although such information may vary in timing and value. 
 Network research has demonstrated that relationships have provided actors the 
social capital to acquire a number of different kinds of information. Granovetter (1973) 
famously demonstrated that network members could gain privileged access to information 
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about job opportunities. Podolny and Page (1998) showed that interorganizational 
networks help firms acquire new knowledge. Actors may also “broker” information 
between other actors, giving them a good deal of power and influence within a network 
(Burt, 1992).  
 Meyer (1997) has noted that NGOs exchange information to strengthen each 
other’s ability to act. Indeed, Meyer further suggested that much of the activity of NGOs 
involves the production and sharing of knowledge. Information exchange between NGOs 
is particularly valuable before undertaking a shared action, and to strengthening technical 
and organizational skills (Drabek, 1987; Meyer, 1997). Taylor and Doerfel (2003) 
suggested NGOs that hold similar goals should share information and other resources to 
help cope with ambiguity, particularly in transitional nations. And while NGOs as non-
profit organizations do compete for donor funds, which may result in isolationism (Clark, 
1995; Doerfel & Taylor, 2003), NGOs have more reasons to share information with 
other NGOs than do profit-seeking organizations (Meyer, 1997). However, as with 
cooperation, networks and network structures influence the range of information that 
may be accessed by an actor. Therefore, measurements of cooperation, information 
exchange and of social capital in general should also come from assessments of the 
network structure of a set of actors. 
 Networks. A central proposition of social capital theory is that networks of 
relationships constitute a valuable resource for the conduct of social affairs (Putnam, 
1993). Social capital interprets networks of relationships and the resources they provide 
access to as social resources. The analysis of social capital is thus inherently tied to the 
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structure and quality of relationships among social actors. As such, one of the most 
common ways in which social capital is studied is through social network analysis (Lin, 
1999).  
Social Network Analysis 
 The previous sections have interrogated civil society and social capital. Both were 
discussed in terms of their dependencies upon relationships to succeed. While previous 
research in public relations has established the means by which to examine relationships 
between a single organization–public dyad, it has not yet considered how to assess the 
existence, structure and consequences of relationships among many actors in a networked 
environment and how such networks may affect an individual organization. As such, this 
section introduces social network analysis as a theoretical perspective and method for 
research of relationships in public relations. The section briefly relays the theoretical 
origins of social network analysis, its relevance to public relations research and theory 
development, and explains several basic principles for those unfamiliar with the approach. 
 The study of the structure of interaction among social actors is known as social 
network analysis. Social network analysis (SNA) provides both a theoretical and 
methodological paradigm for examining complex social structures and their activity (Van 
der Hulst, 2009). The key feature that distinguishes SNA from other theoretical and 
methodological approaches is that it focuses on structural relations, the patterns of 
relationships that exist among any kind of social entity in a system and the implications of 
those relationships for the system as a whole (Freeman, 2004). Instead of measuring and 
testing individual behaviors or beliefs, SNA examines the interaction between social 
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entities and how these interactions comprise a framework or structure that can be 
analyzed in its own right (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). A SNA approach to research 
examines both the content and pattern of relationships in order to identify the impact of 
these relationship to the functioning of individual actors and the entire network.  
 The conceptual and theoretical roots of SNA can be traced back to structural 
traditions in a variety of literatures (Freeman, 2004). August Comte proposed dynamics, 
or the laws of social interconnection as main aspect of sociology, suggesting that certain 
parts of a social system are connected (Coser, 2003). Tönnies (1887/2002) put forward 
the idea that the nature of linkages between individuals can distinguish social groups. He 
classified two kinds of social systems: (1) a community based system with linkages of 
individuals who shared personal ties and belief systems (gemeinschaft), and (2) a societal or 
a system of individual links that are formal and instrumental (geschellschaft). However, 
early social network methodologists such as Kurt Lewin would find inspiration in the 
Gestalt traditions, stressing the importance of internal and external forces on behavior, 
while Jacob Moreno’s (1934) drew from sociometric techniques, and espoused that the 
ways in which people interacted with others are opportunities for action (Freeman, 2004). 
Other social scientists would go on to use the metaphor of the social network to indicate 
complex sets of relationships (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown, 1940; Simmel, 1922/1955). And 
while the perspective and methods used in SNA are relatively “new” to social scientific 
research, Hummon and Carley (1993) have declared network analysis to be “normal” 
science in the sense described by Thomas Kuhn (1962). In other words, network analysis 
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is an accepted research method applied in the effort to answer questions typical to the 
discipline in which it is used. 
 Knoke and Yang (2008) put forward that the importance of SNA to social 
scientific research rests on three principles. First, they commented that structural 
relationships are often more important for understanding behavior than are observable 
variables such as age, gender or socio-economic status. Network analysis strives to 
understand how structural properties affect behavior beyond the effects of personal 
attributes (Wellman, 1983). Second, networks are presumed to influence perceptions, 
beliefs and actions through a variety of structural mechanisms that have been constructed 
by relationships among entities. Unlike in “standard” social science perspectives, in SNA 
the actors are viewed as interdependent rather than independent units, whose 
interdependencies can provide benefits or hindrances based on the nature of the 
connection (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The third underlying 
assumption of SNA is that structural relationships should be viewed as dynamic processes. 
SNA recognizes that the quality and structure of a relationship network is not static, and 
that as relationships change, so too does the ability of a network to provide opportunities 
or constraints on individual action (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
 Network analysis is particularly useful for the study of relationships among 
organizations. Indeed, Nohria (1992) noted that ever since organizations were recognized 
to be open systems—largely due to the influence of resource dependency theory—the 
significance of the role the environment plays in shaping organizational activities has 
become critical to theory. Thus, it is crucial for organizational studies to study the 
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relationships that exist within an organization’s environment. As Barley, Freeman and 
Hybels (1992) wrote:  
Not only are organizations suspended in multiple, complex, and overlapping webs 
of relationships, the webs are likely to exhibit structural patterns that are invisible 
from the standpoint of a single organization caught in the tangle. To detect 
overarching structures, one has to rise above the individual firm and analyze the 
system as a whole. (p. 312) 
Through such descriptions of the perspective and function of network analysis, it 
becomes clearer how useful the perspective may be for the study of organizational 
relationships in public relations.  
 There is a need in public relations for innovative and advanced research tools that 
improve the quality of research on organization–public relationships. Social network 
analysis is a tool that can help to systematically uncover how the quality and structure of 
relationships abets individual organizational efficacy and the relational vitality of a whole 
network. If we are to extend theories of relationships in public relations, the discipline 
must move beyond a focus on the organization–public dyad and return to an appreciation 
for a resource dependency approach, one that recognizes an organization has linkages with 
and is embedded in its environment and is affected by the condition of relationships 
among other social actors. An understanding of the principles of SNA and how they may 
be applied to public relations research would thus be of significant heuristic value to 
theory advancement in the discipline. 
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Some Basic Principles of SNA 
 Actors. A social network is comprised of discrete actors or nodes that are tied by a 
set of specific relations between them. Actors in SNA may be individual persons or 
collectivities such as groups, organizations, or even nation-states. As such, use of the term 
“actor” does not necessarily imply agency. The level of analysis of SNA is largely 
determined by the type of actor being studied (e.g. individuals, organizations, nations). 
Most social network research will examine actors of the same general type, known as one-
mode networks. However, networks between actors of conceptually different types or levels 
can also be examined (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Measurements of an actor’s attributes, 
such as age, sex, occupation, and resources can be recorded.  
 Ties. Relational ties are a form of connection between two actors that indicates an 
activity, bonding or exchange. Ties can cover the sharing, delivery, or exchange of a wide 
variety of resources, Thus, relational ties can be characterized by their content. Ties can be 
defined by any specific kind of contact or connection. The kinds of ties to be considered 
in SNA are to be determined by the nature of the research, but might include resources 
such as information, social support, cooperation, money, or advice. Other forms of ties 
could include a physical connection, association or affiliation or personal evaluations 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
  An enormous variety of relationships occur among individuals or organizations 
that could prove to be relevant for study. Analysis of relational ties can uncover 
dimensions of complex social interactions that cannot be analyzed simply by looking an 
actor’s attributes. Hall and Wellman (1985) noted that the information, resources or 
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support measured in a relational tie can vary in quality (e.g. whether the relationship 
provides support or certain resources, quantity (e.g. how much support or resources the 
relationship provides), and multiplexity (whether it provides only support or both support 
and resources), and symmetry (whether both actors provide support and resources to each 
other).  
 Relational ties may be one-way or unidirectional, wherein one actor provides 
resources or performs some other transaction that is not reciprocated by the receiving 
node. Ties may also be nondirected, reciprocal, or symmetrical, where mutuality of 
exchange occurs (Knoke & Yang, 2008). As in public relations approaches to relationship 
measurement (Hon & Grunig, 1998; Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), mutual or reciprocal 
ties are generally viewed to be evidence of stronger relationships (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994).  However, network analysis stresses the influence of relationships outside of the 
dyad and how such relationships may affect the nature of dyadic interactions. 
 Network analysis also takes into consideration the absent, as well as the present 
relational ties. Examination of the characteristics of relational ties thus provides 
researchers with a mechanism by which to assess the quality of relationships that exist 
among a set of actors. In studying actors and the set of relationships among them, 
network analysts can explore relational properties of networks, such as how cohesive the 
group is or what subgroups of interconnected actors exist, and positional properties, such 
as who occupies what positions in a network (Haythornthwaite, 1996). 
 Boundary specification. One of the most common problems facing SNA 
researchers is that of boundary specification, or who is to be included in the network. In 
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the case of a small set of actors, such as a workplace, the boundary of who is to be 
included in the network may be readily apparent. However, in larger-scale studies there is 
frequently no clear boundary of a network that helps a researcher decide which actors 
should be included in it (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This is of special concern to 
network analysis as the method focuses on the interdependencies among the units 
studied. Omission of certain actors or an unclear boundary specification can adversely 
affect results (Marsden, 1990). 
 There are several approaches to setting a network boundary. Lauman, Marsden, 
and Presenky (1989) detailed the realist and nominalist strategies. In the realist strategy, 
the network is based on the perceptions of the system actors themselves. As Laumann et 
al. (1989) related, “the network is treated as a social fact on in that it is consciously 
experienced as such by the actors composing it” (p. 65). For example, Laumann and 
Pappi (1973) asked community leaders to identify elite and influential leaders. In this 
approach, actors are only included in the network to the extent that other actors deem 
them to be relevant. The second approach, called the nominalist approach, is based on the 
concerns of the researcher, using an a priori framework or collection of actors determined 
to be relevant to the study. Delineation of network boundaries is done for the purposes of 
the researcher, with no intent that reality will naturally conform to the boundary specified 
by the researcher (Laumann et al., 1989). 
In keeping with the realist approach, Knoke and Yang (2008) discussed a 
reputational method wherein researchers ask knowledgeable informants to nominate a set 
of actors for study. However, such method relies heavily on the ability of key informants 
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to provide accurate and complete information. A way in which this limitation can be 
compensated for is to use a snowball sampling technique, beginning with a set of 
informants or network actors, who are asked to nominate other network members. This 
continues until few or no new names surface (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994).   
 Centrality and prestige. If SNA is the study of complex social structures through 
networks (Van der Hulst, 2009), one of the primary uses of SNA is to determine the 
“most important” actors in the social structure (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Network 
positions of prestige and centrality are structural positions of certain actors relative to the 
positions of the other actors in a network and the relationships among them. Measures of 
centrality and prestige quantify an actor’s prominence by summarizing all of the structural 
relationships between nodes (Knoke & Yang, 2008). An actor is high in centrality if it is 
extensively involved in relationships with other actors, regardless if it sends or receives ties. 
An actor is considered to be more prominent if it initiates few relationships but receives 
many directed ties (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
 Degree centrality is the extent to which an actor is connected to all other actors in a 
network. An actor may have high in-degree centrality when it is the recipient of ties from 
others, or out-degree centrality when it is the initiator of ties. An actor with a high degree 
centrality level is “where the action is” in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Freeman (1979) decribed actors with high degree centrality as being in the thick of 
things, while those with low levels are likely to be peripheral to communication processes 
in the network. 
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Betweeness centrality concerns how other actors can control or mediate between 
actors that are not directly connected. Betweeness centrality is an important indicator of 
the control over information exchange or the flow of resources (Knoke & Yang; 2008). 
Actors with high betweeness centrality are “in a position to act as a gatekeeper for 
information that flows through a network” (Krackhardt, 1992, p. 223). 
 Centrality has been found to be beneficial to many types of actors or to indicate 
their influence in a variety of arenas. Galaskiewicz (1979) found that the more central the 
organization, the greater its reputation for influence in community affairs or in a 
functional area. Taylor and Deorfel (2003) found that the most central NGOs in Bosnian 
civil society were those that communicate most frequently or provide resources to others. 
Moreover, centrality has been shown to indicate those NGOs who are better positioned 
to oversee the flow of information or coordinate activities (Moore, Eng, & Daniel, 2003). 
 Density and structural holes. Coleman (1988) proponed that a dense network—
one wherein all actors are connected to each other—is a source of social capital. A dense 
network is one wherein the opportunity for sharing resources and information is 
maximized. Taylor and Doerfel (2003) found that the density of the network of Croatian 
civil society organizations was moderately dense at 43 percent indicating a reasonably 
well-connected network of relationships. Scholars such as Burt (1992) and Kauffman 
(1993) have suggested that moderately dense networks are preferably to highly dense 
networks, wherein there is a redundancy of contacts and few structural holes to fill. 
Further, organizations can experience beneficial opportunities because of the nature of 
their ties, and also of their position in a network. Burt (1992) suggested that actors 
	   47 
positioned between dense parts of the network represent structural holes. These holes 
represent opportunities for brokering information flows among other actors.  
The previous few paragraphs have described several key concepts in social network 
research. Each of these concepts was applied in the methodological approach to the study 
that will be presented shortly. However, given the variety of perspectives and concepts 
discussed in this review, a brief summary of the approach this dissertation study will take 
follows. 
Summary of Dissertation Approach 
 The approach to the study of the arrangement of actors in civil society is both 
structural and cognitive (cf. Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). That is, the study looked 
for the existence of civil society actors aimed at media development as well as assessed the 
nature of relationships among them. The study also adopted a meso to macro level 
approach to measuring social capital, focusing on the position of individual actors in a 
network of relations, and the consequences of network structure for groups. In other 
words, the study looked to determine if the quality of relationships determined the 
structural positions of network actors. The study also, to an extent, considers quality 
relationships, as measured via Hon and Grunig’s (1999) relationship scales, as akin to 
social capital, although the study also chose to measure levels of social support. This 
perspective on social capital, and in turn, network analysis, did not view bridging or 
bonding social capital as mutually exclusive. Instead, it adopted a dual approach, such as 
that espoused by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), and treated social capital both as the 
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result of internal relationships for individual actors as well as the network structure as a 
whole. 
  As Taylor and Doerfel (2003) have described, one of the best places to study the 
process of relationship building in civil-society efforts is in a context that involves 
conditions of cooperation, influence, importance, various communication partners, and 
competition for scarce resources. The nation of Peru was selected for this study of civil 
society because the nation has recently emerged from a series of crises that have shaken 
the public trust in government, media, and the ability of NGOs to operate freely. The 
next section provides an overview of the case of Peru. 
Background on Peru 
 The Republic of Peru sits on the Western coast of South American and is 
bounded by both the Andean mountain range and the Amazon rainforest. With a 
geographic area three times the size of California, many areas of the country remain 
without adequate transportation or essential services. Population density in Peru is low, 
but 7.5 million inhabitants (out of a total population of 29 million) are concentrated in 
the capital city of Lima (World Bank, 2009). This is the result of a phenomenon of mass 
migration from the mountain and highland areas to the capital, in part due to the 
violence in rural areas during the last few decades. The poverty level in the nation is high 
at 54.1% of the population, with most of the poor living in the rural, mountainous or 
highlands regions (European Union External Action, 2007).  
 The country has a long record of political instability and unrest. In recent history, 
the people of Peru have undergone several military coups, a government that has 
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fluctuated from democracy, to dictatorship, to autocracy and back again, as well as 
experiencing violence from guerilla groups. Yet, as the main focus of this discussion has 
been the assessment of civil society, social capital, NGOs, and media—the vitality of the 
former largely dependent on the latter—the background information on Peru presented 
below will largely be focused on the development and state of media in Peru.  
The Press in Peru, 1968 to 1990 
 Peru declared its independence from the Spanish monarchy in 1821 and 
maintained a representative democracy until 1968 (Anna, 1979). In 1968, the leader of 
the Peruvian armed forces, General Juan Velasco Alvarado led a coup against president 
Fernando Belaúnde and established state control over the economic and media 
institutions of Peru (Saba, 1987). However, Velasco was forcibly replaced as president by 
General Francisco Morales Bemúdez in 1975. The Bemúdez government proved less 
authoritarian than its predecessor, and in 1978 called for a constitutional assembly to 
draft a new constitution by freely elected delegates. Free elections and adoption of a new 
constitution occurred in 1980 (Saba, 1987). Ferdanando Belaúnde won back the 
presidency in the 1980 election and remained in office until 1985. 
 Before the 1968 coup lead by General Velasco, the Peruvian newspaper sector was 
comprised by a select few families that would use them to propagate their political and 
economic interests (Conaghan, 2005). During the coup, the military government seized 
shares of stock in radio and television stations, and forced journalists to “tow the official 
line” (Conaghan, 2005, p. 21). The Peruvian press was under strict government control 
during the military rule from 1968 to 1980. There were severe penalties for criticizing 
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government officials, and many newspapers were forced to publish government reports. 
However, with the return of Belaúnde to the presidency, media systems were returned to 
their former owners. With this restoration of private control came a rapid growth in 
media, particularly in television stations (Conaghan, 2005; LaPlante & Phenecie, 2010a). 
 However, the 1980s would see political, economic and social crises for Peru and 
its media. Government was perceived as corrupt, and mismanagement was assumed to 
have lead to hyperinflation and negative growth. In the 1980s, the economy of Peru saw a 
steep decline in GDP, increasing unemployment, and wages falling to their 1970 levels. 
Nearly 70 percent of the nation was thought to be living in conditions of poverty, with 
one-third living in extreme poverty (Graham, 1994). At the same time, the communist 
party of Peru (frequently cast as a guerilla movement) known as the Shining Path came 
into conflict with the Peruvian military—a clash that would bring about the death of tens 
of thousands of Peruvians before the capture of the movement’s leader in 1992 (Graham, 
1994; McMillan & Zoido, 2004). The Peruvian press also lived in fear of the Shining 
Path, and were subject to attack across the country (Rocha, 2007). Indeed, eight 
journalists who were investigating the actions of the Shining Path in the region of 
Ayacucho in were brutally murdered in the 1980s (LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010b). 
Everyday violence and the precipitous collapse of the economic system had shaken the 
confidence of the average Peruvian in the ability of government to provide for and protect 
the people. 
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Fujimori and “Hybrid Authoritarianism” 
 In 1990, Alberto Fujimori, a relatively unknown political outsider, was elected to 
the presidency.  Fujimori assumed office during a period of intense turmoil for Peru. The 
country was in a state of political, economic and social chaos. Fujimori’s first election as 
president has been attributed to his capitalization on the populace’s general disgust with 
existing political parties and politicians (Youngers, 2000). The election of Fujimori was 
seen as a profound transformation of the political landscape in Peru. Fujimori represented 
Peruvian’s frustration with the existing political system (Graham, 1994).  
In 1992 Fujimori launched a coup against his own government, suspending the 
nation’s constitution, closing congress, dissolving the judiciary, and arresting members of 
the media—an act that would come to be known as autogolpe, or “self-coup.” A 
subsequent referendum in 1993 considerably broadened the authority of the executive, 
giving Fujimori significant freedom to shape political institutions and to censure the press 
(Tulchin & Bland, 1994). Despite Fujimori’s overt grab of power, his actions were 
positively received by the public (Youngers, 2000). The subsequent reforms put into place 
by his government were largely successful in slowing Peru’s economic downturn and 
restoring a sense of stability to the nation. He was elected to a second term in 1995, and 
to a third term in 2000. In order to run for an unprecedented third term as president, 
Fujimori had to persuade the Congress to amend the two-term limit rule in the Peruvian 
constitution. 
 Shortly after Fujimori entered office, the president would build an increasingly 
autocratic government based on the support of the military. Fujimori’s covert slide 
	   52 
towards authoritarianism was accomplished out of the public eye with the aid of his most 
prominent advisor and chief of secret police, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres. Montesinos 
would systematically work to undermine democratic ideals in Peru through bribery and 
intimidation of the judiciary, politicians and the press—a practice that would eventually 
lead to both his and Fujimori’s undoing. As McMillan and Zoido (2004) described, the 
Fujimori government maintained, “the façade of democracy—the citizens voted, judges 
decided, the media reported—but they drained its substance” (p. 69). Indeed, Fujimori’s 
approach to governance was called a new form of “hybrid authoritarianism” by Youngers 
(2000); a system of government wherein “the formal trappings of democracy are 
maintained, but are often neutralized” (p. 3). As an example to suit our current purposes, 
the 1993 Peruvian constitution provided for freedom of the press, but the Fujimori 
government would adopt a variety of coercive tactics to control the media, and in so 
doing restricting an institutional underpinning of democracy. 
The Press under Fujimori 
 While some journalists would record and spotlight the abuses of the Fujimori 
regime—information that would eventually be used in the trial against him in 2009—the 
vigilance of some media did not come without challenge or consequences. Press fear of 
the government was not attributed to Fujimori directly, but to his chief of secret police. 
Montesinos habitually blackmailed or bought off those persons or entities that could have 
threatened the power of the regime. The bribes for owners of television stations were 
typically ten times the size of bribes for politicians or judges (McMillan & Zoido, 2004). 
If we are to take the size of the bribes offered to the news media as a gauge, the press was 
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seen as a greater threat to the authority of the Fujimori government than either Congress 
or the judiciary. The press as a democratic institution was subverted, using it to maintain 
tight control over the population (LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010b).  
 When media failed to tow the official line, as it were, Montesinos would threaten 
to shut them down, as he did with the second-largest channel Frecuencia Latina in 1997 
after the station aired stories on human rights violations that implicated the Peruvian 
National Intelligence Service (Youngers, 2000). The owner of the station was stripped of 
his citizenship and of his majority ownership of the station. Only a small number of news 
organizations resisted the pressure placed on them by Montesinos, most notably the Lima 
daily papers Caretas, Gestion, La República, and El Comercio (LaPlante & Phenicie, 
2010b). The tabloids, or chicha newspapers, that were largely read (and still are) by 
poorer, less educated populations, succumbed to the intimidation of the regime. These 
papers published stories that favored Fujimori, attacked his opponents, and persecuted 
journalists or prominent media owners (LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010a; Youngers, 2000).  
 Despite all of Fujimori’s efforts to undermine and control media, it was media 
that caused the undoing of his administration in 2000. As credit to its power in Peru, it 
was television that began the undoing of Fujimori. Two congressmen from the opposition 
party acquired a leaked videotape of Montesinos bribing yet another congressman. When 
the tape was shown at a press conference, Montesinos reacted by threatening television 
station owners to play down the incident (McMillan & Zoido, 2004). However, Channel 
N—one of the only stations to not have taken bribes from the administration—began to 
repeatedly show the recording. Despite these threats and bribes received from Montesinos 
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in the past, many television stations would rebroadcast the videotape, which turned out to 
be but one of thousands of vladivideos, the term for videos showing Montesinos bribing 
politicians, judges, and members of the press (LaPlante & Phenecie, 2010a).  
 Fujimori would eventually claim he knew nothing of Montesino’s activities, led a 
search and seizure party after Montesinos, and called for new elections. Despite winning 
the election in 2000—which were largely thought to have been rigged—Fujimori fled to 
Japan shortly after his victory, faxing his resignation to Congress from the lobby of a 
luxury hotel. 
After Fujimori, 2001 to 2010 
 Peru returned to a badly shaken system of democracy in 2001 with the election of 
Alejandro Toledo, who had run against Fujimori in the 2000 election and lost. The 
Toledo government was generally believed to have operated with more transparency and 
regard for the rule of law (Taylor, 2005). However, the demise of the Fujimori regime 
was not the end of troubles for Peru or for its press. The Toledo government experienced 
several waves of popular mobilization and civil unrest in 2003 and 2004 in the form of 
strikes by public sector workers, violent conflicts between students and the military, and 
protests from labor federations. In May 2005, a Congressional commission found 
President Toledo guilty of electoral fraud in the 2000, and he was subsequently 
impeached. The year 2006 saw the election of Alan Garcia to the presidency, and in 2007 
Fujimori was successfully extradited to Peru and later sentenced to 25 years in prison for 
human rights violations. 
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 During the trial, Fujimori’s lawyer claimed that the former president was the 
target of a media smear campaign that was intent upon influencing the judges (Praxis 
Institute for Social Justice, 2009). However, LaPlante and Phenecie (2010a) reported that 
at the same time Fujimori supporters accused the media of bias against him, they used 
media to distract from the real issues at trial. Fujimori himself was able to increase his 
popularity through an impassioned speech about how he had saved the country from 
terrorism and economic ruin. Fujimori’s family would complain to local media regarding 
the conditions of the prison at which he was being held, and a pro-Fujimori newspaper 
ran a story about Fujmori being diagnosed with cancer, despite there being no such 
diagnosis. Researchers have accused Peruvian journalists for succumbing to such 
sensationalizations, and in so doing trivializing news content (LaPlante & Phenicie, 
2010a).  
The failure of journalists to mediate the “Fujimoristas’ sensationalism” (LaPlante 
& Phenicie, 2010a, p. 279), has lead to a change in Peruvian public opinion that 
Fujimori’s crimes were perhaps justified and in the best interests of the nation. In 2008, 
53 percent of Peruvians believed Fujimori was guilty, but 65 percent said they still 
approved of his government and his policies (Salazar, 2008). Moreover, Fujimori’s 
daughter, Keiko Fujimori, was one of two candidates who participated in a run-off 
election for the presidency in June 2011—but lost to Ollanta Humala. Keiko is perceived 
to be largely a puppet of her father and the “Fujimoristas.” LaPlante and Phenicie (2010a) 
have suggested that her political successes and popularity may be linked to the 
manipulation of media by Fujimori’s supporters. 
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Moving Forward 
 The media will play a central role in the reconciliation and healing process of 
Peru. Moreover, as has been discussed in the previous section, the era of Fujimori’s 
influence over the media is not yet over. Keiko Fujimori nearly ascended to the 
presidency in 2011, and while she may have lost, her political career is far from over. 
More power may yet be placed in the hands of the “Fujimoristas.”  
 The flow of information into the public domain has somewhat improved, no 
longer overtly hindered or distorted by Montesino’s extensive media manipulation. In 
2005, Taylor expressed that human rights activists, NGOs and the media have greater 
opportunity to criticize actions taken by government and its officers. However, large 
amounts of government spending in advertising still provide the government with 
significant power over what is published in mainstream media.   
Rocha (2007) argued that the challenge moving forward should be the 
establishment of a new regulatory system in Peru aimed at fostering the development 
efforts of media, without the political influence or outside interests—seemingly calling for 
the development of a support network for media comprised of domestically-funded 
NGOs. Rocha suggested that the government must consider communication networks as 
important for the civil society and future development of Peru. However, LaPlante and 
Phenecie (2010a) argued that the development of the media system in Peru is constrained 
by its past. Conaghan (2005) pointed out that, in its entire history, Peruvian media has 
been a poor watchdog of government. Conaghan further suggested that journalistic 
neutrality—a paradigm vital to North American journalism—held little relevance for 
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Peruvian journalists. Instead, journalism in Peru remains rooted in the Spanish tradition 
of “opinion” journalism.  
 More often than not, the press in Peru has been a partisan player or in the service 
of political interests. Journalists in Peru have acknowledged that their coverage of the 
1990 election was largely biased and politicized against Fujimori (Boas, 2005; Conaghan, 
2005). In contrast, media portrayals of candidates in the 1995 and 2000 presidential 
elections were overwhelmingly favorable to the incumbent, Alberto Fujimori (Boas, 2005; 
Sanborn, Chernick, Eguiguren, Kay, & Schimpp, 2000). And although journalists and 
media stations may no longer be blatantly bribed or manipulated, they are still subject to 
the government’s influence and to a group of powerful elites whose connections may run 
back to Fujimori (LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010b). 
Hindrances to Peruvian Civil Society 
 While civil society is seen as existing independently from the government, it is not 
free from government influence. Freedom House (2010) has reported that while freedom 
of the press is guaranteed by the 1993 Peruvian constitution, there is cause for concern 
regarding the ability of media to openly criticize the government. Freedom House further 
reported that politicians will frequently react to criticism from media by suing journalists 
and press outlets. Moreover, journalists are still subject to physical attacks and verbal 
threats from local authorities and police.  
 In 2005, the government approved the Radio and Television Law, which was 
ostensibly designed to ensure an impartial broadcast media environment. However, 
instead it was widely believed by civil society and the media to be the government’s covert 
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strategy to assign excessive regulatory power to the chief regulatory authority, the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications (U.S. Department of State, 2005). 
 In 2006, a law was passed by the governing Aprista party (viewed as closely 
aligned with Fujimori) that required the mandatory registration of NGOs operating in 
Peru and their international donors (Howard, 2006). The law required NGOs to register 
with the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), to report how funds 
from abroad are spent, and agree to extensive government oversight. According to the 
law, NGOs have to register with the APCI and their “work plans should be in line with 
the development guidelines and priorities established by the state” (Paez, 2006). Penalties 
for misconduct by NGOs—assessed in the government’s eyes alone—include the 
revoking of the NGOs license to operate and prohibiting its officers to participate in 
another NGO for five years (Environmental Defender Law Center, n.d.). Many 
provisions of the law were struck down by Peru’s courts in 2007. However, after clashes 
between NGOs and the Peruvian military in 2009, legislation was again introduced—
abetted by the Fujimoristas—to expand the power of the APCI (The International Center 
for Non-Profit Law, 2010). 
Peruvian NGOs 
 As of December 2006, there were reportedly 2,100 registered NGOs in Peru, 900 
of which were active (Paez, 2006). Howard (2010) reported that between 2004 and 2005, 
Peruvian NGOs received nearly $500 million from international aid organizations. The 
same amount was reported to be received from international donors in 2010 (Guerra, 
2010). Within Latin America, Peru stands in fifth in the list of priority countries for 
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donors (Alasino, 2008). As of 2007, the largest international donor is the United States, 
providing 46 percent of the overall official aid to Peru. European aid constitutes 35 
percent, 90 percent of which comes from Spain, Germany and Italy. Japan and Canada 
are the next most important donors (Alasino, 2008). 
 Alasino (2008) noted that Peru is rapidly moving toward a civil society 
democracy, given the large number of NGOs in the nation and their exertion of influence 
over government. Under President Toledo’s government, the number of NGOs in the 
nation substantially increased, and foreign funding began flowing in increased amounts. 
However, there appears to be no clear list or other aggregation of the organizations 
devoted to the promotion of press freedom and/or media development, a deficiency this 
research has helped to remedy. The next section will outline the research questions and 
hypotheses that guided the study. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The larger purpose and rationale of this study are twofold. For one, the study will 
be aimed at determining the existence and quality of civil society in Peru in terms of its 
support for media development and reform. In so doing, the research will also help to 
further theory development in public relations by expanding on the OPR literature. As 
such, the second major purpose of this research will be to use common features of 
relationship measurement from public relations as variables of interest in network 
analysis, and position network centrality as an important outcome of relationships in 
public relations. The study will therefore help to advance research metrics in public 
relations and further the integration of public relations into civil society theory. The 
	   60 
following sections provide the research questions that will guide this study, and the 
rationale for posing these questions. 
Institutional Social Capital and Environmental Factors  
 The institutional and communitarian views of social capital (Grootaert & van 
Bastelaer, 2002) suggest that the mere existence of community-based groups such as 
NGOs are indications of a civil society. However, there is no aggregative list of 
organizations that are dedicated to the preservation, advancement and reform of media in 
Peru. As such, the first research question was posed. 
 RQ1: Who are the important media development actors in Peruvian civil society? 
  Scholars of civil society and social capital have also proponed that the social and 
political environment in which civil society actors exist are likely to affect their ability to 
operate and succeed in accomplishing their goals (Grootaert & van Bastlaer, 2002; 
Putnam, 1995). Government intervention or pressure on media, social norms, and 
historical precedent may be issues that adversely affect the ability of civil society 
organizations to function in Peru. 
 RQ2: What are the factors that influence the ability of these groups to operate? 
These research questions will be aimed at identifying the list of prominent media actors in 
Peru, meaning: donors, professional associations, nonprofit, or nongovernmental 
organizations that provide support to media actors. Such will be an indication of the 
institutional social capital of Peru’s media system. Further, the second research question 
will assess the nature of the environment in which Peruvian civil society actors exist, and 
	   61 
how the environment is conducive to, or a impediment of, the ability of media to further 
develop and succeed in advancing media credibility and sustainability.  
Networks and Civil Society 
 Civil society is a relational construct. Thus, civil society is at its most healthy 
when the organizations that comprise it are not atomized, and when they are arranged in 
networks of close proximity (Doerfel & Taylor, 2004; Hadenius & Uggla, 1996; 
Renshaw, 1994). Relationships among civil society organizations with similar goals is thus 
paramount to the efficacy of civil society. Examinations of network positions, such as 
centrality, and of the structure and quality of relationships among civil society groups 
should help to illustrate the state of Peruvian civil society and the importance of actors 
within it.  
 RQ3: What are the most central organizations in Peru’s media development 
network? 
In a similar vein, research has espoused that the network of relationships among 
civil society organizations should ideally be moderately dense (Burt, 1992; Kauffman, 
1993; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003).  
 RQ4: What is the density of the relationship network? 
NGOs and Social Capital 
 Social capital is a multidimensional construct. Trust is perhaps the most broadly 
used indicator of social capital (Halpern, 2005) and is a precondition for any number of 
other behaviors (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust is also a common feature used to assess the 
quality of relationships (Grunig & Huang, 2000; Hon & Grunig, 1999; Huang, 2001). 
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 RQ5: To what extent is the media development network of Peru characterized by 
trust? 
 Doerfel and Taylor (2003) and others have suggested that civil society is 
underlined with themes of competition and conflict. NGOs must often compete for 
resources to remain efficacious, however a strong civil society is characterized by networks 
of cooperation.  
 RQ6: To what extent is the media development network of Peru characterized by 
cooperation and competition? 
 Further, NGOs must exchange information to strengthen each other’s ability to 
act (Meyer, 1997). The relationships an actor has with its alters may constitute channels 
for exchanging information (Haythornthwaite, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghosahal, 1998).  
 RQ7: To what extent does the media development network of Peru provide 
information to each other? 
 As an extension of their hypotheses on cooperation and competition, Doerfel and 
Taylor (2004) hypothesized—and subsequently confirmed—that organizations that fill 
structural holes will be perceived as more cooperative. As betweeness centrality and filling 
structural holes are often associated with information brokerage, a subsidiary hypothesis 
regarding information provision is proposed.  
 H1: Organizations that fill structural holes will be perceived as more cooperative. 
 H1b: Organizations that fill structural holes will be perceived as valuable 
information providers. 
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OPR and Centrality 
 Public relations research regarding the quality of organization–public relationships 
has previously been limited to the study of the organization–public dyad. The discussion 
has argued that examination of the network of relationships within which an organization 
is located will help to expand the focus of inquiry beyond the organization–public 
interaction. As such, the research will inquire as to the extent to which the relationship 
network of Peruvian media civil society organizations is comprised by quality 
relationships, as conceived of by Hon and Grunig (1999). 
 RQ8: What are the characteristics of the network relationships? 
Moreover, the discussion has pointed out that centrality measures may provide the 
natural extension of OPR measurement of relationship outcomes. 
 RQ9: To what extent are the relationship quality indicators associated with 
organizational centrality?  
 Ledingham and Bruning (1998) have argued that the desired end-state of 
relationships is for them to be characterized as having a mutual regard. An extension of 
OPR beyond the dyadic relationship would be to consider organizational centrality as an 
outcome of positive relations with an organization’s alters and the position of the actor in 
the network as a whole. Thus, the network concept of simmelian ties (to be explained in 
the following section) is predicted to be positively associated with centrality. 
 H2: Simmelian ties will be positively associated with organizational centrality. 
Further, symmetrical relationships, or relationships that are characterized by a 
mutual regard, will facilitate successful information flow (Broom et al., 1997). Thus, 
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extending OPR research, positive networked relationships, based on standard relationship 
characteristics, will facilitate information flow in the network. 
 H3: Relationship strength will be associated with networked information flow. 
Summary  
 Resource dependency theory, themes of social capital such as trust, cooperation 
(and implicitly, competition), and information exchange, and the organization–public 
relationships literature provided the theoretical framework for the proposed research 
questions and hypotheses. The following chapter will describe the participants, concepts 
of interest, and the means that will help to illustrate the network of organizational 
relationships associated with the system of organizations that participate in the 
development and maintenance of civil society in Peru.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
 The previous sections have discussed how relationship networks among NGOs are 
essential to an effective civil society. The case of Peru and its media system has been 
outlined, and research questions directed at assessing the state of the media development 
sector of Peruvian civil society have been posed. This chapter will describe how the study 
researched the nature of the Peruvian media development civil society network and strove 
to answer the posed research questions and hypotheses. 
As Ihlen (2005) suggested, both qualitative and quantitative methods are needed 
to fully understand social capital. The study was conducted in two phases. In brief, the 
research consisted of informant interviews coupled with organizational profiles in Peru, 
followed by an online social network survey. The goal of collecting both qualitative and 
quantitative data was to provide as clear a picture of possible of the organizational 
network, its levels of social capital and relationship quality, and the environment in which 
it exists. For a complete listing of the research questions and hypotheses and the methods 
by which each will be answered and analyzed, see Table 1. The following sections will 
outline the general method by which the research for this study will proceed and highlight 
key points of the research that will be used to answer the research questions and 
hypotheses. The method by which the interviews were conducted is discussed first, 
followed by a discussion of the sample, procedure, and analysis of the network analysis 
survey. 
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Informant and Organizational Profile Interviews 
Informant interviews help to familiarize the researcher with the community of 
interest and its characteristics, and should be done before other instruments are applied 
(Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). The interviews in this study not only served to 
identify relevant community actors, but also to helped inventory community 
characteristics, and provided an initial assessment of community needs and assets. 
Interviewees were asked about the state of the media system in Peru, the political, 
economic and social climate that affects media operations, the need for media-related 
NGOs, and their means and capacity of making contact with each other and the outside 
world. Interviewees were asked what organizations they regard to be prominent or 
influential in the community of interest, the nature of relationships among them, and 
about the factors that influence their operation (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002).  
 In addition to informant interviews, Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) have 
described interviews with organizational actors in a community under scrutiny as 
organizational profiles. The purpose of the organizational profile interviews was to assess 
the political, social, and cultural factors in which media development actors must operate, 
as well as the internal characteristics of the organizations themselves and the relationships 
they have with other organizations. They suggested that collecting such information is 
beneficial not only to provide qualitative commentary on the quantitative data—in this 
study collected via an online social network analysis survey—but also to assess the 
community’s capacity “to create and maintain networks within and beyond its 
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boundaries” (p. 28). Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) recommend that between four 
and 10 interviews with community members or organizations should be conducted.  
The informant interviews and organizational profiles were directed at answering 
the first two research questions. The first research question sought to identify the 
influential media-related actors in Peruvian civil society. This question was not only 
aimed at elucidating prominent organizations, but also served to establish the network of 
actors to be examined in the remaining research questions and hypotheses. The second 
research question regarded the factors that influence the ability of these groups to operate. 
As Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) described it, context matters, and so the function 
of the second research question was to describe the environment in which the groups 
exist, providing the contextual data in which the network analysis study of social capital 
will be situated. The next section discusses the sample, procedure, and analysis used to 
answer the first two research questions. 
Sample 
Prior to any research on participants, approval was obtained from the University 
of Oklahoma Office of Human Research Participant Protection. Participants for the 
informant and organizational profile interviews were recruited via a reputational snowball 
sampling method (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) based on initial recommendations from 
the Internews team and then from recommendations of the initial interview participants 
themselves. A total of six organizational profile interviews were conducted, meeting the 
number of profiles suggested by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) for the assessment of 
social capital in a community. In addition to the six organizations that were profiled, two 
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informant interviews were conducted in the field. One interview participant was currently 
unaffiliated with any development organization, though he had previously worked for two 
such groups, and another was a university professor. Both had general knowledge of 
media development efforts in Peru and of development NGOs. Obtaining information 
from organizational leaders, as well as the key informants (the professor and freelance 
journalist), help to obtain a reliable assessment of Peruvian civil society organizations, 
their capacity, the relationships among other media development actors, and the general 
environment in which they operate. 
The organizations profiled included two international organizations that fund 
media development and four media development NGOs. The interview participants 
agreed to participate on the condition of anonymity. Five participants were male and 
three were female, ranging in age from 31 to 60. Six of the participants worked in a 
leadership capacity for their organizations, with the job titles of executive director, 
director of communications, press and communications manager, and president. One of 
informant interview participants was a professor at a prominent university in Lima, and 
the other was a freelance journalist who had previously worked for two different media 
development NGOs in Peru.  
Procedure 
 Once consent had been given, interviews were conducted in person and digitally 
recorded. The interviews lasted between 41 and 80 minutes, with an average of 58 
minutes. Three interviews were conducted in English and the remaining interviews were 
conducted in Spanish with the assistance of a certified interpreter. The research 
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instrument used in the informant interviews was designed to elicit the names of 
prominent media development actors and to assess the state of the relations among them. 
The instrument can be seen in Appendix A. Participants in the organizational profile 
interviews were asked many of the same questions as in the informant interviews (as 
outlined in Appendix A) in order to gain further perspective on the connections among 
Peruvian media development actors as well as on the general social, political, and cultural 
environment of Peru. However, the research instrument specific to the organizational 
profile interviews included questions regarding the internal characteristics and capacity of 
organizations to create social capital. See Appendix B for the organizational profile topics 
guide, which was modeled after the World Bank Social Capital Assessment Tool 
(Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). The interview guide was designed to probe the 
origination of the organization, its current goals and practices, the capacity of the 
organization to accomplish those goals, its linkages to other media development NGOs, 
and its relationship with government. Both interview topics guides were used to provide a 
general framework and tentative agenda for the interviews, although they did not 
preclude discussion of other relevant issues as they arose.  
After the interviews were completed, they were transcribed verbatim. Following 
transcription, the data were examined for common themes and experiences, key words 
and topical relevance. Strauss and Corbin (1990) detailed coding procedures by which 
qualitative data can be systematically analyzed. Qualitative coding is the operation 
through which data are “broken down, conceptualized, and put back together again in 
new ways” (p. 57). The specific coding procedure used in this study was open coding. As 
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Strauss and Corbin defined it, “open coding is the part of analysis that pertains 
specifically to the naming and categorizing of phenomena through close examination of 
data” (p. 62). During open coding, data is broken down into discrete parts, examined 
closely, compared for similarities and differences, and questions are asked about the 
phenomena as reflected through the data.  
First, data was broken down into conceptual units by looking for observations, 
incidents, ideas, or events in the text deemed interesting by the researcher. These units 
were given a conceptual name by asking questions like: what is the nature of this incident? 
Or, what does it represent? Incidents were compared throughout the analysis and similar 
phenomena were given the same name. In course of analysis, Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
suggested that dozens of conceptual labels may be yielded. These concepts must be 
grouped in order to reduce the number of units of analysis. Strauss and Corbin named the 
process of grouping concepts that seem to pertain to the same phenomena as categorizing 
(p. 65). Categories were given abstract, conceptual names that attempted to pull together 
the subcategories and groups subsumed in it. In sum, similar conceptual events and 
incidents were labeled and grouped together to form categories that are thematically 
representative of the social phenomena. The categories and quotes complementing the 
categories were used to discuss the areas of interest in the next chapter of this manuscript, 
as well as the data derived from the network data, discussed next. 
Network Analysis 
 As scholars of social capital measurement have suggested, interviews with key 
community players should be conducted before any formal, quantitative measurement of 
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social capital is undertaken (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). The informant and 
organizational profile interviews helped to set the stage for the network analysis study. 
The interviews provided the contextual, qualitative data that informed and 
complemented the data acquired from the network analysis about the levels of social 
capital among media development actors. Social network analysis is appropriate for the 
study of social capital, and the state of civil society, as it is a theoretical perspective and a 
method for assessing complex social structures (Van der Hulst, 2009). The next few 
sections detail the sample, procedure, and analysis used in the online social network 
analysis survey that followed the interviews. 
Sample 
 Arriving at the sample for analysis in the network study helped to answer RQ1, as 
well as serving as the basis of analysis to answer most of the remaining questions and 
hypotheses. There are several network sampling methods: node sampling, link sampling, 
and snowball sampling (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Snowball sampling is particularly 
suitable for employment when the population of interest is not readily visible, and when 
compiling a list of the population poses difficulties for the researcher (Babbie, 1995). In 
other words, snowball methods can be particularly helpful in tracking down special or 
hard to reach populations (Knoke & Yang, 2008). The method is feasible when the focus 
of research is intended to be on the distribution of social contacts and to estimate the 
structure of a given population (Frank, 2005; Scott et al., 2007). 
 The snowball procedure in network analysis can be defined as one that enlarges an 
original node sample by joining adjacent nodes (Frank, 2005). Frank (2005) has argued 
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that researchers should draw on an initial sample and use this sample to refer further 
contacts. Wasserman and Faust (1994) suggested that initial contacts should report on the 
actors to whom they have ties of a specific kind. All of these actors then constitute the 
“first order” zone of the network. Researchers then go on to contact the members of the 
first order zone that were not members of the initial sample. The snowballing procedure 
continues through several zones until no or few new actors are identified in each 
snowballing stage.  
 Farquharson (2005) launched a snowball sample through informing an initial 
sample that they were beginning the reputatational nomination process, and then asking 
them the question:  
Please nominate those individuals who are most influential in the area of health 
policy in Victoria (residence in Victoria is not necessarily a requirement). You 
may find it convenient to nominate ten to fifteen names, but you can nominate 
more or fewer if you wish. (p. 347) 
 Upon receipt of the names, Farquharson (2005) contacted all the nominees, informing 
them they had been identified as an influential player and, in turn, asked them to 
participate in the nomination process. In Farquharson’s study, after the fifth round few 
new names were elicited and the nomination process was closed. 
As such, the nominating question used in this research was modeled after 
Faquharson’s (2005) study: “Please nominate all those organizations that are influential in 
the area of media development in Peru.” Based on the initial recommendations of the 
Internews team, the nomination question was asked of seven first round actors (two via e-
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mail, five in person). The first round produced an additional eight organizations as 
nominees for inclusion in the network. These organizations were contacted (five via e-
mail, three in person) and from the five that responded an additional five names were 
generated. These third round actors were contacted via e-mail, and of the three that 
responded only three additional organizations were identified. The decision was made 
after the third round to stop the snowball nomination process given the small number of 
new names elicited in the third round, resulting in an initial network sample of 23 actors. 
However, in the survey participants were able to identify important actors that were not 
included in the original network roster. One additional actor was added via this method, 
resulting in a final roster of 24 organizations. The list of organizations included in the 
network study and a description of their development activities can be found in Table 2. 
Procedure 
 Once the initial network sample was identified, as detailed in the previous section, 
a survey with a social network design was administered online. The survey was 
administered in Spanish, and was translated by a certified translator and back translated 
to English by another translator. Participants were e-mailed consent documents, and 
reminded of their rights at the beginning of the online survey. Of the 24 organizations 
approached to take the survey, 17 responded in the six weeks the survey was left open, 
resulting in a response rate of 71 percent, which is consistent with response rates in 
previous network analysis research (Doerfel & Taylor, 2003, Feeley, 2000). Those 
organizations that did not respond were kept in the data for analysis of nonsymmetrical 
network data, and in-degree centrality measures (the number of ties received by an 
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organization) for the interaction network. Reciprocity was assumed among organizations 
for other network measures.  
 The network analysis survey was intended to answer a number of the research 
questions and hypotheses. As such, the survey instrument included questions designed to 
measure the different concepts implicit in these questions. The complete survey can be 
found in Appendix C. 
Variables and Network Measures 
 The survey included some open-ended questions, but mostly 5-point Likert-type 
questions that contributed to the measurement of several variables that will be used to 
answer the research questions and hypotheses. These variables included: (1) 
communication importance, (2), interaction, (3) interaction intensity, (4) trust, (5) 
cooperation, (6) competition, (7) information exchange, (8) in-degree centrality, (9) 
betweeness centrality, (10) simmelian ties, (11) structural holes, and (12) network density. 
A description of these variables and the means by which they were operationalized are 
explained next. 
Communication importance. To gauge the institutional social capital of the 
media development community and to discern those organizations that are perceived to 
be the most integral to development in Peru, a communication importance question was 
employed. To answer RQ3, an adaptation of Taylor and Doerfel’s (2003) question “On a 
scale from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (very important), rate the value of your 
organization's communication relationship with each organization listed below,” was used 
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to gauge positive relations and organizational centrality. This question was used to create 
the network of relations based on organizational importance.  
Data was recorded in the form of an adjacency matrix in UCINET6 (Borgatti et 
al., 2002), where each node is assigned both a column and a row in the matrix. According 
to Scott et al., (2005) an adjacency matrix constructed in this way will have two cells 
representing the intersection of any two nodes, one above and one below the diagonal. 
The diagonal cells remain blank. If a connection or tie exists between two nodes, then a 
one (1) (or another positive number representing the strength of the tie) is entered in the 
matrix cell representing the intersection of these two nodes. If no tie exists, then a zero (0) 
is entered. It is not necessary that the two cells for each pair of notes have the same value, 
as actors may rank one another differently. For instance, node i may rank node j as 
providing a high degree of information, but node j ranks node i as providing a lesser 
amount of information. The matrix was analyzed using in-degree centrality (a method 
described in more detail shortly) in UCINET6 to obtain normalized importance values 
for each ego based on all other organization’s assessment of that ego. 
Interaction network. Perceptions of importance do not necessarily indicate 
interaction.  As such, it is necessary to gauge what organizations interact with one another 
and the quality of relationships that exist among them. The network data used to analyze 
relationship quality was acquired by a single-name generating question (Knoke & Yang, 
2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The name-generating question was modeled after the 
National Opinion Research Center’s (NORC) General Social Survey—a commonly used 
question in network survey design (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Marsden, 2005; Wasserman & 
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Faust, 1994). Participants were presented with a list of the organizations generated 
through the snowball sampling process, and asked: “From time to time most people 
discuss important matters with other people. Looking back over the last year—what are 
the organizations on this roster with whom you discussed matters important to your 
organization?” Answers to this question were used to construct an adjacency matrix. 
Participants were then asked a series of questions about the nature of their relationships 
with the alters identified in the single-name generating question. 	    
 Trust. Trust is an abstract concept that has been measured in many different ways 
in many different disciplines. Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) have suggested that in 
social capital measurement studies, there should be a focus both on generalized trust (the 
extent individuals have trust in people overall) and transactional trust, or the extent to 
which trust extends in the contexts of relationships where resources are exchanged. 
Generalized trust in social capital has commonly been assessed via some modification of 
the World Values Survey’s question on social trust, “most people are basically honest and 
can be trusted.” Participants were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with 
the previous statement on a Likert-type, five-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree.  
In order to help avoid redundant questions and burnout by survey participants, 
relational or transactional trust was assessed using Hon and Grunig’s (1999) adapted scale 
as presented in Appendix C. A trust matrix was constructed in the aforementioned 
manner, and in-degree centrality scores calculated for each actor. A binary trust matrix 
was also constructed by recoding all mean scores, with 3.75 on the 5 point scale as the 
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cutoff for a trusting relationship to help measure the density (explained in greater detail 
shortly) of trusting relationships. 
Cooperation and competition. Civil society is often characterized by 
cooperation and competition, and the extent to which organizations are cooperative or 
competitive helps to determine the vitality of a civil society (Taylor & Doerfel, 2003; 
Doerfel & Taylor, 2004). To help answer RQ6, the cooperation and competition 
variables, based on Deutsch’s (1985, 1994) theory of cooperation and competition and 
Doerfel and Taylor’s (2004) measurement scales, were analyzed in UCINET6. A check of 
internal consistency of the measures for cooperation (α = .93, M = 45.52, SD = 5.67) and 
competition (α = .65, M = 7.83, SD = 2.13) revealed both concept indices met 
established levels of accepted reliability (Singleton & Straits, 2005). However, a check of 
reliability for the rival dimension yielded poor results (α = .48, M = 7.71, SD = 1.30). 
The rival dimension was not used in subsequent analysis.  
Following Doerfel and Taylor (2004), the marker variables matrices for 
cooperation were averaged to create an index measure (the mean) of cooperation for each 
organization, variables for the competition matrices were averaged used to create an index 
measure (the mean) of competition for each organization. Using these data, an adjacency 
matrices for cooperation and competition were created in which each cell ij represents the 
mean cooperation/competition rating organization i reported about organization j. These 
two matrices were then analyzed using the in-degree centrality measure in the UCINET 
computer program to attain (1) a score of cooperation and (2) a score of competition 
values for each organization i based on all other organizations’ evaluations of organization. 
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In addition, binary matrices for cooperation and competition will be constructed using 
3.75 on a 5-point scale as the cutoff for a cooperative or competitive relationship to help 
analyze the network density of cooperative or competitive relationships. 
Information exchange. Measures of relationships in a network can help to 
indicate what information is being exchanged, between whom, and to what extent. 
Similarly, ties between actors can be explored to find out what the important information 
exchanges are among the multiple relationships that tie the actors. Information exchange 
was assessed via questions regarding the accuracy, timeliness, and frequency of 
information received from each organization named in the single-name generator 
question. Items were adapted from Taylor and Doerfel (2003) and Haythornthwaite 
(1996), and can be read in Appendix C. A reliability test of the information exchange 
scale showed the composite variable to meet acceptable levels of internal reliability (α = 
.67, M = 20.65, SD = 2.83). An adjacency matrix of the index of normalized in-degree 
centrality scores for information exchange was created in the same manner outlined in the 
cooperation and competition section. In addition, a binary matrix for information 
exchange was constructed using 3.75 as the cutoff to help analyze the network density of 
information exchange relationships.  
OPR. Quality relationships have been described as leading to greater 
organizational effectiveness and autonomy (Grunig & Huang, 2000; Huang, 2001; 
Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). In order to assess if relationship quality, as has been 
described in the relationship management and OPR literatures, can be adapted for 
network analysis and be associated with organizational centrality, Hon and Grunig’s 
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(1999) relationship measures were adapted and employed in this study. While other 
measures of OPR exist (e.g. Bruning & Ledingham, 1999; Huang, 2001), Hon and 
Grunig’s (1999) scales were chosen for use because of their easier adaptation to the case of 
an organization-to-organization relationship.  
A reliability assessment indicated that each adapted scale met acceptable levels of 
internal consistency: control mutuality (α = .85, M = 20.01, SD = 2.69), trust (α = .88, 
M = 23.9, SD = 3.18), commitment (α = .84, M = 20.97, SD = 2.92), satisfaction (α = 
.85, M = 20.53, SD = 2.96), and communal relationship (α = .70, M = 21.73, SD = 
1.76).  The reliability levels of the scales are similar to those obtained by Hon and Grunig 
(1999). An adjacency matrix of the index scores for each relationship dimension was 
created in the same manner outlined in the cooperation and competition section. 
Assessment of relationship quality among actors using Hon and Grunig’s scales were used 
to help answer RQ8 and 9 as well as H2 and H3.  
OPR matrices were also analyzed against the information exchange matrices to 
determine the extent they are related. Quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) is a matrix 
correlation procedure in UCINET that tests the similarities of two networks by tabulating 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between corresponding cells in two matrices without 
making parametric assumptions (Borgatti et al., 2002). Additionally, the QAP double 
decker semi-partialling regression method was used to test the predictive value of the 
OPR indices on information exchange. These procedures were used to test H3, which 
states that relationship quality will be positively associated with information exchange. 
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In-degree centrality. Organizations that have high in-degree centralities are more 
likely to be thoroughly integrated into a network, to be in the thick of things (Freeman, 
1979). In-degree centrality also helps to gauge how actors rate a focal organization on 
certain measures. To help answer RQ9 and H2, UCINET6 can provide data about the 
centrality and prestige of organizations, including in-degree centrality. In-degree 
centrality is a simple node-level measure of prestige (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In-
degree centrality provides information about the number of ties received by a node. As 
mentioned earlier, in-degree centrality can also describe valued relational ties. The intent 
of RQ9, and H1b is on the extent to which organizations are identified and rated by the 
other actors in the network. As such, the normalized in-degree centralities of intensity, 
cooperation, and the OPR variables are used. Standardized or normalized scores provide 
the proportion of actors in the network who choose an ego on a measure; the larger the 
index score, the more prestigious the actor (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Betweeness centrality. Betweeness centrality helps to gauge the extent to which 
an organization serves as a broker of information and resources in a network (Freeman, 
1979). As such betweeness centrality is a good measure to study if organizations help to 
connect different parts of a network and become valuable communication partners. To 
help answer RQ7 and H2, the UCINET measure of betweeness centrality was chosen as 
the indicator of network centrality and prestige. Betweeness centrality concerns how other 
actors can control or mediate between actors that are not directly connected. Betweeness 
centrality is an important indicator of the control over information exchange or the flow 
of resources (Knoke & Yang, 2008).   
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An extension of betweeness centrality, flow centrality, was used to help answer 
H3, which regarded the extent to which relationship strength is associated with 
information flows in the network. Flow centrality assumes that actors will use all 
pathways that connect them, proportionate to the number of paths that connect them. 
The measure corresponds to the capacity for information flow (Borgatti, et al., 2002). 
Simmelian ties. In a dyadic relationship, power relations are more likely to be 
asymmetrical (Krackhardt, 1998). Actors are simmelian-tied to one another if “they are 
reciprocally and strongly tied to each other and if they are each reciprocally and strongly 
tied to at least one third party in common” (Krackhardt, 1998, p. 24). As such, looking at 
triadic relations or simmelian ties—the existence of a tie reinforced by a common tie to a 
third actor may be a better measure of how the quality of OPR affects organizational 
position. These are ties that are backed up by the power of groups, providing stability to 
an actor. Simmelian ties may thus be a better measure of relationship strength for the 
study of an organizational ego in a network and a more appropriate variable for study in 
public relations. Simmelian ties will be calculated and associated with centrality measures 
to answer H2. 
Structural holes. The existence or absence of ties in networks is an indication of 
the extent to which networks are cohesive (Burt, 1992). Organizations that fill strategic 
positions in networks, without which the network would be less cohesive, are perceived to 
fill structural holes. Structural holes can be measured by effective size, efficiency, constraint, 
and hierarchy (Burt, 1992). An effective link provides access to other nodes beyond an 
initial contact node, and results can run from zero to the total number of nodes in the 
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network. Efficiency refers to a contact that connects an actor to a subgroup by way of a 
single actor in that subgroup. Constraint is the extent to which a focal organization is 
invested in the others of the focal organization’s alters (Borgatti et al., 2002). Scores for 
efficiency and constraint range between 0 and 1, where scores close to 0 suggest many 
redundant contacts, and scores of 1 indicates only one contact. Those with scores closer 
to one on constraint are limited by their relationship position in the network while those 
with lower scores are not. Hierarchy represents the extent to which constraint on a focal 
organization is concentrated on a single other organization. Scores for hierarchy range 
from 0 to 1, where 0 means there is equal constraint from all alters, and 1 means 
constraint comes from just one contact. Using the structural holes option in UCINET6 
provided the variables to answer H1 and H1b.  
Network density. RQ4 concerns the extent to which the media development 
community is Peru is linked. Density is a network construct that merely represents the 
number of ties that exist in the network out of the total possible number of ties. Density 
may represent a system transitioning to order or descending into fragmentation and 
disorganization (Kauffman, 1993). Density is calculated by dividing the number of links 
among nodes in a network by the total number of possible links among all nodes in a 
network (Borgatti et al., 2002). Density measures range from 0 to 1, where 0 means that 
none of the actors are linked to one another, and 1 means that every node in the network 
has a link to all other nodes. Density calculations were also used to help answer research 
questions 5–7. 
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Summary of Methodological Approach 
 In brief, this study interviewed experts about the media environment of Peru and 
prominent civil society actors. These interviews provided a launching pad from which to 
construct the network boundary of media development civil society actors in Peru. Once 
the network was established, the social network survey was administered online. The 
employment of informant interviews, organizational profiles, and a social network survey 
was intended to impart a comprehensive, well-rounded picture of the media support 
environment in Peru. The use of multiple methods constituted a triangulated approach to 
the study of the media development sector of Peruvian civil society and social capital. The 
next chapter reports the results of the research.	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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
As recounted in the earlier sections of this dissertation, the research was 
undertaken in two parts. The first part was to conduct interviews with experts on the 
media development environment to help identify the relevant actors in Peruvian civil 
society and the factors influencing their operation. The second was to conduct an online 
network analysis survey to determine the structure of the media development network in 
Peru, and to analyze the network for measures such as density, centrality, and relationship 
strength. By using multiple methods, the hope was to obtain the best possible picture of 
the media development community in Peru. In so doing, the researcher hoped to generate 
new knowledge about the nature of civil society and the potential role of public relations 
in sustaining it. 
 For the sake of clarity, the results of the study are first presented in terms of the 
answers derived from the interview stage. The first part of this chapter will thus present 
the results of the expert and organizational profile interviews together. The section will 
introduce some of the prominent media development actors in Peru as well as discuss the 
factors that arose from the interviews as relevant to the development of media in Peru. 
The second part of the chapter will address the answers to the research questions and 
hypotheses derived from the network analysis data.  
Informant Interviews and Organizational Profiles 
The main purpose of the interviews was to help identify the relevant media 
development actors in Peru and to discuss the factors that may be influencing their ability 
to succeed. Social capital requires an enabling environment to thrive. The creation of 
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social capital is dependent upon any number of political, social, institutional, and cultural 
factors (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). As Grootaert and van Bastelaer suggested, 
examination of such factors provide the specific context for studying how social capital 
works in a selected area of study. As such, the next sections identify the relevant media 
development actors in Peru and explicate the political, social, institutional and cultural 
context in which these actors function.  
Actors in Media Development  
 RQ1 was answered, in part, by consulting the media development community on 
the important actors in Peru. As part of the reputational snowball sampling method to 
establish the network (cf. Farquharson, 2005; Knoke & Yang, 2008), interview 
participants were asked to discuss their links to other media development actors as well as 
to comment on the important donors for media projects in Peru. The participants 
mentioned an array of different types of organizations as participating the development of 
media. This list included some donors, NGOs, professional associations, government 
agencies and universities. A complete list of the network of 24 actors along with a short 
description of their activities related to media development can be found in Table 2. 
A number of international organizations have funded media development in Peru 
in the past 20 years, although often under the aegis of human rights development—a 
topic to be discussed in a subsequent section. Several donors were mentioned by the 
participants as funding media development currently or in the recent past, including: the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID, Open Society Institute (OSI), the 
British and American Embassies, the Catholic Church, and the United Nations 
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Development Program (UNPD). All of these donor organizations were mentioned as 
directly or indirectly connected to funding media development. 
 Based on the reputational nominations of the interview participants, the central 
civil society groups and NGOs that specifically address the advancement and protection 
of media in Peru include: Calandria, Consejo de la Prensa Peruana (Peruvian Press 
Council), Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (IPYS, Institute for Press and Society), and Red 
TV/TV Cultura. These Lima-based organizations work on different aspects of media 
development including, but not limited to, conducting research on media (Calandria), 
developing and producing media content for radio and television (RedTV/TV Cultura), 
journalist training (IPYS), advocating for the free access of information and the rights of 
media owners (Press Council), as well as functioning as government watchdogs. 
In addition to the aforementioned groups, there were several other organizations, 
including NGOs, professional organizations, and universities, who indirectly assist in 
media development and often work with the media development-specific NGOs 
(Calandria, IPYS, Press Council, RedTV/TV Cultura). Such organizations included 
Asociación Nacional de Periodistas del Perú (ANP, National Association of Peruvian 
Journalists), Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL, Institute for Legal Defense), El Centro 
Peruano de Estudios Sociales (CEPES, Peruvian Center of Social Studies), Ciudadanos al 
Día (CAD, Citizen’s Day), Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman), Instituto de 
Comunicacion para el Desarrollo (ICD, The Institute for Development 
Communication), Instituto para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral (IDEA, The 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), Proetica, Red de Periodistas de 
	   87 
Provincias del Perú (Network of Peruvian Provincial Journalists), Transparencia, and the 
Pontifical University of Lima (often referred to as simply the Catholic University).  
  As mentioned, the Catholic Church was also cited as being active in media 
development. The Church funds and operates several radio stations, many of which are 
networked under the umbrella of the Coordinadora Nacional de Radio (CNR, National 
Radio Coordinator). The CNR is the largest donor funded radio network in the country 
with over 200 affiliates, and is particularly influential in the provinces, where radio is the 
primary form of media consumed by citizens.  
 Lastly, the Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional (APCI, Peruvian 
Agency for International Cooperation), the government body that requires NGOs to be 
officially registered and that tracks international investment, was often mentioned as a key 
player in the media development environment of Peru, even if the agency does not in and 
of itself directly participate in development activities.  
Factors that Influence Development 
 RQ2 was answered by consulting the participants on the political, social, and 
cultural environments of Peru. Many items were discussed as hindrances and boons to 
media development, although the difficulties far outweighed the advantages. The factors 
that influence the ability of media development civil society groups to thrive can be 
placed into two large groups: environmental, that is the historical, cultural and market-
driven factors that impede development; and structural, the constitution of the media 
development organizations themselves, in terms of their staff, resources, and their 
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relationships with donors and other civil society groups. The environmental factors are 
discussed first. 
 Environmental factors. The environmental factors begin with a discussion of the 
development of some of the groups in question, focusing on how the Fujimori regime 
gave purpose to or spawned many media development NGOs. A lack of trust in media 
and government institutions, as well as a lack of general social trust among Peruvians is 
then discussed, followed by an explanation of how Peruvian media’s sensationalist model 
of journalism is undermining the credibility of the profession. Then, the general apathy of 
the media and public to change is outlined, followed by the lack of training and 
corruption in the provinces. Environmental factors, to a large extent, influence the 
interpretation of the network structure, as these factors are representative of the problems 
for which the media development sector must come together to correct. 
 Development under Fujimori. While many of the organizations under 
consideration were established well before Fujimori ascended to the presidency in 1990, it 
seems that most media development organizations came into their own or were created as 
a direct consequence of his regime. And while the purpose of these organizations during 
the Fujimori era was to defend media from his policies and also to call into question said 
policies, the purpose of these organizations now seems largely to stop such things from 
happening again. As such, Fujimori has shaped the past and present purposes of media 
development NGOs. 
Two of the most prominent actors in media development, IPYS and the Peruvian 
Press Council, were formed in the 1990s partly as a response to the difficult situation for 
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press freedom and freedom of expression under the government of Alberto Fujimori. 
While IPYS was formed largely to educate journalists and protect them from the 
prosecution of Fujimori’s government, the Press Council was formed to provide a united 
platform from which media owners could fight for their rights and speak out against the 
actions of Fujimori and Montesinos. Interestingly, a founding member of IPYS, 
established in 1993, would leave the organization in 1997 to help establish the Press 
Council. Both organizations remain a prominent and active voice in lobbying for freedom 
of information and the protection of journalists, who must still, more than 10 years after 
Fujimori’s collapse, cope with many of the same obstacles and limitations they faced in 
the 1990s.  
Proetica, an organization dedicated to transparency and anti-corruption 
education, emerged shortly after the fall of Fujimori, and was formed through the 
participation of several other NGOs who focused on related issues, including 
Transparencia and IPYS. As a representive of Proetica stated: 
We decided to found a specific organization related with these issues of 
transparency, control, and people's participation in government. Because when we 
had to deal with this Fujimori, the reelection, we found that we didn't have a 
specific organization that deal with this movement. 
At the time there were no organizations dedicated to the pursuit of transparency and 
accountability in government. Proetica was consequently created to specifically address 
the concerns raised by the malfeasance of the Fujimori regime, and to work towards the 
prevention of such things from occurring in the future. 
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 As most of the organizations in question were either formed in response to or 
fought against Fujimori’s outright assault on the media industry, the legacy of his 
government continues to shape and direct the activities of the media development 
community. While a scholar of development communication noted that the history of the 
relationship of media with government in Peru is one of continued struggle, subjugation, 
and reinvention, the 1990s saw a significant perversion in the tactics by which 
government attempted to influence media and other institutions: 
The Fujimori government engaged, very successfully in destroying institutions. It 
destroyed political parties, it brought down citizens associations of all types. It 
destroyed unions, the trade unions, and through that work, it was able to 
manipulate media to reach out directly to the population by manipulating the 
media. The media became the servants of the government. And to this day the 
media are dysfunctional. 
Indeed, as trust in institutions is a strong indicator of social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Putnam, 1993) lack of trust in media and government institutions is a significant 
challenge for the media development community in Peru. 
 Lack of trust. While levels of trust among the organizations studied were high, 
many participants commented on the lack of public trust in media institutions, in 
government, and indeed, in each other, as a significant obstacle for the development of 
media and civil society in Peru. The mainstream media and press, and television in 
particular, was completely discredited by the widespread corruption, including control of 
the press, under Fujimori. The owners and managers of many major networks willingly 
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received millions of dollars to order their journalists and other workers to remain 
uncritical, silent, or support the Fujimori regime (LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010a; Youngers, 
2000). This fact has tarnished the role of media, and there is distrust in both government 
and mainstream media. The image of corruption in the press is still very much present in 
the minds of the public (LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010b). 
 Participants described the efforts on behalf of media to regain the public trust as 
not altogether concerted or genuine. One specific problem with media regaining public 
trust in Peru, large media in particular, is that many media organizations are still run by 
those individuals who accepted bribes from Montesinos in 1990s in exchange for political 
favors or for keeping quiet. One participant commented on this fact as a hindrance to the 
rebuilding of trust in media: 
We must consider that not much has changed in real terms. The [media] owners 
and broadcasters are the same. The licensing system is exactly the same. It’s the 
same people. The same people who worked under Fujimori still run the show. 
These “same people” were also cited as a problem to the advancement of media in Peru 
because they are business people and not “media people.” 
 A representative of an international donor suggested that media bungled an 
opportunity to rebuild public trust after Fujimori’s fall: 
I think they had, they should have, rebuilt their reputation in terms of what 
people expectations and peoples impressions were in those days, because 
unfortunately media became one of the least trusted groups of society. 
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This participant and others suggested that media fell prey to “commercial logic,” 
economic and political interests instead of focusing on rebuilding public trust and 
reestablishing themselves as reliable information authorities.  
 Economic and market forces, and the content such forces dictate media to create, 
were often discussed as a major obstacle to rebuilding public trust in media. Participants 
consistently described the news media as “systematically underestimating its public.”  
[Media] dumbs down everything. So it doesn't address issues, and whatever it 
does address it does it in a shallow way. It doesn't stimulate debate, or challenge 
people's intelligence. It is quite obvious that it is biased and implicitly assumes 
their readers are ignorant, shallow people who are not interested in any serious 
issue. 
 As illustrated in the preceding quote, there is a general frustration among civil society 
actors that media caters to the lowest common denominator because it is economically 
advantageous to do so. Sensationalism is the norm, not the exception, in Peruvian 
journalism. 
 Sensationalism. While there are isolated cases of journalists and media outlets 
that are trying to elevate the debate in Peru, there is no widespread effort on the part of 
the media to take on the mantle of “serious” journalism. This was in part blamed on the 
journalists themselves for succumbing to lowbrow coverage, but fault was mostly placed at 
the feet of large media owners, who instruct their employees on the nature of the content 
to be produced. “So, as to the large media, they basically focus on entertainment, on 
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rumors, on political gossip. There is no in depth analysis. You have, there is 
sensationalism.” 
The interviews were conducted just two months prior to the April 2011 
presidential election (the results of which lead to a run-off election in June 2011 between 
the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, Keiko Fujimori, and Ollanta Humala—Humala being 
the victor—and the election coverage was a frequently mentioned example of the current 
problems with Peruvian media. Participants were disparaging but unsurprised about the 
candidate’s behavior towards the media: 
The candidates need to be in the media, so they will do whatever they have to do 
in order to be front page for the headlines of the TV news show, so they will jump 
and swim and kiss people and do the most useless things for a presidential 
campaign, but they will be on the front pages. 
However, participants were extremely critical of the journalists who cover the candidates 
and their lack of scrutiny and unprofessionalism. One participant, who works for an 
organization that conducts journalist training, said: 
And you have serious journalists, serious newspapers, but they will go along this 
kind of silly campaign things and they don’t ask the questions that must be asked 
for a good presidential campaign. 
The frivolous nature of the coverage of the presidential election is an example of 
the media fulfilling public demands—the public appetite for sensationalist news. The 
Peruvian public is thought to enjoy the media circus and has no desire for serious news or 
thorough investigative journalism. Indeed, the interview participants agreed there is 
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public apathy for solid news and information. And while the public may be “waking up” 
to the realities of public life after Fujimori, a significant challenge for the media 
development community will be to reduce public apathy and increase the demand for 
quality, balanced, and nuanced news. 
Public and media apathy. Five of the participants discussed a lack of will on the 
part of the people and media to make any changes in the way the media system currently 
functions. There is a cynicism among the Peruvian people about the chance for 
improvement in their important public institutions, media included. Their apathetic 
pessimism has been continually fed by decades of political instability, broken government 
promises and inefficiencies, and the often deceitful behavior of the media and its 
manipulation by the state. Research performed by an anti-corruption NGO in Peru 
showed that while people are aware of the problems with poorly performing government 
institutions, widespread corruption, and wayward media, they complacently accept that 
things are not likely to change: “they are like fatalists, nothing is going to change, 
everything will be like this, so the feeling is very, it’s a cause of concern.”   
On the one hand, the Peruvian public has gradually become more aware of 
corruption and deceit in public institutions, but on the other hand they are more tolerant 
of the offending bodies. This dichotomy is particularly disheartening for media 
development NGOs such as IPYS, for whom a key goal is to work for an informed and 
empowered citizenry. The hope is that an informed citizenry will lead to a democratic, 
open society. As such, a significant goal of many of the media development NGOs in 
Peru is to reform media to better inform the public.  
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The attempt to reform media to resist sensationalism is largely seen as an effort to 
raise the level of political will to change among people within media organizations, and 
media owners in particular. Media owners as well as some journalists were perceived by 
the interview participants as being politically unaware and uneducated about the proper 
role of media in a democratic society. One participant offered an anecdote about a media 
owner and journalist confronted with evidence that material he had published was pure 
political propaganda with no verifiable facts: 
He was a journalist, the director of the paper, and he said, “why yes, sure, this is 
politics.” I will never forget that. He did not have a clue of what his role as a 
journalist was, and he was in completely good faith. I am sure he was sincere.  
To this journalist and media owner, putting his newspaper at the service of political 
propaganda was not a betrayal of the public trust or of the inviolability of a journalistic 
ethic, because in his mind there was nothing to betray.  
 From the point of view of the participant who recounted this story, the anecdote 
perfectly illustrates two key problems within Peruvian media itself: a commitment to 
market forces that demands the production of media that sells, and a lack of 
understanding or commitment to journalistic ethics. As such, many participants also 
discussed the lack of proper training for Peruvian journalists, particularly in the provincial 
areas of the country.  
Lack of training and provincial problems. There is a large disparity between the 
education that journalists receive at university and the current realities of the profession in 
Peru. As one participant described: “I think that there is a world, a gap between, even 
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here in Lima, between the training in universities, and what actually have to do as a 
journalist. I don’t know why.” When young journalists leave school they find a world in 
Peru that is completely driven by supply and demand, where jobs are hard to find, very 
poorly paid, and where journalists are merely the producers of content. Journalists are 
viewed to be disposable and replaceable. As such, journalists must quickly come to terms 
with these facts, which in many cases means compromising and putting on hold the 
values and ethics instilled in them at university. As a university professor frankly 
described, “I must say that many of our students don’t look on their futures as being very 
promising.” 
 While there may be inadequate training and a general lack of ethics among 
journalists in Lima, the situation in the provinces is far worse. As nearly one-third of 
Peru’s population of more than 29 million lives in the metropolitan area of Lima 
(European Union External Action, 2007), participants claimed that the provinces are an 
overlooked part of Peru in terms of many forms of development, including journalist 
training. Not only is there limited access to training in the provinces, but there is a large 
disparity between how much journalists in Lima and their provincial counterparts earn. 
As such, provincial journalists are far more likely to be bribed or face pressure from local 
authorities, politicians or corporations. According to the participants, the levels of 
corruption and chicanery among government officials and institutions in the provinces far 
exceeds those in Lima, and level to which these bodies exercise power over journalists 
increases the farther away a journalist works from Lima—particularly in smaller cities or 
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towns. As one participant commented, in the provinces there is a “patronage way to exert 
power,” where bribery and the exchange of favors with the powers that be is the norm.  
In the provinces this is, journalists, they are by and large deeply corrupted. They 
have no independence. They call themselves journalists, but they are in fact the 
property of miners, the drug traffickers, they have no ethic. They have no limits 
when it comes to libel or defamation. 
 Several participants discussed the state of radio and advertising as a weakness of 
provincial journalism. Radio is by far the main medium in the provinces. Many radio 
stations in the provinces will “farm out” hours of broadcasting time a day to a journalist 
for a fee, and then it falls upon the journalist to justify to management the money he or 
she must spend to fill the hour. It is up to the journalist to decide whom to interview, to 
communicate with municipal authorities, basically, to decide what programs to produce. 
Owners of radio stations often have no journalistic training, they merely have the means 
to purchase stations as a money-making operation. Rarely will the owners of the radio 
stations intervene in the content aired by producers, unless the programming upsets those 
in positions of power, who are often advertisers: 
To get advertising money means to go to these authorities. And they do whatever 
they want. The radio station is such that the broadcaster has no responsibility 
whatever, except if they tread on someone who is powerful. Then they 
[advertisers] will go to the owner and say ‘get your guy out, he is attacking me,’ 
and he does that. 
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Because media owners will rarely intervene in the affairs of their radio station, journalists 
are given carte blanche over content and have free reign to create their own editorial 
policy, if any such policy exists. And because the principal advertisers of radio stations are 
the government and large corporations, rarely will radio journalists produce content that 
is critical of their advertisers. 
 Problems with the integrity of radio news only increase during campaign seasons 
where many political parties or candidates will buy their own radio stations to produce 
content favorable to their campaign, “so when you have elections you get the proliferation 
of radios, which are all tied to and funded by individual candidates. They just sprout all 
over the place, programs and radio stations.” Air space is often rented to promote hate 
campaigns against a particular candidate, citizen, or corporation. The end result of such 
corruption in radio programming is a provincial population that is fairly ignorant to 
begin with is also completely uninformed about even the most basic details of pressing 
national and local issues.   
 While the provincial citizenry may be uniformed about the subtleties of current 
events, they are not naïve or unaware of the unreliability of their media or of the 
backroom deals that pervade business and politics. Given this recognition by the public, 
participants felt that transparency and accountability was not only a problem for the 
authorities, politicians and media owners, but also as praxis for the population. The 
citizenry are willing to tolerate the fraudulent behavior of those in power, because they 
hold the false hope that they, too, will one day hold power and be influential.  
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So that’s the way it is . . . they think they will have the opportunity. They dream 
they will have the same opportunity, so if is that is the way it is, they won’t ask for 
transparency. Now it’s their turn, someday it will be my turn. 
This fallacy, or national myth, if you will, is yet another form of apathy on the part of the 
Peruvian population. If citizens agree that this is simply the way business is done, there 
will be no demand for reform. 
 Several participants noted that when it comes to media in the provinces, the only 
exception to the norm of corruption, transparency, and a lack of accountability are the 
stations owned and operated by the Catholic Church, many of them under the umbrella 
organization Coordinadora Nacional de Radio (CNR). While these stations are fairly 
uncorrupt and independent, they also have a certain ideological bent. Editorial freedom is 
restricted when it comes to controversial social or moral issues such as abortion, even in 
those stations controlled by the Jesuit or Franciscan orders, which are generally regarded 
as being fairly progressive.  
 The provincial press in Peru is thought of as weak when put in contrast to other 
South American nations such as Chile and Argentina, which were mentioned by 
participants as having a much stronger press in the provinces. The news coverage in Peru 
tends to be highly centralized in Lima. One participant noted that because most attention 
to media, including attention from international donors, is paid to institutions in Lima, a 
sense of resentment has arisen among those practicing journalism in the provinces. 
However, the challenge of improving the situation in the provinces is further exacerbated 
by the extremely low level of training. Even when organizations such as RedTV and TV-
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Cultura attempt to work with provincial journalists to acquire news from the provinces, 
they find that journalists are so poorly trained the content they submit is often low in 
quality and nearly unusable.  
 Summary of environmental factors. Thus, organizations that are dedicated to 
the development of media in Peru are faced with many environmental difficulties. They 
are attempting to reform a media system that is still largely controlled by individuals who 
were party to and supportive of (or at least bought out by) an autocratic regime. These 
owners largely adhere to market forces that show sensationalism sells. At the same time, 
media development NGOs must work with a public who is largely apathetic when it 
comes to the quality of their media or of the likelihood that anything will ever change. To 
a large extent, these actors are located in Lima and confine their efforts to development 
issues in the capital. Their problems are heightened even more in the provinces where 
there is little education or sufficient international attention to support development. 
These difficulties aside, there are a number of internal or structural factors of the 
organizations themselves that influence the efforts of media development NGOs to act.  
Structural factors. Beyond the difficulties that exist in the contextual 
environment of Peru, many of which are the problems media development NGOs are 
dedicated to rectifying, there are a number of factors that are directly related to the 
functioning of the NGOs themselves. The factors that directly pertain to the operation of 
the NGOs—termed here as structural factors—include the general recognition that 
international donor attention in Peru is waning and a simultaneous inability of media 
development NGOs to become self-sustaining. Further, the nature of cooperation and 
	   101 
competition among these civil society organizations is discussed, as well as their 
institutional capacity.  
 Waning international attention. As discussed in an earlier section, the general 
furor that Fujimori inspired—both in Peru and worldwide—led to the creation of a 
number of NGOs and the increased attention of the international donor community. 
However, without referencing actual numbers, the general impression among all those 
interviewed is that international donors are now pulling out of Peru with growing 
rapidity. While funds have never been plentiful for media development, an item to be 
more fully developed shortly, monies funneled through international cooperation agencies 
were perceived to be available in far greater quantity in the Fujimori era. This is partly 
due to the fact that international attention to anti-corruption and freedom of the press 
was dramatically heightened under Fujimori’s autocracy and immediately thereafter. 
Much attention was paid to the transitional governments in the few years after Fujimori, 
but interest has been on the decline since.  
Participants described a general perception from the rest of the world that Peru 
must somehow “be okay” now that Fujimori has been out for power for more than a 
decade and that Peru’s macro socioeconomic indicators are on the rise. Indeed, two 
participants recounted how the Swedish and the Dutch have recently withdrawn all 
international aid to Peru solely based on Peru’s improving economic indicators. In 
addition, participants believed that budgets for international aid, particularly those from 
European governments, are being cut. There is also a perception that priorities of 
international governments are changing, again from Europe, where many conservative 
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parties have won recent elections and have cut down funding to third world countries. 
For example, a large funder of media development was the Dutch organization Free 
Voice, which has recently been dissolved, and a private international media foundation 
has given some Peruvian NGOs notice that they will no longer be offering financial 
assistance.  
 Donations also appear to be turning away from NGOs in Peru as many such 
organizations have been found to be corrupted and unprofessional. Participants described 
cases of embezzlement in several NGOs that have resulted in international donors losing 
trust in Peruvian civil society actors. As such, one participant described how in the last 
five years international development financing organizations have been taking a harder 
look at their implementers, turning away from NGOs and choosing to work with 
universities instead.  
 The general recognition that international funding agencies are turning their 
attention away from Peru was coupled with the acknowledgment that development funds 
specifically for media have always been limited. Instead, participants noted that what 
funding has been available has generally been for human rights efforts, not media. 
 Funds for human rights, not media. All of the NGOs profiled suggested that 
media development has always had a “very different kind of international cooperation.” 
These organizations recognize that international donors are far more likely to fund 
economic development and anti-poverty efforts than media. As one participant described 
it, “Media, and freedom of expression, free speech had a very different patronage you 
might say.” As another articulated, “most international cooperation in Peru is not targeted 
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at media. Because they see the media not as an end, but as a means for other purposes.” 
Funding for media development is often so specialized that most of the NGOs described 
having to look to general human rights funding to acquire support. 
International cooperation in Peru is largely engaged in helping the Peruvian 
government and citizenry to address issues such as poverty, health, and women’s rights. 
Participants described having to look for loopholes to find how they could tailor their 
activities to the requirements of the funding organization. Often, media development 
NGOs must determine how they can frame communication and a free and fair press as 
fitting into the goals of funding initiatives. But still, it has been extremely difficult to 
acquire money where the media was the objective, not a means to an end. 
A representative of a donor organization articulated that while they were likely to 
support one-off initiatives for media in the past, such as bringing in experts to help train 
journalists, they are not as involved as in the past. He described that it is hard to allocate 
funds for media development specifically. However, participants described that they are 
more likely to acquire funds from freedom of expression or anti-corruption funds. Indeed, 
one participant believed that freedom of expression/speech has become an overriding 
concern of the international donor community: 
 . . . the free press issue is no longer the province of the human rights movement, 
its gone beyond it. It’s become a cross-sectional issue. . . . Free press, free speech 
has become a banner across the spectrum. The same goes for corruption in fact. 
Corruption is no longer the work rite of a tiny movement; it has become a general 
concern.  
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As free speech is no longer the specific province of human rights funding, as this 
participant believed, it is something that is an overarching, global concern. Media NGOs 
have thus found success tailoring their funding applications to freedom of speech monies 
by showing how journalist training can improve media and how media, in turn, can help 
to change mindsets and behaviors. However, the limited ability of media NGOs to 
acquire funds from international donors becomes a more significant problem when 
coupled with the recognition that they are likely to be incapable of becoming self-
sustaining. 
 Most of the NGOs profiled more or less admitted that they are not likely to be 
able to support themselves without outside funding. Participants described having to shut 
their doors if external funding is not continued in close to their present levels. One 
participant noted that the biggest challenge facing this community of media development 
NGOs is indeed self-sustainability. He suggested that NGOs must adapt to depend less 
and less on outside donations: 
However, this is much easier said than done, and in some cases its feasible and in 
other cases it’s hard to see how that is possible. . . . So some has to come from 
outside funding. But in the case of organizations like IPYS or Calandria I don’t 
see what they can really sell for money, so they are really dependent on outside 
donations. It depends, but it is a challenge to the entire sector. 
In order to help subsidize their incomes, two participants described producing 
publications that they sell to media organizations, but commented that the profits from 
such efforts are minimal. However, despite the limited monies available for media 
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development work, participants described relatively little competition among the 
community of actors in Peru. 
 Cooperation and competition. Doerfel and Taylor (2004) prescribed that civil 
society can often be characterized in terms of cooperation and competition. In contrast to 
the many difficult challenges facing media development NGOs in Peru, there appeared to 
be very little overt competition among the groups, at least little that was admitted to by 
the representatives of NGOs themselves. Competition over funding exists, but is not a 
major cause of friction among the actors. As one participant mentioned, “There is a high 
level of cooperation, but of course we also compete, there isn’t that much money to go 
around.” 
However, despite that there is little overt competition among media NGOs, there 
was a division among participants when it came to characterizing the relationship among 
NGOs as cooperative. Several participants described a high level of cooperation among 
media NGOs, but were only able to offer a select few issues or projects that exemplified 
such cooperation. On the other hand, some did not describe the relationship as either 
overtly cooperative or competitive, but mentioned the same few projects. In other words, 
some felt the relationships were cooperative based on only a few examples, while others 
felt the relationships were not particularly cooperative or competitive based on the same 
examples.  
Those outside the core NGO community, those participants not currently 
working for a media development NGO, had a more pessimistic view of the collaboration 
of the civil society sector in question. One individual suggested that there are indeed 
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frictions among some of the organizations, largely to do with their mission and 
constituency. For example, there are some perceptions of the Press Council as merely 
representing the interests of big media owners: 
There is a friction between the Press Council and IPYS, because IPYS is the group 
of journalists, so they feel like, “yeah” you are the owner’s representatives and so 
we are the people actually doing the work in the streets. 
This same participant noted that the partnership between the Press Council and IPYS 
would seem to be a natural one. His organization thought it would originally work with 
both groups on an issue, “Because we thought, its a natural partnership, the owners and 
the journalists, but they were kind of ‘I am not sure you want to work with IPYS or the 
Press Council in the same project.’” Consequently, it seems that two of the most central 
development actors are not seen to “play well” together. Aside from the professional 
tension between the two groups, there may also be personal frictions between the two 
organizations, given that one of the founders of IPYS moved on to help establish the Press 
Council. 
 Those not directly connected with a NGO agreed that in order for these 
organizations to make a difference, they should attempt to coordinate their missions’ vis-
à-vis the current needs of Peruvian society. As they viewed these NGOs to be currently 
uncoordinated, they are regarded as largely ineffectual: “I believe they would be far more 
effective if they developed a united strategy, and they don’t do that. They are not 
interconnected.” Moreover, another participant noted that this lack of coordination 
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intrinsic to the structural qualities of the organizations. He suggested they are 
uncoordinated:  
because they have different beneficiaries, different stakeholders, different sources 
of funding, different missions basically. And the end result is that they don’t 
necessarily address the overarching goal of say developing public opinion, you see 
what I mean, promoting political awareness, etc. They have different action axis. 
They have their own goals, their own indicators. 
As this participant described, the NGOs in question have their individual goals and 
idiosyncratic metrics of what constitutes success. As such, while the organizations come 
together on certain occasions, they are engaged in different lines of business, so to speak. 
They may be allied in a general way, but they have not developed a united strategy with 
specific goals. As one participant succinctly put it, “they need a joint program of action.” 
 As mentioned in the previous paragraph, these NGOs do indeed talk, and not 
always in an official capacity. The number of organizations who are specifically engaged 
in developing media in Peru is small, and it was the general consensus among participants 
that everyone basically knows everyone else: “we all know each other, we know on which 
doors to knock.” Several participants described a strong interpersonal network among 
people who work for various media development NGOs, some who have worked for 
several of the organizations in question. Moreover, several of the leaders of the 
development NGOs were once government ministers in the Toledo government. A leader 
of an anti-corruption NGO described the communities relationship with government as 
“complicated” not only because of the efforts of such groups to make government more 
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open and transparent, but because of the personal history of NGO leaders in the 
government: 
Many of us were called by the government to work as ministers. So we left the 
[NGO] institutions and we went as ministers. I actually myself went to the 
minister of women's and social affairs. Many of us had these government posts. 
So, not only are the individual actors in the media development community connected at 
a professional and personal level, but there are connections to current government 
officials as well.  
Dedicated staff and membership. Participants were more reluctant to discuss the 
health and stability of their own organization than they were discussing the nature of their 
relationships with other groups. However, the organizations profiled agreed they had a 
knowledgeable, dedicated staff with the expertise to effectively carry out their goals. 
Participants described that many former journalists and government officials (as noted in 
the previous section) have joined the development community to work for the benefit of 
Peruvian media. The leadership of the organizations has also remained quite stable; many 
participants described the same actors being involved in development efforts for quite 
some time. And while many of the organizations rely on a healthy supply of interns from 
local universities, most of the organizations had the financial wherewithal to employ 
several full time staff members, most of whom were described as highly qualified 
individuals.  
Summary of structural factors. While it appears media development NGOs and 
other groups who assist in such efforts are staffed by knowledgeable, dedicated 
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professionals, the Peruvian media development civil society sector faces several challenges. 
The most obvious structural challenge is the immediate lack of media development funds. 
Although the dearth of funds specifically for media is not a new problem, obtaining funds 
from international donors is likely to become even more difficult as they begin to pull out 
of Peru. While competition among NGOs in this sector does not appear to be particularly 
fierce, as funds decrease, one could expect to see increasing levels of competition for 
funding. That said, there appears to be—at least from the perspective of the 
participants—an acceptable level of communication among the NGOs if not a high 
degree of collaboration or coordination of efforts. Though there may be a few personal 
frictions among some of the NGOs, the network seems to be generally characterized by a 
healthy mutual regard.  
As mentioned earlier, the goal of the interviews was to provide the context in 
which the network analysis study would be situated. Along with the knowledge provided 
from the interviews, testing the network quantitatively provided insight into the complex 
system of interaction of media development actors in Peru. The next section recounts the 
results of the network analysis. 
Results of Network Analysis 
The following sections report the results of the analysis of the data gathered from 
the online social network analysis survey. The results of each research question and 
hypothesis as derived from the network data is presented in individual sections. However, 
there is first a short section regarding the treatment of missing data. 
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Missing data. Prior to any testing of the survey data, the variable matrices were 
examined for missing data or abnormalities. As the intent of the study was to illuminate 
an interaction network and to gathering the rankings of certain egos by their alters, in 
directed data (such as the interaction network matrix) missing answers were assumed to 
indicate the absence of tie. However, as many of the remaining matrices measured 
relationship quality (OPR scales), reciprocity was assumed and a single report from either 
informant could be used to infer the strength of the relationship (Knoke & Yang, 2008). 
This effect of any missing data was also somewhat mitigated by the collapsing of marker 
variables into the index measures. If a respondent did not answer a question for a specific 
value, the average of the completed answers was computed without the absent value. 
Moreover, as the research was interested in how an actor ranks another actor on a 
particular measure, their responses were taken at face value and included in the analysis 
unaltered.  
Important actors. All of the research questions and hypotheses and the method 
by which they were answered are included in Table 1. The first research question was 
dedicated to determine the most important actors in the Peruvian media development 
community. While RQ1 was partially answered through the construction of the network 
roster, analysis of the in-degree centrality scores of the perceived communication 
importance network also provided a measure of importance. The complete ranking of 
organizational importance can be found in Table 3. The Defensoría del Pueblo, or the 
Ombudsman’s office, ranked as the most important organization in the network with an 
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in-degree centrality score of 45.21. The remaining organizations in the top five included: 
OSI (42.61), USAID (42.17), CNR (42.17), and IDL (40.44). 
Central actors. While the second research question was answered qualitatively, 
and discussed in the previous sections, the third research question sought to determine 
who the most central actors were in the network. RQ3 was answered through the analysis 
of the actual interaction network’s in-degree centrality scores as well as the betweeness 
centrality scores. The complete listing of the scores can be found in Table 3. IPYS ranked 
first in in-degree centrality (39.13), followed by Transparencia (34.78), USAID (30.43), 
CNR (30.43), the Defensoria del Pueblo (30.43), Calandria (30.43), the Press Council 
(30.43), and the Catholic University (30.43). However, the organizations with the 
highest betweeness centrality scores included CAD (10.63), Calandria (9.22), UNPD 
(7.53), USAID (6.47), and OSI (5.82). Figure 1 represents the interaction network with 
nodes sized by in-degree centrality and Figure 2 shows the interaction network sized by 
betweeness centrality. Notice the size of IPYS in Figure 1 compared to Figure 2, which 
helps to visually illustrate how the two centrality measures lead to different results.  
Network density. The fourth research question was concerned with the density of 
the network. The interaction network of the media development actors was analyzed 
using UCINET6. The resulting density of the network was low at 21.4 percent.  This 
suggests a network not progressing towards order (Kauffman, 1993). 
Trust. The fifth research question asked about levels of trust that exist in the 
network. RQ5 was answered via a variety of means. General trust, as measured by the 
question “most people in Peru are basically honest and can be trusted,” resulted in an 
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ambivalent score (M = 3.00, SD = .78).  The most trusted organization in the network, 
based on the in-degree centrality scores is the Defensoría del Pueblo (44.78), followed by 
CAD (41.45), Calandria (40.87), Press Council (38.69), and OSI (35.36). The remaining 
in-degree centrality scores are included in Table 3. The density of trusting relationships 
was high at 69 percent, meaning that 69 percent of all relationships among actors in the 
network could be characterized as trusting. Figure 3 shows the trust network with nodes 
sized by in-degree centrality. 
Cooperation and competition. The sixth research question asked about the 
levels of cooperation and competition among the actors. RQ6 was answered by 
calculating the in-degree centrality measures for cooperation and competition. All of the 
scores are listed in Table 3. The actor perceived to be the most cooperative was the 
UNPD (46.17), followed by the Defensoría del Pueblo (43.39), OSI (43.39), CAD 
(43.21), and the Press Council (42.26). The density of cooperative relationships was high 
at 82 percent. Figure 4 shows the cooperation network with nodes sized by betweeness 
centrality. 
The actors ranked as least competitive were the UNPD (43.48), Calandria 
(35.14), Press Council (31.52), CAD (31.16), and IPYS (31.16). A comparison of the in-
degree centrality means showed that donors (M = 26.012, SD = 15.29) are not 
significantly more likely than implementers (M = 25.68, SD = 11.23) to be perceived as 
cooperative (t = .058, p > .05). Moreover, donors (M = 18.32, SD = 3.87) are not 
significantly less likely than implementers (M  = 20.92, SD = 8.66) to be perceived as 
competitive (t = -.561, p > .05) (two-tailed). The density of the competition network is 
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zero, meaning none of the relationships could be described as competitive using the 3.75 
cutoff point. 
Information exchange. The seventh research question regarded the levels of 
information exchange among the actors. RQ7 was answered by calculating the betweeness 
centrality scores for information exchange. CAD receieved the highest score for 
information exchange centrality (12.72), followed by UNPD (10.59), Calandria (10.07), 
OSI (6.21), and Red de Periodistas del Perú (6.07). Donors (M = 3.29, SD = 3.90) are 
not significantly more likely than implementers (M = 3.38, SD = 3.62) to control access 
to information in the network (t = -.055, p > .05) (two-tailed).  
The density of information exchange is low at .12, meaning that only 12 percent 
of the total possible relationships in the network could be described as having an intense 
exchange of information, using the 3.75 cutoff point. When examining the existing level 
of relationships, the density grows to .51, meaning only half of the existing relationships 
exhibit high levels of information exchange, and represents a network barely transitioned 
to order (Kauffman, 1993). The information exchange network is shown in Figure 5, 
with nodes sized by flow betweeness centrality. Notice the size of USAID in this Figure 
compared to the interaction network in Figure 2, also sized by the similar measure of 
betweeness centrality. 
Relationship quality. The eighth research question asked about the relational 
characteristics of the network based on the OPR scales. RQ8 was answered by calculating 
the in-degree centrality scores of the five OPR scales: control mutuality, trust, 
commitment, satisfaction, and communal relationship. The Defensoría del Pueblo, 
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Calandria, CAD, OSI, the Press Council, and IPYS consistently ranked in the top six for 
each index. The scores can be found in Table 4. 
OPR association with centrality. The ninth research question was aimed at 
determining if OPR scores were associated with centrality scores. RQ9 was answered by 
determining if measures of relationship quality were statistically associated with centrality 
measures. The in-degree centrality scores for interaction and the OPR scales were 
correlated in UCINET. Table 5 includes a list of the correlation coefficients. All OPR 
scales have a moderate, positive, significant correlation with centrality in the interaction 
network. In other words the higher the ranking on the OPR scales the higher an actor was 
ranked in centrality scores. Scatterplots indicated that nodewise datapoints are reasonably 
well distributed along the regression line with no outliers. The strongest correlation was 
between control mutuality (shared power and interdependency) and interaction in-degree 
centrality (r = .514, p < .01), followed by satisfaction (favorability)(r = .497, p < .01), 
commitment (sustainability)(r = .496, p  < .01), trust (integrity, dependability, 
competence)(r = .493, p < .01), and communal relationship (mutual concern and no 
expectation of reciprocity)(r = .488, p < .01).  All of the correlations indicate that as 
measures of OPR increase so too do scores of centrality. 
The betweeness centrality scores for the interaction network and the in-degree 
centrality scores for the OPR scales also exhibited moderate to strong correlations. 
Examination of the scatterplots indicated reasonably well distributed datapoints on along 
the regression line with no outliers. Control mutuality had the strongest correlation with 
betweeness centrality (r = .807, p < .001), followed by satisfaction (r = .734, p < .001), 
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communal relationship (r = .728, p < .001), commitment (r = .725, p < .001), and trust (r 
= .715, p < .001). This set of correlations also shows that as relationship quality increases, 
so too does betweeness centrality. 
Filling structural holes. H1 predicted that organizations that fill structural holes 
are more likely to be perceived as cooperative. Structural holes were examined in 
UCINET and the values for effective size, efficiency, constraint, and hierarchy can be 
found in Table 6. The values for structural holes were correlated with the in-degree 
cooperation measures, the theory being that those who are perceived as most cooperative 
are located in strategic positions in the network. The resulting coefficients are listed in 
Table 7. Cooperation was significantly positively correlated with effective size (r = .877, p 
< .01), efficiency (r = .533, p < .05), and negatively correlated with constraint (r = -.808, 
p < .01). The correlation with hierarchy was not significant (r = .354, p > .05). This 
suggests that as levels of cooperation increase, so does the likelihood of an organization to 
occupy position that connects actors, and supply it with non-redundant contacts and 
sources of information. As cooperation was not significantly associated with hierarchy, 
H1 was only partially supported.  
H1b predicted that organizations that fill structural holes would be perceived as 
valuable information providers. The information exchange values of flow betweeness were 
correlated with the structural holes measures, the theory being that those who are 
perceived to provide high levels of information are located in strategic positions in the 
network. The information exchange index was found to be significantly associated with 
all four measures. The scatterplots indicated good clustering around the regression line. 
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The coefficients are included in Table 7. Flow betweeness was positively associated with 
effective size (r = .875, p < .01), efficiency (r = .462, p < .05), and hierarchy (r = .455, p < 
.05) and negatively associated with constraint (r = -.658, p < .01). H1b was fully 
supported. 
 Simmelian ties. H2 predicted that actors with symmetrical ties would be 
positively associated with organizational centrality. The Press Council and the Defensoria 
del Pueblo have six simmelian ties, followed by the ANP, Calandria, and UNPD with 
four simmelian ties, and OSI, USAID and Red de Periodistas del Peru with two 
simmelian ties each. A correlation of the sum of simmelian ties with the normalized in-
degree centrality (r = .467, p < .05) and betweeness centrality (r = .515, p < .01) showed 
that simmelian ties and centrality are significantly positively associated, showing that 
those with strong ties outside of a dyad are centrally positioned. Thus, H2 was fully 
supported. The nodes with simmelian ties are shown in Figure 6.  
Information flow. H3 predicted that relationship strength, as measured by the 
OPR indices would be positively associated with network information flow. One method 
used to test the association between the OPR indices and information exchange was 
correlating the OPR matrices and the information exchange matrix using the QAP 
correlation function in UCINET6. Examination of scatterplots showed reasonably well-
distributed points along the regression line. Control mutuality had the strongest 
association (r = .687, p < .001), followed by commitment (r = .662, p < .001), trust (r = 
.661, p < .001), satisfaction (r = .660, p < .001), and communal (r = .660, p < .001). All 
of the OPR variables are likely to increase as levels of information increase. 
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To further assess the relation among relationship quality and information 
exchange, the information exchange matrix was regressed on the five OPR variables using 
the QAP double decker semi-partialling method in UCINET. The overall model 
explained 47.9% of the variance in information exchange. The adjusted R2 dropped only 
.002 when compared to the R2. The only positive predictor of information exchange was 
control mutuality (B = 1.43, p < .001). Surprisingly, the rest of the OPR indices were not 
significant predictors of information exchange: satisfaction (B = .22, p > .05), 
commitment (B = .23, p > .05), and communal (B = -.03, p > .05) and trust (B = .84, p > 
.05). This suggests that the only OPR factor that is a significant predictor of if an actor is 
viewed as a valuable information provider is control mutuality. The standardized 
coefficients and the standard error for each variable are included in Table 8.  
In addition, the OPR matrices have a strong, positive correlation with flow 
betweeness centrality. The normalized scores for flow betweeness and the normalized 
OPR indices showed moderate to high, positive, significant correlations. Control 
mutuality exhibited the strongest correlation with network information flow betweeness 
(r = .783, p < .001), followed by satisfaction (r = .730, p < .001), communal relationship 
(r = .723, p < .001), commitment (r = .720, p < .001), and trust (r = .715, p < .001). All 
tests were one-tailed. While all of the OPR scales were statistically associated with 
information exchange centrality, only control mutuality significantly predicted the 
centrality of the organizations in the network. As a result, H3 is only partially supported. 
Summary of results. Several organizations were identified as prominent in terms 
of influence and interaction, including the Defensoría del Pueblo, IPYS, Transparencia, 
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the Press Council, USAID, and OSI, among a few others. The overall density of the 
network is low, indicating a lack of order and systemization in the network. There were 
high levels of trust and cooperation among the actors and low levels of competition. The 
levels of information provision are also low. Higher levels of OPR were associated with 
increased centrality in the network and increased information flow, and cooperation was 
associated with filling structural holes. Moreover, those organizations that provided 
higher levels of information are more likely to occupy structural holes. The next chapter 
discusses the implication of these results.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION  
 The previous chapter presented the results of the research on the media 
development sector of Peruvian civil society. The field research in Peru, as well as portions 
of the network analysis results, have helped to illuminate the prominent actors in media 
development and the challenges facing them as they strive to promote a free press and 
more transparency in government. The network analysis also provided practical data 
about the structure of relations among these civil society groups and the levels of social 
capital that exist—information that may be of “real-world” use to the NGOs and donor 
community. 
 At the same time, the interviews and the network study also have the potential to 
contribute to the furthering of civil society theory. For example, the study revealed that 
Peruvian civil society, or at least its media development sector, has likely entered its third 
stage of development, but exhibits some unexpected characteristics, such as low levels of 
information exchange. Moreover, the results have implications for the practice and theory 
of public relations regarding organization–public relationships (OPR), indicating that 
OPRs are likely to influence the position of an actor in a network and its access to social 
capital. 
 The original goals of the study were twofold. For one, the intent was to examine a 
relationship network of actors through a public relations perspective, and in so doing 
elaborate on how network analysis is a valuable research tool for the study of OPR. The 
second intent was to further the integration of public relations in civil society theory 
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through investigating how quality relationships may affect the structure and processes of 
civil society.  
 Given these two purposes, the chapter is split into two sections. The first 
considers the function network analysis may play in advancing public relations theory and 
metrics. In so doing, the section includes topics such as discovering important actors in 
networks, positioning centrality as an important outcome of OPRs, and the assessment of 
structural holes as a way to improve organizational efficiency. The second section 
considers the role of relationships in civil society and how determinations of the health of 
those relationships and implications for civil society can be made through public relations 
metrics. 
SNA: A Method for Assessing Relationships 
 One of the express purposes of this research was to help extend the relationship 
management and OPR research beyond the examination of the relationship between a 
single organization and a single public. To do so, the case of a community of 
organizational actors dedicated to media development in Peru was examined. For certain, 
this particular community, located in a particular political and cultural context, has 
idiosyncrasies that may not be generalizable. However, the methods by which these 
idiosyncrasies were uncovered may prove useful to other efforts to examine the state of 
relationships among any community of actors, anywhere. 
 This section of the discussion will thus present the results of the network study of 
media development actors in Peru and explain how such results may be useful as a 
diagnostic tool for public relations in other contexts. Consequently, the first section of the 
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discussion comments on the importance of centrality as an outcome for public relations, 
and then uses the examples of organizations in Peru who achieved high levels of 
centrality. The section also includes an explanation of how structural holes measures may 
help to fulfill the promise of OPR as predictors of organizational efficiency. 
Centrality as a Function of OPR 
Huang (2001) has suggested “it is necessary to measure the quality of OPRs from 
the perspective of a public’s perception of a specific relationship” (p. 70). As discussed in 
earlier sections of this manuscript, the measurement of relationship quality in public 
relations research has consistently focused on the dyad. Scholars of OPR have more or less 
suggested that to determine whether a relationship is healthy or not, one has only to 
observe or measure the interactions and exchanges between an organization and a public 
(Broom et al., 1997; Grunig & Huang, 2000; Hon & Grunig, 1999). Certainly, there is 
value to be found in measuring the quality of the dyadic relationship between an 
organization and a public. A dyadic relationship has individuality to it, and it is intuitive 
that dyadic relationships are important to organizational effectiveness—if that is indeed 
the aim we hope to achieve from establishing and maintaining quality relationships. 
 However, we know there are mediating factors to consider in assessing the overall 
relational status of an organization. There is a good deal more power to be had by one 
actor over the other in a dyad (Krackhardt, 1998). Whereas, Krackhardt noted, when 
faced with only one other actor, this power can be significantly mediated or dissolved. As 
seen in the results of H2, shown in Figure 6, the simmelian ties among several of the 
actors are likely to exert strong influence on one another. Yet, if the relationships are 
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strong in the dyad, and in a third relationship in common, centrality in the network is 
more likely to be attained. Ties in common are likely to influence dyadic exchanges, as 
well as the extent to which an organization attains centrality. Considerations of other 
social actors in the assessment of relationship quality thus become essential to the 
measurement of OPR because the presence of other organizations or publics in a social 
environment can fundamentally change the character, dynamics, and consequences of a 
relationship between two actors.  
Centrality measures, particularly those of in-degree and betweeness, should 
become important considerations in the evaluation of an organization’s relationships with 
other actors in the environment, no matter whether the environment is political, social, 
economic, or all of the above. The next sections discuss how centrality is an important 
outcome variable for public relations, and provide examples from the network study of 
Peru’s media development actors. 
Centrality as Organizational Outcome 
Central to Broom et al.’s (1997) model of relationship management is the 
importance of the identification of antecedents, states, and consequences of relationships. 
Reference Table 9 for a brief description of the stages of Broom et al.’s model. The major 
reason that OPR has been emphasized in the relationship management literature and in 
the practice of public relations is that the existence of quality relationships between an 
organization and its publics is believed to be a major contributor to organizational 
effectiveness. The predominant perspective on the influence of relationships on 
organizations is that relationships “constrain or enhance the ability of the organization to 
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meet its mission” (Grunig, 1992, p. 20). Grunig, Grunig, and Dozier (1995) concluded 
that public relations increases organizational effectiveness when it builds a “long-term 
relationship of trust and understanding” (p. 5). Relationship quality, in terms of affective 
or psychological variables such as trust (and any number of others), has thus been 
conceived of as the independent variable that affects the dependent variable of 
organizational effectiveness. 
While many relational consequences in public relations are often defined in terms 
of goal achievement (Broom et al., 1997), organizational effectiveness, or psychological or 
affective concepts such as control mutuality, satisfaction, and trust (Grunig & Huang, 
2000), these relational measures or outcomes, depending on the theoretical positioning 
and use of the variable, do little to help describe the effects or pressures from the 
environment. Reference Table 9 for a description of Grunig and Huang’s model of 
relationship antecedents and consequences, and for an early attempt at defining 
relationship and consequences from a network perspective. Broom et al. (1997) pointed 
out the need for measures of relationships that “are distinct from perceptions held by 
parties in the relationships” (p. 95). Grunig and Huang (2000), Huang (2001), and 
others have also ascertained this need and attempted to extend the concept of 
organization–public relations beyond the “simple relationship between one organization 
and one public” (p. 35), without having devised the adequate means to do so.  
As demonstrated by this study, centrality is another outcome of quality 
relationships that affects perceptions and the strategic position of an organization, and as 
such is included in Table 9 as a possible new outcome of relationships for public relations. 
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Centrality has potential as a key metric for evaluation in public relations. Using network 
analysis to identify the state of relationships that exist in an organization’s environment 
helps to characterize public relations less in terms of what it does, and more in terms of 
what it is—a problem that public relations often faces when the public or management 
attempts to define the purpose or function of the profession (Ledingham & Bruning, 
2000).  
When we shift the focus away from dyadic interactions and one-way 
communication practices, and instead conceive of public relations within “an organic 
framework of evolving relationships” (Pal & Dutta, 2008, p. 168) there is great potential 
for understanding how network analysis may inform our conceptualization of what it 
means to have a relationship. As Kent and Taylor (2011) have written, moving past 
traditional, managerial approaches—ones that often focus on what public relations does 
for organizations, rather than what it is—we may be able to “move toward understanding 
relationships wherever they form and in whatever form they take” (p. 52).   
Centrality is a beneficial metric for public relations because it considers the 
relationships a particular organization’s publics have with other organizations as 
influential in determining the position of the original organization. In other words, what 
we know is shaped by whom we know, but perhaps equally so by whom they know. 
Simple knowledge of successful dyadic relations does not secure an organization a general 
positive perception or an advantageous position from which to broker information, 
resources, or influence.  For example, during the interview stage, none of the 
organizations indicated they have interactions with the Ciudadanos al Día (CAD), due 
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either to a lack of a significant relationship or unconscious omission, or cited the 
organization as an influential player. Yet, as demonstrated by the results of the network 
study (shown in Tables 3 and 4), the location and quality of the linkages CAD did have 
made it one of the most well-rated and well-positioned organizations in the media 
development environment of Peru. As a consequence, the number of dyadic relations an 
organization has may increase its reach, but may not necessarily enhance its strategic 
position in the network. Nor will it necessarily improve the way the organization is 
perceived by others—as exemplified in the case of USAID, which will be further 
elaborated upon later.  
To some extent, centrality is also a metric of the social capital of an organization 
and is thus included as a potential outcome of relationships in Table 9. The relationships 
an organization maintains, often constituted by social capital variables, determines where 
an organization is positioned in the network and subsequently enhances or hinders its 
access to resources and knowledge. The substance of beneficial relationships is akin to the 
social capital embedded within them, making social capital not only an outcome of 
relationships, but of the relationship itself. 
However, social capital can also be considered at a more macro level (Putnam, 
1993). If public relations is to be concerned not only with the health and well-being of 
the organization, but also to help build communities and collective social capital 
(Kruckeberg & Stark, 1998; Sommerfeldt & Taylor, in press), we must also assess the 
sheer existence of actors in a particular community, such as the media development 
community in Peru, and how they are organized. We must take stock of who exists in our 
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communities as well as how they are connected. The following sections thus discuss the 
media development sector as an example of how public relations can both look at 
networks as a way to diagnose the prestige of an organization, as well as the overall health 
of a community. 
Existence of NGOs Equivalent to Social Capital? 
 From a purely institutional or communitarian perspective on social capital (cf. 
Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) the state of Peruvian civil 
society in general could be described as strong. An institutional or communitarian 
approach to the assessment of social capital implies that the mere presence of actors such 
as NGOs and other civil society groups is an indication of high levels of social capital in a 
community. From this perspective, a community may be described as strong in social 
captial simply by counting the people or organizations who are involved. Indeed, as 
Alasino (2008) eloquently put it, Peru may be the “Kingdom of the NGO,” with over 
900 active NGOs reported operating in 2007. As Brown (1998) viewed social capital, the 
presence of a large number of NGOs suggest a strong level of social capital given that 
such groups often emerge as informal citizens or grassroots associations that organized 
into NGOs to manage problematic issues. The number of NGOs in the nation may be 
reflective of the efforts of both citizen groups and international donors to help temper the 
unsettled and sometimes violent recent past of Peru.  
 However, the number of organizations dedicated exclusively to the development 
of media in Peru is comparatively small to the problems inherent in media. Of the 24 
organizations examined, only six could be described as focused exclusively on issues 
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related to media (Calandria, IPYS, Press Council, Red de Periodistas de Provincias del 
Perú, ANP). And while the OSI may be the donor who focuses most on media 
development, most international donor agencies have a swath of issues for which they 
advocate, which in Peru appears to focus more on the protection of civil rights, human 
rights, and transparency in government (Alasino, 2008).   
As related earlier, donor funds for media development are sparse. Most often the 
means by which media development NGOs acquire funds is through human rights, 
transparency, or free speech initiatives. Consistent with prior research, NGOs have had to 
alter their missions or the way they deliver programs to meet the requirements of donors 
(Giffen et al., 2006). Some of the most central NGOs in this study, in terms of both the 
structural and cognitive networks, were those not necessarily dedicated to the 
advancement of media as such, yet were identified by their peers as being influential in 
the media development sector (e.g. Transparencia, CAD, IDL). Interestingly, the most 
central actor in the media development sector of Peruvian civil society is perhaps the 
institution with the broadest focus.  
Network Influence: The Success Story of the Ombudsman 
Unlike other institutions studied in this research, and indeed in other works 
concerning civil society, the ombudsman’s office is a constitutionally independent entity 
created by the government—established under the Fujimori regime no less—but partially 
funded through international cooperation. As Pegram (2008) noted, human rights 
ombudsman’s offices such as that in Peru have rapidly spread throughout Latin America 
in recent decades, and have become important players in civil society, perhaps more so 
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than in other places in the world. The office has thus become an essential participant in 
Peruvian civil society and the object of much donor consideration. 
Alasino (2008) noted that significant international support and attention has been 
paid to the development of the Defensoría del Pueblo. Indeed, he suggests that the 
greatest achievement of international cooperation has been the support board for the 
ombudsman. The profile of the ombudsman’s office is so high that former prime minister 
Beatriz Merino (the first female to hold that office) was the first female ombudsman, who 
recently resigned and is now considered the front runner for the office of prime minister 
again as Humala won the run-off election in June 2011 (Hemispheric Brief, 2011).  
As asked in the first research question, the ombudsman’s office was perceived to 
be the most important actor in media development based on levels of communication 
importance, and received the highest rankings on every measure of OPR employed in this 
study. While the institution is constitutionally free from government intervention, it 
retains a fair modicum of power. In the case of Peru, the ombudsman’s office has express 
jurisdiction over election processes, among other civil and human rights responsibilities 
(Pegram, 2008). Given the office’s function in the maintenance of a free and fair political 
and civil society, it is perhaps not surprising the ombudsman attained such high rankings 
from the actors surveyed.  
The ombudsman’s office is a mediating body between NGOs and the state. The 
ombudsman moderates complaints of political and civil rights. As civil society is often 
defined in terms of its existence between society and the state (Diamond, 1994; Hauser, 
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1998), the ombudsman may be one form of moderating link between civil society and 
government, and between government and society.  
The ombudsman offers an institutional channel through which actors can access 
government. As such, the demand for their services—as exemplified through the high in-
degree centrality scores for both communication importance and slightly less so for 
interaction—is not surprising. Considering the diffuse range of activities in which the 
organizations studied herein engage, the fact that the ombudsman obtained the highest 
importance ranking from participants is testament to the flexibility and extensive 
relevance of the institution. Indeed, the demand for the attention of the ombudsman in 
Peru is so high that 50 percent of all complaints received by the office fall outside their 
purview (Pegram, 2008). Moreover, Pegram reported statistics from a 2006 University of 
Lima poll that showed the office maintained a high approval rating of 46.4 percent, in 
comparison to the judiciary (15.4%) and the legislature (20.1%). Not only is this 
institution afforded with a degree of real power, it is perceived to be efficacious, 
trustworthy, and open to the suggestions and interdependencies of other actors.  
The ombudsman emerged as a central player no doubt because of its perceived 
efficacy, impartiality, and the extensive involvement of international donors. USAID, 
OSI, and UNPD all indicated a relationship with the ombudsman. The Defensoría del 
Pueblo may be the organization best positioned to be the “crucial source of democratic 
change” offered by civil society organizations (Diamond, 1994, p. 5). The interest of civil 
society donors and evaluators should thus consider the role ombudsman’s play in Latin 
America, as such offices are not frequently mentioned in literatures studying civil society 
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elsewhere, such as Eastern Europe or Central Asia (e.g. Badescu & Uslaner, 2003; Doerfel 
& Taylor, 2004; Giffen et al., 2006; Kraidy, 1998; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003).  
The case of the ombudsman is not only interesting in the context of Peru, but for 
theoretical development in public relations as well. One could ask: what is the 
ombudsman doing that makes it so special? Is it because of its special function that it has 
achieved such a high degree of importance and centrality? It is doubtful that this is the 
case, for as ascertained in this research perceived importance is not always associated with 
high scores on OPR measures. As evidenced by USAID, importance is not necessarily 
accompanied by quality relationships. The rankings of USAID in importance, shown in 
Table 3, are not equivalent to the rankings it achieves on other measures, also seen in 
Table 3 and 4. The ombudsman, on the other hand, is the most important actor and at 
the same time maintains excellent relationships with the other actors in the network. The 
Peruvian ombudsman may be unique given its constitutionally afforded powers as well as 
the significant involvement of international donors and the quality relationships it has 
with others actors. 
The relationships the ombudsman has acquired is in no doubt part due to its 
perceived efficacy and power. Organizational effectiveness may thus not only be a 
dependent variable of successful OPRs, as advocated by management scholars (e.g. 
Grunig, 1992; Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), but the perceived effectiveness of an 
institution may also be a driving variable of the establishment of quality relationships. 
This implication is particularly relevant for considerations of relationships in civil society, 
which normatively functions as a collectivity aimed at enacting change (Brown, 1998). 
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Civil society organizations may choose to interact and build relationships with others 
whom they perceive to be efficacious, and positive relationships result from the 
subsequent partnerships to solve problems.  
The ombudsman thus serves as an example of what all organizations should strive 
to be. Organizations should attempt to attain a high degree of efficacy—we should be 
good at what we do. At the same time, quality relationships must be maintained so that 
positive perceptions from publics are ensured. Moreover, as asked in RQ9, quality 
relationships may affect the degree to which organizations occupy key positions in a 
network that afford it access to resources such as information. Discussing some of the 
organizations that fill key positions in the network may yield additional insights into how 
centrality measures hold promise as metrics for public relations. 
Examining Key Network Positions 
 As represented in Tables 3 and 4, the ombudsman, along with a few other groups 
such as CAD, CNR, Transparencia, IPYS, OSI, and the Press Council repeatedly 
occupied key positions in the structural and cognitive networks of the media development 
sector. While the ombudsman was perceived as the most important player in the media 
development sector, perception does not always translate to interaction. Other measures, 
such as in-degree centrality, betweeness centrality, and structural holes of lend additional 
insight into other prestigious organizations and provide examples of the relevance of 
network analysis for public relations. 
In-degree centrality. In-degree centrality is a useful metric for determining how 
many ties an organization received as well as the extent to which alters feel positively 
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towards an ego. As such, in-degree centrality was used to help answer RQ3. The 
organization with the highest in-degree centrality for interaction—the number of people 
who claimed to interact with another actor—was IPYS. The interaction network with 
nodes sized by in-degree centrality can be seen in Figure 1. Information from the 
qualitative interviews supports the finding that IPYS is among the most prominent, and 
perhaps the most efficacious, of the media development NGOs. IPYS’s journalism 
training programs and efforts to overthrow Fujimori in the 1990s secured IPYS a place as 
one of the leading NGOs in Peru. Doerfel and Taylor (2004) found that the history of an 
organization’s participation in civil society is likely to lead to an enhanced reputation and 
greater in-degree centrality. In the case of IPYS, it may be its history in the community 
and its past successes that have led to its receiving the most ties from others. 
 The counterpart to IPYS as a NGO for journalists is the Consejo de la Prensa 
Peruana, The Peruvian Press Council—one of whose goals is lobbying for the rights of 
media owners. While it was tenth in perceived communication importance, the Press 
Council ranked highly on all of the cognitive measures employed in the study. 
Qualitatively, it was implied the Press Council and IPYS may have somewhat of an 
adversarial relationship, given the development history of both organizations and their 
current purposes. The Press Council had been described as merely representing the 
interests of media owners, who are not a particularly popular crowd among the media 
development community. That said, the Council does not appear to be suffering from a 
lack of quality relationships with other organizations, including IPYS. Although, for the 
information exchange measure, IPYS claimed to have a strong information exchange 
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relationship with the Press Council, that is, it looked to the Press Council for important 
information, but the relationship was not reciprocated. Such discrepancies are interesting 
to note in public relations’ considerations of overall relational health. The existence of a 
relationship does not always mean the content within the relationship is reciprocally 
exchanged.   
Like IPYS, the Council has a high degree of perceived efficacy among media 
NGOs, both given the clout of its members and the recent accomplishments of the 
institution in lobbying for the passage of laws and the involvement of the judiciary. The 
Council may also be benefitting from the participation of the UNPD, who claimed to 
interact with many other groups, but did not receive ties from as many other institutions. 
This suggests a particularly strong relationship between the donor and the Press 
Council—a relationship that was qualitatively supported as being robust.  
 In-degree centrality is not always an indication of quality relationships. Like the 
Defensoría del Pueblo, USAID ranked third in terms of in-degree centrality for the 
interaction network. Unlike the ombudsman, however, USAID’s OPRs were substantially 
lower in quality, based on the OPR metrics presented in Table 4. As such, in network 
analysis, it is not only important to study the number of ties received, but also the nature 
of those ties and what flows through them. Information is often thought to be among the 
most important resources that flow through civil society relationships, providing the 
social capital for a successfully functioning community (Coleman, 1988; Meyer, 1997; 
Putnam, 1993). Assessments of how resources such as information flow through a 
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network help to reveal organizations that have the capability to strategically broker or 
control the resource flow of the network. 
 Information brokerage. In-degree centrality provides a basic measure of 
organizational prestige. There are, however, examples of organizations that did not rank 
highly in importance or in interaction in-degree centrality, yet hold strategic positions in 
the network. As Borgatti (2005) has advocated, “the importance of a node in a network 
cannot be determined without reference to how traffic flows through the network” (p. 
69). RQ7 considered if information flow is associated with network centrality. The 
information exchange network with nodes sized by in-degree centrality, shown in Figure 
5, illustrates this concept well. While Ciudadanos al Día (CAD) was neither perceived to 
be among the most important actors in media development (it ranked 18th out of 24 
organizations) nor was it the organization with the highest in-degree centrality (5th out of 
24), the relationships it does have affords it the highest betweeness centrality for 
interaction and highest flow betweeness centrality for information exchange in the 
network.  
CAD sits in a unique position in the network because it connects actors that 
would otherwise have no easy way to access others in the network (Knoke & Yang, 2008). 
CAD connects different types of organizations (Donors, researchers, and professional 
associations), which is likely the reason it occupies the number one position for 
information exchange. Due to its relationships with different kinds of organizations 
spread out in the network, CAD is likely to receive information sooner, and from a 
variety of sources (Borgatti, 2005).  
	   135 
 Depending on the research question of interest, betweeness centrality may thus be 
a more useful metric for public relations than in-degree centrality. For example, if the 
network community of interest is bloggers or another form of social media and the 
relationship content studied is information exchange, measures of betweeness centrality 
and flow betweeness may help public relations to pinpoint the best actors to which 
information should be sent. As actors with high betweeness centrality are likely to serve as 
a gatekeeper for resources that flow through a network (Krackhardt, 1992), targeting such 
actors as contacts for information may help organizations to distribute information 
throughout a community more efficiently. Another measure, structural holes, may also 
help public relations to determine if the organization itself is acting efficiently. Structural 
holes may be one way of determining if quality OPRs truly lead to a form of 
organizational efficiency. 
 Structural holes. Many of the organizations mentioned heretofore as filling key 
positions in the network in terms of in-degree centrality and betweeness centrality also 
filled structural holes. Structural holes are positions in the network that link together 
actors that would otherwise remain unconnected (Burt, 1992). Calandria, CAD, UNPD, 
the ombudsman, and Press Council had high values for effective size, indicating an 
exposure to diverse sources of information through non-redundant contacts. That is, they 
have relationships with different types of organizations that afford them access to clusters 
of other well-positioned actors.   
 The structural holes measures show that donor organizations like NED and the 
U.S. Embassy have among the least effective and efficient links in the network, indicating 
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they are not fully integrated. In contrast, donors like UNPD, OSI, and USAID fill 
structural holes by having more effective and efficient links. Similar to Doerfel and Taylor 
(2004), these donors help to foster a more efficient and effective network, filling holes in 
relationships and limiting redundancy of contacts.  
Also similar to the findings of Doerfel and Taylor (2004) was the answer to H1, 
which found a positive, significant correlation between levels of information exchange 
and the filling of structural holes. Moreover, as seen in the answer to H1b, there is an 
inverse relationship between levels of cooperation and structural constraint. While no 
organization was fully dependent on a single other group in this network, both NED and 
Proetica had high scores in constraint. At the same time, both organizations ranked 
poorly on the cooperation metric. Conversely, organizations such as the UNPD, OSI and 
the ombudsman had high scores for cooperation and were simultaneously in positions 
with little constraint. Being perceived as more cooperative is likely to lead to lower levels 
of constraint, that is, the connections an actor has do not constrain their behavior—actors 
do not lose freedom to access resources within a network based on their poorly connected 
alters.    
As recounted several times in this manuscript, managerial perspectives on public 
relations have stressed organizational effectiveness as the desired outcome of positive 
OPRs (Grunig, 1992; Grunig & Huang, 2000). Burt’s (1992) theory of structural holes 
may be useful to public relations scholars interested in examining the benefits of 
establishing relationships with certain other organizations in a system to maximize 
organizational efficiency in gathering information or resources, while at the same time 
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eliminating the need for redundant contacts. Measures of structural holes help to assess 
the benefits of having relationships with organizations that provide resources, and at the 
same time avoid the costs in terms of money and time spent in building more 
relationships than required. Structural holes provide a map that can guide organizations, 
through the building of strategic relationships, to become influential and prestigious 
actors in a network.  
One has only to look at the Defensoría del Pueblo, who attained the highest in-
degree centrality for all five of the OPR scales (shown in Table 4), and at the same time 
has effective and efficient relationships, as well as low levels of constraint (shown in Table 
6). The organization has attained a position where relationship quality has likely impacted 
the diversity of their relationships, so that they gain the most out of the network without 
as many relationships. As building cooperative and positive OPRs is strongly associated 
with filling structural holes, as predicted in H1, if we view the various measures of 
structural holes as akin to organizational effectiveness, network analysis can truly fulfill 
the promise of OPRs. 
Moreover, structural holes may help to determine whether different kinds of 
relationships afford an organization with key positions in a network. As Dozier and 
Ehling (1992) have prescribed, organizations have enabling, functional, normative, and 
diffused linkages. The assumption underlying this perspective was, of course, dyadic. In 
this view, the relationship, whether enabling, functional, normative or diffuse, ended at 
the public with whom an organization had the relationship. Examining the position of an 
organization based on the kinds of relationships in a network will provide a better picture 
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of how the nature of a relationship affects the ability of an organization to engage 
effectively with a network. 
 The previous sections have made the case for SNA as a diagnostic tool for public 
relations. Measures such as in-degree centrality, betweeness centrality, and structural holes 
have been introduced as important metrics have been explained, and examples from 
Peruvian civil society have been offered. However, theories and metrics from public 
relations such as OPR also have much to offer civil society theory. The next major section 
of this chapter discusses how the results of this research can help to further integrate 
public relations and civil society theories. 
A Relational Civil Society or None at All 
If civil society is truly a relational construct, then at the heart of what makes for a 
successful civil society is the existence and maintenance of quality relationships. Not only 
are public relations theories and metrics useful to the examination of civil society, the 
practice of public relations is of vital import to its continued success. Maintaining 
relationships, building new ones, and communicating well with donor agencies, fellow 
NGOs and governments is necessary to civil society work. As Taylor (2000) 
demonstrated, media relations by NGOs in Bosnia were an important tool in sustaining 
civil society in the war-torn nation. Public relations can help to create and sustain the 
channels through which information may flow and at the same time be responsible for 
the creation of such information. As noted by Kennan and Hazleton (2006), the public 
relations function is in the best position to create and sustain social capital for 
organizations. Public relations, and the way in which it maintains relationships, facilitates 
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resource exchange and the flow of information, is central to the continuation of a healthy 
civil society. 
However, as demonstrated in answering RQ7, information exchange was only 
evidenced by half of the existing relationships and only 12 percent of the total possible 
relationships in the network. Moreover, collective action on the part of the actors is 
becoming increasingly infrequent. These findings raise questions about the nature of civil 
society and the role of public relations—in the form of ensuring quality OPRs—in 
sustaining a civil society. The next few sections interrogate the nature of civil society and 
social capital by asking:  is civil society simply a relational phenomenon? Or, are actions 
resulting from those relationships required for a civil society to truly manifest? Assessing 
the state of relationships and the extent to which actors come together to achieve 
collective goals is valuable if there is to be a broader role for public relations in facilitating 
social capital and civil society (Sommerfeldt & Taylor, in press; Taylor, 2009) or the 
maintenance of a more fully functioning society at large (Heath, 2006). Such an 
assessment of social capital requires examining the degree to which actors turn to each 
other for support, and the factors that may be limiting them from doing so (Grootaert & 
van Bastelaer, 2002). 
A Civil Society: Relationships or Actions? 
 One conclusion that can be easily drawn from interpreting the results of the study 
is a Peruvian NGO sector that includes organizations that are fairly isolated when 
considering joint activity, but close in terms of relational quality. In other words, they do 
not often work together but they claim to have reasonably strong relationships with one 
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another. As with the institutional view of social capital (Grootaert & van Bastlaer, 
2002)—one that interprets the sheer presence of organizations as evidence of social 
capital—taken at face value the relationships among the organizations studied exhibit 
high levels of social capital. RQ5 and 6 were concerned with assessing the social capital 
variables of trust and cooperation, and based on the measures used in this study, shown in 
Table 3, the civil society community in Peru exhibits relatively strong levels of social 
capital from a bridging perspective (Adler & Kwon, 1998), wherein social capital is a 
resource inherent in durable social networks, but not necessarily actions.  
Social capital can thus be conceived of as the potential to access information, 
resources or support, but not necessarily of their actualization (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). The network of actors have a variety of contacts and resources that could flow 
through the relationships with those contacts; meeting the requirements of what 
constitutes social capital as laid out by some scholars (Ihlen, 2005). The media 
development community has established social networks from which to draw upon 
reserves of social capital. But without a Fujimori to fight—so to speak—the issues and 
practices of the media development community have fragmented. Quality relationships 
exist, they are just not frequently used to facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit 
(Putnam, 1993).  
As civil society is a relational construct (cf. Renshaw, 1994; Taylor, 2000, 2009) 
the examination of the relational structure of media development actors in Peru leads one 
to consider what exactly constitutes a “strong” versus a “weak” civil society. The 
quantitative results of the network survey point to the existence of quality relationships 
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among civil society groups although, as the answer to RQ4 demonstrated, the density of 
network relationships was low. Moreover, there was a qualitative perception that most of 
the actors in the community were cooperative, and that many knew one another 
personally and felt comfortable calling on these individuals for help should it be required. 
While the organizations studied were quantitatively and qualitatively portrayed as 
being generally cooperative and as having little to no competition among them, there was 
a relative lack of concrete examples of issues around which the community came together. 
While there were, on occasion, specific issues for which several of the actors advocated 
for—such as the campaign to restore a license of a radio station shut down by the Garcia 
government—these type of actions appeared to be few and far between. Moreover, these 
issues appeared to be reactive as opposed to proactive. As a representative from one of the 
donor organizations noted, most of the implementing NGOs have their individual issues, 
practices and purposes, and rarely do they come together to proactively work on solutions 
to mutual issues of concern. 
This calls into question the nature of civil society—and to some extent social 
capital—as a relational construct. Are we to measure the state of civil society on the extent 
to which organizations are connected and perceive one another as cooperative and 
trustworthy? Or, should the definition of a civil society be based on the reification of 
quality relationships through frequent collective action? Scholars such as Coleman (1990) 
and Putnam (1993) placed activity coordination at the center of considerations of social 
capital. Relationship networks provide the context for solving problems, but as the data 
from Peru indicates, efforts to collectively manage issues appear to be waning. As there 
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was no baseline study to compare the present results again, it is not possible to be certain 
the collective actions in the community have decreased. However, interviewees 
qualitatively expressed that they believed collective action to be more frequent in the past.  
Brown and Ashman (1996) pointed out that civil society actors must not be 
isolated. They require connections—a well-developed network of support to help them 
accomplish tasks not easily accomplished alone. Civil society actors in Peru reported 
relatively strong levels of social capital in their relationships. As shown in Figure 3, they 
largely trust one another. Further, they are perceived to share influence and to allow 
themselves to be interdependent, yet they are relatively isolated in their purposes and in 
their deeds. This relative isolation, indicated by the network density and levels of 
information exchange, may pose a threat to the continued advancement of the media 
development sector, especially should donors continue to leave. The increased isolation of 
actors and the low levels of information exchange heighten the need for public relations 
efforts to rebuild relationships and facilitate the flow of information. If the decline of 
information exchange continues, without a concerted effort of NGOs to strengthen 
communication relationships the sector is in danger of stagnation. 
Stalling in the Third Stage 
 The community of media development actors, and indeed Peruvian civil society at 
large, has arguably gone through two discernable stages of development, as conceived by 
Giffen et al. (2006). The civil society community in Peru arose in periods of intense 
turmoil, starting in the late 1970s with the rise of The Shining Path, grew during the 
transformation from a military coups to an unstable democracy in the 80s, and the 
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political malfeasance of Fujimori in the 90s. The media development civil society 
community of actors studied here found common purpose in fighting easily identifiable 
opponents such as Fujimori for a fairer, freer, and more transparent Peru. At the same 
time, international donor attention poured into Peru, despite Fujimori’s efforts to 
persecute and dampen the NGO community. Under Toledo’s government, NGOs 
appeared to flourish under increased levels of funding and freedom from an oppressive 
government’s intervention.  
 Given this history, the civil society sector in Peru has made strides to becoming 
and independent and influential force in the political, social, and economic climate of the 
nation. And while the media development sector has shared in these successes somewhat, 
there are a number of problems that may keep the sector from fully realizing its third-
stage potential as a self-sustaining, autonomous civil society. They include, but are not 
necessarily limited to: a continued dependency on outside donors and a simultaneous 
inattention to capacity building, a lack of information exchange, and the environmental 
problems facing the community. 
Continued resource dependency. The media development NGOs in Peru have 
reached a certain level of maturity, and grown capable of lobbying for the interests of 
society at the national level. In addition, there are a number of larger NGOs that are 
capable of and have assisted in the creation of and support for new NGOs 
(Transparencia, IPYS). Such behaviors are indicative of a third-stage civil society (Giffen 
et al. 2006). Yet, according to the interview participants, and as derived from the value 
placed on communication relationships with international donors such as USAID, OSI, 
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and the UNPD, donors remain central to the continuing existence of a healthy Peruvian 
media development community. 
The dependence on donor funding is, of course, one of the most significant 
problems facing NGOs, and frequently a source of contention among them (Doerfel & 
Taylor, 2004). Given the political context of Peru and its recent transition period, 
although more than a decade on, it is easy to understand how Peruvian NGOs remain 
extremely dependent on continued funding from external donors. Peruvian media NGOs 
reported that they have had some success in securing grants for one-time projects, with 
the occasional luck of securing a renewal. Renewals, however, are becoming more 
infrequent, both from the perspective of NGOs and donor organizations. It is becoming 
harder for media development NGOs to keep close to their original mission. They must 
continually adapt to the requirements of international donors, who are largely interested 
in the amorphous areas of human rights and free speech. Indeed, anti-corruption and 
transparency related NGOs do not seem to be suffering from the same funding problems 
as media-specific NGOs.  
Thus, unlike the larger context of civil society in Peru, the media development 
sector appears to exhibit behaviors of a second-stage civil society in that they must adjust 
their missions to sustain their existence (Giffen et al., 2006). The continual struggle to 
find diminishing assistance from international donors is an indication of a lack of self-
sustainability. Neither the media development actors, nor the donors who have funded 
them, have successfully dealt with building the capacity to become self-sustaining in the 
long term. The kinds of relationships these organizations currently have, and the 
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resources flowing through those relationships, are not likely to provide for their continued 
existence.    
 Lack of capacity building. The international donor agenda appears to have been 
to provide for the development and protection of a civil society sector that was able to 
effectively counterbalance an unstable public sector or authoritarian government, 
represented by the Fujimori regime and its aftermath. This mirrors the work of donors in 
Croatia (Taylor, 2000), the Kyrgyz Republic (Giffen et al., 2006) and other Eastern 
European post-communist nations and elsewhere (e.g. Gibson, 2001; Hadenius & Uggla, 
1996; Mercer, 2002). Donors are interested in securing a stable democracy in times of 
crises, consequently money flows into efforts to promote free speech, the protection of 
journalists, and government transparency. But attention wanes when such flagrant crises 
of civil rights violations appear to be over.  
Donors seem to have followed similar strategies in Peru as they have elsewhere. 
The bulk of funds flowing into Peru from international donor agencies such as USAID 
and other private foundations are focused on the strengthening of civil society and 
democracy building (Alasino, 2008). The United States contributes a substantial portion 
of the funds flowing into Peru. Support is available for NGOs that work with vulnerable 
groups, work for human rights issues, or promote values of democratic governance. Yet, 
according to the interviews, little of this money is available to media development NGOs, 
and even less of it may be accessible for use in capacity building.  
 Similar to other studies of civil society, there appears to be a lack of attention to 
capacity building in Peruvian NGOs. Donor funded projects for media development are 
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aimed at education and training, and are not put to use in the establishment of programs 
or activities that help to secure a future for NGOs once funding is withdrawn. Qualitative 
data from this study has shed light on the problem of sustainability in the media 
development community of Peru, but sources of data on the sustainability of media at 
large in Peru is not available. While international donor attention for securing and 
assessing the sustainability of the media civil society sector has been paid to geographic 
areas such as Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa—as exhibited through measures 
such as USAID’s NGO sustainability index and IREX’s media sustainability indices—the 
degree to which Latin American civil society and mass media is sustainable has not yet 
been measured. Neither institution has conducted a study on the degree to which media 
can sustain itself in Latin America. Given the challenges posed to the vitality of media, 
some of which are discussed in a later section, such assessment would be beneficial.  
 Peru requires a strong media development sector of civil society to counterbalance 
government intervention in media, sensationalist journalism, and public apathy. To meet 
these challenges, media development actors should draw upon their established social 
networks of cooperation and trust, share information, and coordinate collective action to 
accomplish shared goals. This, of course, is an idealized view of social capital and the 
normative role of civil society. But while the network of actors in Peru may have existing 
levels of trust and cooperation, it is noticeably lacking in high levels of information 
exchange. 
Dwindling information exchange. With an overall network density of 12 
percent, the lack of information exchange derived from the network study is consistent 
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with commentary from the interviews. Participants were not always aware of what other 
organizations were doing or where their funding came from. Indeed, some noted they 
discovered from whom others were receiving funding only when a donor informed them 
they were in competition with another NGO.  The sharing of information among NGOs 
strengthens the ability of the community to act in tandem. As such, information exchange 
is particularly valuable before engaging in collective actions (Meyer, 1997). As levels of 
information exchange are generally low, as indicated by the network density for 
information exchange, it suggests that the community of actors is not planning on 
engaging in collective action in the near future.  
The low levels of information exchange among the organizations studied is 
perhaps indicative of the third-stage status of Peruvian civil society that is stalling and in 
danger of stagnation. As Doerfel and Taylor (2004) found in their study of Croatian civil 
society, the density of the network dropped significantly after a contentious pre-election 
campaign in which civil society actors played a strong part. The low levels of information 
flow are perhaps symptomatic of the infrequent collective actions in which the 
community engages. But while Doerfel and Taylor were concerned that the decreasing 
network density could have serious implications for Croatian civil society, the measures of 
social capital studied herein suggest that information exchange could resume with little 
difficulty should the need arise. 
That said, there is the concern that not sharing information regularly is a failure 
to take advantage of the social capital accessible in the community. If the relationships 
among the media development community are as agreeable as suggested in the network 
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survey, the failure to regularly share information is akin to a failure to utilize the collective 
social capital in the community to accomplish objectives not easily accomplished alone 
(Brown & Ashman, 1996; Putnam, 1994). Moreover, it is a failure of the public relations 
function to help proactively create social capital in the environment and utilize that social 
capital for the gain of the organization (Ihlen, 2005). As suggested in the interviews, the 
NGOs in Peru have individual goals and purposes. Failing to access social capital in the 
form of information or support may, in time, further distance the organizations, diminish 
social capital and erode the stability of civil society.  
Further, the role of information exchange may be vital to relationship 
maintenance. According to Broom et al. (1997) communication is not found in the 
antecedents or consequences of relationships, but in the maintenance of relationships 
themselves. As we know through the results of H1b that information exchange is 
associated with filling structural holes, a continued decline in information exchange is 
likely to disintegrate the network further, causing the overall cohesion of the network to 
falter and relationships to collapse. Information exchange may thus be vital to the future 
health of the network. Deterioration of the relationship network would be unconstructive 
to the ability of this civil society sector to increase the collective social capital through 
tackling contemporary problems in Peruvian media development. 
Continued problems in Peru. The moderate lack of information sharing among 
media development NGOs is particularly concerning when one considers there is no 
deficiency in issues faced by the community. While Peruvian civil society may be 
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maturing, and socioeconomic indicators improving, the problems for media development 
actors are far from over.  
Two primary concerns are relevant to the advancement of media in Peru. First, 
they are dealing with an apathetic public that is not necessarily interested in changing the 
way media or government institutions operate. Second, if media is at the heart of civil 
society, as Shaw (1996) described it, the heart of Peruvian civil society is pumping 
polluted blood to the other organs in the body. Dramatic metaphors aside, media owners, 
and the current culture for journalistic practice is not one that promotes thoughtful or 
deliberative discourse. As things are, it is doubtful that media content is likely to lead to 
an informed and engaged citizenry, nor does the public seem particularly interested in 
consuming such information should the media ever deign to produce it. The media 
industry is currently fanning the flames of continued distrust in government institutions, 
and indirectly, distrust for media itself.  
The mainstream media in Peru are consequently contributing to low levels of 
social capital in Peruvian society. As Tsetsura and Luoma-aho (2010) suggested, poorly 
functioning social institutions such as the media lead to lower levels of generalized trust, 
ergo lower levels of social capital, in a society. In Peru there is widespread distrust in 
government and the media (Alasino, 2008; LaPlante & Phenicie, 2010b). Restoring 
public trust in public institutions and the media is thus a continuing challenge for the 
media development community, as well as reforming the media to earn such trust.  
However, the history and culture of Peru is not one that grants trust to people or 
institutions easily. Longitudinal data from the World Values Survey showed that Peru has 
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an extraordinarily low level of generalized trust. In 1996, at the height of the Fujimori 
regime, the national level of trust was estimated at only five percent. However, in 2006, 
only 6.3 percent of those surveyed believed most people are honest and can be trusted, 
compared to its neighbors, Argentina at 17.6 percent (2006 survey), and Chile at 22.8 
percent (2000 survey). Public trust has not been restored simply because Fujimori has 
been out of power for more than a decade. Nor may trust ever be afforded to government 
and media, for as one interview participant put it, “no one cares.”  
The role of media relations on the part of NGOs thus becomes heightened in an 
environment such as this. As Taylor (2000) has posited, relationships between NGOs and 
media are one of the most important ways NGOs can inject their knowledge into the 
national dialogue. Yet, this is the normative and idealized function of NGOs and their 
use of media relations. The reality in Peru is that media have no interest in reform due to 
their cultural history and economic interests (Conaghan, 2005; LaPlante & Phencie, 
2010a). Efforts on the part of NGOs to provide the major media institutions with 
balanced information would likely prove futile. The failure and irresponsibility of the 
mainstream media has limited the generation of public spheres of reasoned and informed 
discourse (Habermas, 1989). There are thus limited means by which NGOs can help to 
sustain the debate an effective civil society requires (Taylor, 2000). This amplifies the 
need for support of those few Peruvian media outlets that are dedicated to serious 
journalism and the advancement of a more responsible press, such as El Comercio and 
TV Cultura.   
	   151 
 Moreover, in terms of problems within civil society itself, there is a clear lack of 
leadership on the part of the national government (an institution that has been thrown 
into further turmoil because of the recent elections and their uncertain outcome), a low 
level of trust among political actors in government, and a lack of interest from donors in 
working with government (Alasino, 2008). Uncertainty and unrest in Peru is likely to 
continue in the foreseeable future. The presidential run-off between Humala and 
Fujimori was likened to choosing between cancer and AIDS by Nobel Prize winner and 
1990 presidential contender Mario Vargas Llosa (“Vargas Llosa blasts Humala and 
Keiko,” 2011). The problems faced by NGOs in Peru lend insight into the importance of 
quality relationships and network position for international donor agencies. 
Implications for Civil Society Donors  
As discussed earlier, many of the interview participants sensed a growing 
withdrawal of the international donor community from Peru, especially in media 
development. This withdrawal was attributed to the growing wealth and infrastructural 
advances of the nation, as well as the shrinking budgets and growing deficits of donor 
nations in North America and Western Europe. That said, increasing socioeconomic 
factors are not necessarily an indication of development, particularly when the focus of 
development actors is media. Despite Peru’s recent elevation to a middle-income state, 
the distribution of wealth in the country is stark, and areas such as the provinces remain 
underdeveloped (Alasino, 2008). And as discussed in the previous section, challenges to 
media and its potential to contribute to democratization and transparency are great. 
Media development appears to be somewhat of the redheaded stepchild of human rights 
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development funds. Many international donors were until recently active in media 
development Peru, the Dutch and Swedish governments among them. Moreover, while 
donors such as USAID and OSI were noted as being among the most important 
organizations in Peruvian media development, they too are scaling back their involvement 
in the nation, at least in terms of their funding of media development projects. 
As organizations that provide resources to NGOs, the position of donors in civil 
society networks is particularly vital (Doerfel & Taylor, 2004; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003). 
The priority for international agencies should be to construct relationships with other 
organizations in the network so that they fill key strategic positions. Donor agencies are 
critical sources of information and support in civil society (Taylor & Doerfel, 2003). 
While the UNPD, OSI, and USAID fill holes in the network that help to bridge 
unconnected actors and share information and resources, other donor organizations such 
as NED and the British and American Embassies are well outside the central interaction 
network. This suggests that their involvement may be limited, or that their support is 
directed at a few select actors.   
 Understanding relationship quality and measures of network importance may also 
be of strategic value in considering where to invest future resources. The high betweeness 
centrality and structural holes rankings achieved by organizations such as CAD (an 
organization that is not specifically focused on media development per se) and Calandria 
(a flagship NGO for media development) underscores the importance of donors 
understanding where NGOs are situated in a network, and to ensure organizations such 
as these receive funding. However, as Taylor and Doerfel (2003) suggested, it is necessary 
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to determine if organizations are aware of their brokerage positions in a network and are 
willing to serve as a “go-between” (p. 174).  
Lastly, the OPR measures may help donor organizations understand how 
relationships lead to key network positions. At the same time that USAID was noted as 
highly important, it was moderately ranked on the OPR measures and the information 
exchange scale. USAID provides funding and is regarded as an important partner with 
whom to maintain a relationship, but is seen as less cooperative, trustworthy, and less 
likely to provide valuable information. As evidenced by the results of H3, if an 
organization is not perceived as open to outside influence, they are less likely to be seen as 
an important information provider. A public may necessarily be in relationship with an 
organization that provides needed resources but not feel that the organization shares 
power or listens to what the public has to say. This finding has strong implications for the 
corporate world as well. Organizations must be perceived to be open to dialogue and 
willing to cede a degree of power in order to attain more advantageous position in a 
network of actors. Given this association, a more detailed discussion of control mutuality 
is offered next. 
Interdependencies Lead to Influence 
The dimensions of trust, control mutuality, relationship satisfaction, relationship 
commitment have been conceptualized as the essences of organization–public 
relationships (Grunig & Huang, 2000; Huang, 2001). While all of the OPR scales were 
associated with centrality, control mutuality was consistently the strongest measure 
associated with organizational centrality, in a variety of networks. In other words, control 
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mutuality was not only associated with a higher degree of incoming relationships and the 
structural position of an organization, but was also the only significant predictor of high 
levels of information exchange. Control mutuality is thus likely to determine the degree 
to which other actors will seek out information from an organization, and feel that 
information forthcoming from that organization is accurate, timely, and received with a 
healthy degree of frequency. 
 Control mutuality is a reflection of the degree to which power is equally shared in 
a relationship (Grunig & Huang, 2000; Huang, 2001). The more organizations were 
perceived to share power—to let other actors be influential in the decision making and 
management of the organization—the more likely organizations were to receive ties from 
other organizations and to be in key positions in a network. In other words, the more an 
organization is perceived to share power and to be open to outside influences or actively 
encourage interdependence, the more likely it was to have relationships with other 
organizations and at the same time be placed in advantageous positions in the network. 
These positions, in turn, afford organizations with key knowledge and resources, allowing 
them to become significant power brokers.  
This study confirms the work of earlier researchers who showed that efforts to 
control a relationship, or to exact influence over the other party in a relationship are not 
likely to lead to a successful relationship outcome. Yet, at the same time the results of the 
study suggest that not only would poor values for control mutuality affect the outcome of 
a dyadic relationship—the perception of one public toward a single organization—but it 
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would affect the ability of an organization to obtain an influential position in a network 
of actors.  
The role of public relations in civil society is not necessarily one of media 
relations, donor relations, or government relations—although these certainly are 
important tasks for NGOs. NGOs are lacking in attention to relationship maintenance—
an orientation and process that has become the raison d’etre of much public relations 
research and practice. A recognition is necessary on the part of NGOs that their 
relationships have a direct consequence on the ability of not only the entire sector to 
succeed, but also of their organization to benefit from the social capital acquired via those 
relationships (Ihlen, 2005).  
Public relations should thus become a function of civil society actors not always in 
terms of what it does, but what it is. In order for relationships that result from 
antecedents, such as a need for resources or social norms, to result in desirable 
consequences, such as goal achievement or centrality, they must be continually 
maintained through adaptation and response in the preservation of relational social 
capital. In other words, civil society actors must engage in reciprocal communicative 
behaviors that are aimed at improving the constitutive variables of relationships that are 
high in social capital, such as collaboration and those that are likely to result in collective 
social capital, such as information exchange.   
 This second half of the chapter has attempted to further integrate the role of 
public relations in civil society theory. Questions have been raised about the nature of 
civil society as a relational or action-oriented concept. The discussion has shown how a 
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dearth of needed relationships, both in terms of existence and in quality, may possibly 
contribute to to a stagnating civil society. Public relations, as a means to maintain 
relationships and facilitate information exchange has been presented as a potential remedy 
to such a decline. Lastly, it has discussed how interdependency, in the form of control 
mutuality in relationships, can directly contribute to the exchange of information needed 
to coordinate collective action—perhaps the single most important outcome of a civil 
society. The following chapter brings this dissertation to a close by reiterating how the 
findings of this study have implications for civil society theory, the practice of public 
relations and its role in creating social capital for communities and societies, and the 
contributions it may have to advancing public relations metrics.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 The previous chapter discussed the findings of the research in direct response to 
the two initial goals of the study: the potential for SNA as a metric for public relations, 
and the further integration of public relations and civil society theory. In so doing, it has 
also provided a detailed picture of the media development environment in Peru—a 
country emerging from political turmoil and struggling to find its feet as a thoroughly 
democratic nation. This next and final chapter of the dissertation will offer a few 
concluding remarks and implications for the development of civil society theory, the role 
of public relations in sustaining civil society, and the benefits of a social network analysis 
approach to evaluation work in public relations. First, however, a short discussion of the 
limitations of the study and opportunities for future research are offered.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Before offering any final inferences, there are a few limitations of the research that 
should be addressed. While network analysis is not as constrained by sample size as some 
more traditional methods of social scientific research, the study was nonetheless 
conducted on a small community of actors with its own idiosyncrasies; cultural, political, 
historical or otherwise. Also, while remedial techniques were used to compensate for the 
missing data, in a closed network study of a small community obtaining complete 
responses from all actors, particularly from some of the large donors who did not 
participate, would be the ideal. Efforts could be made to extend these concepts in studies 
of larger networks and in different cultural contexts.  
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Also, many of the tests utilized in this research were measures of association, not 
prediction. While variables such as information exchange and centrality were assumed to 
be outcomes based on existing literature, without tests of causation, it cannot be fully 
determined if information exchange is an outcome of quality OPR or vice versa. 
However, in the case of positioning centrality as dependent on relationships, dependency 
can be claimed, as the statistical measurement of centrality is fully dependent upon the 
existence of relationships. Centrality will always be preceded by relationships, and thus 
causation can be assumed. Considering this, positive statistical association among 
measures of OPR and centrality is more than enough to justify the relevance of network 
measures to the field and to the advancement of theory regarding the potential 
antecedents and consequences of relationships.  
Another limitation of the study is that it adapted relationship scales developed in 
the United States without extensive consideration of any cultural idiosyncrasies regarding 
the nature of relationships in Peru. Future research should attempt to identify important 
cultural variables that may affect relationship quality and determine how such concepts 
may affect organizational centrality. Despite these limitations, there are a number of 
implications for civil society theory in general, public relations as an aid to civil society, as 
social network analysis as a research tool and metric for public relations. 
Implications for Civil Society 
Research has generally accepted that civil society is a relational construct and 
requires relationships to function. These relationships are thought to provide civil society 
actors with social capital—a network of relationships embedded with potential resources 
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that can be activated by those within the network. Implicit in these assumptions is that 
relationships, characterized by affective variables such as trust and cooperation, will be 
used as vehicles for information exchange geared towards the realization of collective 
action.  
As demonstrated in the example of the Peruvian media development civil society 
sector, this is not always the case. Peruvian civil society, and the media development 
sector in particular, exhibits characteristics of a mature civil society, one with the 
professionalized staff and the skill to exert influence at the state level. On the surface, it 
appears they have access to sufficient resources in the form of the collective social capital 
from their peer organizations. Yet, this social capital, if it can be called such, remains 
inactive.  
This study has therefore raised some questions about the role of relationships, and 
by extension, social capital in facilitating a civil society. As the question was posed earlier 
in this manuscript: can you have a functioning and effective civil society that does not 
utilize the social capital embedded in relationships to collectively manage and influence 
the outcome of issues? The results of this research cannot make the claim of fully 
answering this query, but they can help contribute to the formation of a few speculative 
explanations. 
 Perhaps decreasing information levels and a lessening of cooperation is not 
necessarily indicative of a civil society on the decline, but rather indicative of a form of 
dormancy. As a civil society progresses through its life cycle, it is likely to become more 
atomized as donors withdraw and social problems (many of which NGOs were created to 
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remedy) are perceived to wane. Civil society may also grow dormant when organizations 
work their way towards sustainability and no longer require the support from donors or 
the social capital inherent in networks of relationships with other civil society actors. 
Indeed the expectation that civil society actors will continually maintain high levels of 
information exchange, even in times of relative quiet, is in need of reexamination.  
This is not the case, however, in the media development sector of Peru. There are 
a mountain of problems that could be collectively addressed by the civil society actors 
studied herein. Yet, as found through the interviews little collaborative action has been 
undertaken in the recent past. This is perhaps indicative of a civil society not going 
naturally dormant, as one might expect when issues hush or are resolved, but instead 
going stagnant—stalling in the third stage of development. Either through the withdrawal 
of donors, the shifting of program focus to meet donor requirements, an inability to find 
common ground, insufficient number or resources to tackle the problems facing media in 
Peru, or some other problem not uncovered by the research, the media development 
sector of Peru looks likely to continue to fragment, not come together.  
 Given this, the role of donors is likely to continue to be of critical import to the 
future of this sector. Currently, several of the major donors in Peru occupy strategic 
positions in the media development network. If they were to withdraw from such 
positions, the network as it currently exists would likely shatter. The long-term health of 
this network is thus dependent on donors to continue their involvement in the sector, 
further invest in the sustainability of NGOs, and to serve as facilitators of relationships 
and information exchange. Organizations like USAID may be important to the media 
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development sector in Peru, but it is not perceived as a valuable information provider. As 
such, USAID, and the other donor organizations that do not sit in strategic positions in 
the network should attempt to foster relationships and fill structural holes.  
Moreover, the research indicates donors should work to reduce the obvious power 
differential in donor–NGO relations. Those donors who display higher levels of control 
mutuality are more likely to be turned to for information by NGOs, and to secure more 
strategic positions in the network. This has implications for organizations of all kinds, 
NGOs or otherwise. In relinquishing some control in relationships, organizations are 
likely to be rewarded with increased influence and resource brokerage. Organizations 
must only give up a little, but they gain a lot in return. Findings such as these also have 
significance for the advancement of public relations theory in civil society. 
Implications for Public Relations Theory 
 Public relations as a theory and practice is particularly well suited for employment 
in studies of civil society. The function of public relations, in the negotiation of 
communication among organizations and publics, organization to organization, public to 
public, or any combination thereof, becomes particularly important for ensuring the 
continued success of both a civil society network at large as well as the success of 
individual actors. Previously it has been assumed that information flow is a natural 
occurrence among civil society actors, particularly if such actors are preparing for a 
collective engagement of some kind. This may not always be the case. The maintenance 
of quality relationships, perhaps most importantly through fostering control mutuality, is 
likely to help ensure that information continues to freely flow. Communication activities 
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directed at improving the quality of relationships are likely to result not only in increased 
levels of information exchange among the network as a whole, but are also likely to 
elevate the profile of the organization in the network. 
Ineffective public relations is often described as performing a reactive as opposed 
to a proactive function. Public relations in civil society must adopt a proactive stance on 
communication with other organizations. The work of public relations in civil society 
should closely resemble public relations as practiced by activist organizations, which 
regularly forge coalitions with other groups to increase their social capital and 
consequently their efficacy. Activists recognize they are far more likely to accomplish goals 
when participating in a coalition. Maintaining inter-organizational relationships and 
facilitating the flow of information to proactively address issues may help to reinvigorate a 
stalling civil society sector. 
 Relationship maintenance, as measured through variables such as trust, control 
mutuality, satisfaction, and communal relationships are likely to lead to an organization’s 
increased visibility in an environment (a.k.a. prestige), as well as attaining positions that 
afford it with greater social capital. Helping organizations to build and maintain the 
relationships necessary to occupy strategic positions such as structural holes are beneficial 
to the network, if the organization is a willing broker of information and resources. 
Moreover, occupying such positions also improve the efficiency of the organization itself 
by ensuring it does not waste time or resources in redundant contacts that neither help 
the organization nor the network at large. This implication, among others derived from 
the network analysis, is particularly useful for advancing public relations metrics. 
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Implications for Public Relations Research 
In order to better understand organizational effectiveness, public relations as a 
field of inquiry should focus more attention on the social relationships that organizations 
maintain. Metrics such as centrality and structural holes are valuable to the future of 
public relations research because they are they demonstrable effects of relationships. 
Relationships are the sin qua non of centrality measures and those of structural holes. For 
a field that consistently struggles to provide hard data that demonstrates the outcomes of 
public relations efforts, network measures of centrality and structural holes are clear 
evidence of the impact that the existence and quality of relationships have for the 
organization.  
In-degree centrality is a simple metric of prestige, one that can be used to measure 
the extent to which others recognize the organization as important on a given metric. 
Measures such as betweeness centrality and structural holes have as many, if not more 
applications to public relations. For example, analyses of resource exchange networks may 
demonstrate that organizations that have attained more central positions in the network 
and fill structural holes may have satisfied their resource dependency needs and are able to 
assist in the growth of others. Organizations that occupy structural holes can therefore 
decide whom to share their resources with—those around structural holes tend to benefit 
from them. Moreover, occupying structural holes implies that an actor has highly efficient 
relationships with non-redundant contacts. This provides an organization access to non-
redundant information and as a result, more opportunities. To be sure, there are 
limitations to the network perspective, as there are to any methodological or theoretical 
	   164 
approaches. That said, both the industry and the academy would benefit from the 
quantitative measures that are substantial evidence of the outcome of relationships.  
In examining the larger network of relationships in a community instead of 
looking at specific organizations away from their context, we gain a greater sense of the 
opportunities and challenges organizations have in their environment. Only considering 
the exchange between a single organization and public is a failure to recognize context. A 
network approach to assessing the state of OPR is differentiated from a symmetrical 
model of public relations in that it acknowledges that active publics are not the only ones 
that generate consequences for an organization.  
A network approach to public relations, one that appreciates the complexity of 
social interactions and the consequences those interactions have for the system as a whole, 
recognizes that all publics are relevant and will more or less directly have consequences on 
an organization. The relationships organizations have in common with others positively 
augment or constrain the behavior of organizations. If one were to adopt a new set of 
assumptions about the function of public relations in communities and societies, one 
guided by networks, there would likely be no such thing as non-relevant publics. 
Public relations becomes the communication processes by which organizations 
attempt to bind themselves together for a mutual benefit. This mutual benefit takes the 
form of social capital. This assumption stands in stark contrast to research that assumes 
organizations do not need to concern themselves with stakeholders or publics not directly 
affiliated with the organizations, and where the maintenance of relationships is a reactive 
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activity. Relationships are the vehicle through which organizations empower themselves 
and the community. 
Despite the advantages SNA may hold for the study and practice of public 
relations, a caveat must be offered. Without explicit care, the method can be (mis)used for 
managerial purposes in the measuring and interpretation of relationships and centrality. 
SNA concepts such as prestige could be interpreted as being at odds with the co-
creational approach public relations has adopted in recent years. Depending on the type 
of relationship measured, organizational prestige is not necessarily a desired outcome of 
effective public relations in the co-creational view. Betweeness centrality and structural 
holes can also be used to assess the extent to which organizations are capable of 
manipulating those nodes around them. SNA must therefore be executed and interpreted 
with a clear and ethical intent.  
 Clearly, this study’s theoretical and methodological approaches to the assessment 
of OPRs help to address some of the restraints of previous relationship management and 
OPR research. Not only does it help to rectify some of the methodological and theoretical 
limitations of past managerial research, it has also made contributions to the larger role of 
public relations in society. This research should be distinguished from past studies in that 
it provides a new approach to clarifying how the structure of relationships affects desirable 
organizational outcomes and at the same time benefit the environment in which an 
organization is located. An organization is, to some extent, only as strong as the network 
in which it is embedded. Future research should continue to investigate, through network 
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analysis and other means, the reciprocal nature of an environment that is strong in social 
capital, and a successful, efficient organization.   
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Table 1.  
 
Research questions/hypotheses with corresponding method and analytical procedures 
 
Research Question/Hypothesis 
 
Procedure/Data 
 
Mode of Analysis 
 
RQ1: Who are the important media development actors in Peruvian 
civil society? 
 
Informant Interviews, organizational profiles 
Importance Network 
 
Network roster, in-degree centrality  
RQ2: What are the factors that influence the ability of these groups 
to operate? 
 
Informant interviews, organizational profiles 
 
Open coding 
RQ3: What are the most central organizations in Peru’s media 
development network? 
Network survey, single name generator question In-degree centrality, betweeness centrality 
RQ4: What is the density of the interaction network Network survey, single name generator question Density 
RQ5: To what extent is the media development network of Peru 
characterized by trust? 
Network survey, trust measures (adapted from Hon & Grunig, 
1999) 
In-degree centrality, density 
RQ6: To what extent is the media development in Peru 
characterized by cooperation and competition? 
Network survey, cooperation and competition (adapted from 
Doerfel & Taylor, 2004) 
In-degree centrality, density, t-tests 
RQ7: To what extent do media development actors in Peru provide 
information to each other? 
Network survey, information exchange measures In-degree centrality, density, t-tests  
RQ8: What are the characteristics of the network of relationships 
based on OPR scales? 
Network survey, OPR measures (adapted from Hon & Grunig, 
1999) 
In-degree centrality  
RQ9: To what extent are the relationship quality indicators 
associated with organizational centrality?  
Network survey, OPR measures (adapted from Hon & Grunig, 
1999) 
QAP correlation 
H1: Organizations that fill structural holes will be perceived as more 
cooperative. 
Network survey, single name generator question, cooperation 
measures 
Pearson correlation of structural holes data and 
cooperation matrices 
H1b: Organizations that fill structural holes will be perceived as 
valuable information providers 
Network survey, single name generator question, information 
exchange measures 
Pearson correlation with OPR and centrality matrices 
(in-degree, betweeness) 
H2: Simmliean ties will be positively associated with organizational 
centrality. 
Network survey, OPR measures (adapted from Hon & Grunig, 
1999) 
Pearson correlation simmelian ties and centrality 
measures 
H3: Relationship strength will be associated with networked 
information flow. 
OPR measures and information exchange measures QAP correlation, regression of OPR indices and 
information exchange matrices 
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Table 2.  
 
Network roster of organizations, their type, activities, funding source 
Organization Type Development activities/purpose Funding source 
 
ANP 
 
Professional association 
 
Journalist and union training, defense of press freedom and journalist 
rights 
 
Self funded 
APCI Government Monitors international donations, registers NGOs - 
British Embassy Donor Journalist training British government 
CAD NGO Research, evaluation Self funded 
Calandria NGO Journalist training, research and consultancy, media observation Germany, USAID 
Catholic University NGO   
CEPES NGO Community radio training, free speech OSI, Germany, Spain 
Chemonics Professional association Environment, health, education USAID 
CNR NGO  Catholic Church 
Defensoría  del Pueblo Public institution, autonomous Civil rights, citizens rights State treasury, USAID, UNPD, 
Canada 
ICD Professional association Training, research, communication production USAID 
IDEA NGO Nonpartisan training and promotion  Spain, Norway 
IDL NGO   
IPYS NGO Training, promotion of investigative journalism, access to information OSI, NED 
NED Donor Strengthening democratic institutions Private foundation 
OSI Donor Financial support, capacity building, research Private foundation 
Press Council Press association Freedom of expression/press, right to public information, media 
responsibility 
UNPD 
Proetica NGO Transparency and anti-corruption training, research OSI, Swedish 
Red de Periodistas de 
Provincias del Perú 
NGO Journalist training OSI, USAID, Knight Foundation 
RedTV/TV Cultura NGO Develop alternative media projects, media production, training TV 
channels 
OSI, UNESCO, partially self 
funded 
Transparencia NGO Consolidation of democracy, promote civil society, lobbying British Embassy, IDEA, IRI, 
NED, Canadians, Netherlands 
U.S. Embassy Donor Project funding, training  
UNPD Donor Technical assistance within the framework of development projects United Nations 
USAID Donor Project funding, training  
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Table 3. 
 
Network measures of communication importance, interaction, trust, and social capital 
  
 Communication 
Importance 
 
Interaction 
 
Trust 
 
Cooperation 
 
Competition 
Information 
exchange 
 In-degree  
centrality (rank) 
In-degree 
centrality (rank) 
Betweeness centrality 
(rank) 
In-degree 
centrality (rank) 
In-degree 
centrality (rank) 
In-degree 
centrality 
Betweeness 
Centrality (rank) 
 
Defensoría del Pueblo 
 
45.21 (1) 30.43 (3) 4.45 (8) 
 
44.78 (1) 43.39 (2) 
 
28.62 (5) 5.09 (7) 
OSI 42.61 (2) 26.08 (4) 5.82 (5) 35.36 (5) 43.39 (2) 26.81 (7) 6.21 (4) 
USAID 42.17 (3) 30.43 (3) 6.47 (4) 21.45 (14) 21.82 (16) 17.39 (12) 1.89 (12) 
CNR 42.17 (4) 30.43 (3) 2.00 (13) 21.01 (15) 25.21 (8) 20.65 (9) 2.43 (10) 
IDL 40.44  (5) 26.08 (4) .64 (20) 16.81 (17) 22.52 (15) 18.11 (10) .68 (18) 
Transparencia 39.56 (6) 34.78 (2) 3.81 (10) 23.19 (11) 25.04 (11) 16.30 (14) 1.70 (13) 
IPYS 39.56 (7) 39.13 (1) 5.14 (6) 33.91 (6) 33.22 (7) 31.16 (4) 5.72 (6) 
U.S. Embassy 38.71 (8) 17.39 (6) .06 (22) 12.89 (20) 9.39 (21) 5.79 (20) .06 (19) 
Calandria 38.70 (9) 30.43 (3) 9.22 (2) 40.87 (3) 38.26(6) 35.14 (2) 10.07 (3) 
Press Council 38.26 (10) 30.43 (3) 4.92 (7) 38.69 (4) 42.26 (5) 31.52 (3) 4.96 (8) 
RedTV/TV Cultura 35.22 (11) 13.04 (7) 1.43 (15) 24.93 (10) 24.61 (13) 13.41 (17) 1.64 (14) 
UNPD 34.78 (12) 17.39 (6) 7.53 (3) 12.46 (22) 46.17 (1) 43.47 (1) 10.59 (2) 
NED 29.13 (13) 13.04 (7) 0 (23) 6.52 (23) 7.83 (22) 1.45 (22) 0.00 (20) 
IDEA 28.70 (14) 21.73 (5) 2.72 (11) 29.85 (8) 32.61 (8) 17.75 (11) 3.48 (9) 
British Embassy 26.08 (15) 13.04 (7) .77 (18) 18.69 (16) 20.87 (17) 15.58 (16) .81 (15) 
Proetica 25.22 (16) 13.04 (7) .00 (23) 3.91 (24) 8.17 (22) 5.54 (21) 0.00 (20) 
APCI 25.21 (17) 26.08 (4) .92  (16) 12.61 (21) 16.70 (18) 15.94 (15) .69 (17) 
CAD 24.78 (18) 21.73 (5) 10.63 (1) 41.45 (2) 43.21 (3) 31.52 (3) 12.72 (1) 
Red de Periodistas del Perú 24.35 (19) 17.39 (6) 4.05 (9) 31.88 (7) 24.78 (12) 28.26 (6) 6.07 (5) 
ANP 23.91 (20) 17.39 (6) .80 (17) 22.46 (12) 26.17 (9) 22.10 (8) .80 (16) 
CEPES 20.87 (21) 0.00 (10) .43 (21) 13.62 (18) 15.82 (19) 12.32 (18) .42 (18) 
Chemonics 18.69 (22) 4.34 (9) 2.03 (12) 25.65 (9) 13.65 (20) 17.75 (11) 2.09 (11) 
ICD 15.65  (23) 8.69 (8) .69 (19) 13.47 (19) 9.39 (21) 10.87 (19) .69 (17) 
Catholic University* 
 
N/A 30.43 (3) 1.71 (14) 22.17 (13) 24.26 (14) 16.66 (13) 1.76 (13) 
 
* Not included in communication importance matrix as it was added to the roster by nomination after beginning the survey. 
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Table 4. 
 
Network measures of OPR 
 
 
Control Mutuality 
 
Trust 
 
Commitment 
 
Satisfaction 
 
Communal 
In-degree centrality 
(rank) 
In-degree centrality 
(rank) 
In-degree centrality 
(rank) 
In-degree centrality 
(rank) 
In-degree centrality 
(rank) 
 
Defensoría del Pueblo 
 
44.22 (1) 44.78 (1) 
 
44.34 (1) 
 
45.74 (1) 46.26 (1) 
Calandria 42.27 (2) 40.87 (3) 43.13 (2) 40.00 (4) 43.65 (3) 
CAD 41.07 (3) 41.45 (2) 42.95 (3) 43.65 (2) 45.36(2) 
OSI 39.13 (4) 35.36 (5) 38.08 (5) 34.95 (6) 34.78 (5) 
Press Council 38.68 (5) 38.69 (4) 41.21 (4) 40.17 (3) 40.52 (4) 
IPYS 36.88 (6) 33.91 (6) 36.35 (6) 35.48 (5) 34.26 (6) 
Red de Periodistas del Peru 29.08 (7) 31.88 (7) 33.56 (7) 31.13 (7) 33.04 (7) 
IDEA 27.58 (8) 29.85 (8) 31.65 (8) 29.91 (8) 30.95 (8) 
Chemonics 26.53 (9) 25.65 (9) 25.74 (9) 26.43 (9) 25.91 (9) 
UNPD 25.33 (10) 12.46 (22) 12.87 (20) 12.87 (20) 12.35 (22) 
RedTV/TVCultura 25.18 (11) 24.93 (10) 21.39 (13) 20.69 (14) 24.35 (11) 
ANP 24.13 (12) 22.46 (12) 23.65 (10) 22.95 (11) 24.69 (10) 
CNR 23.68 (13) 21.01 (15) 19.65 (14) 20.52 (15) 22.26 (16) 
Transparencia 23.38 (14) 23.19 (11) 23.13 (11) 23.13 (10) 23.65 (13) 
USAID 21.73 (15) 21.45 (14) 22.08 (12) 21.56 (13) 23.48 (14) 
Catholic University 20.54 (16) 22.17 (13) 20.00 (16) 21.74 (12) 24.17 (12) 
British Embassy 19.19 (17) 18.69 (16) 20.35 (14) 18.26 (16) 19.13 (16) 
IDL 18.74 (18) 16.81 (17) 17.74 (17) 16.52 (17) 16.69 (17) 
U.S. Embassy 13.49 (19) 12.89 (20) 13.39 (20) 12.69 (21) 13.91 (19) 
ICD 13.34 (21) 13.48 (19) 12.69 (22) 13.39 (19) 13.74 (20) 
CEPES 13.19 (22) 13.62 (18) 14.08 (19) 13.91 (18) 15.30 (18) 
APCI 13.04 (23) 12.60 (21) 14.26 (18) 12.34 (22) 12.87 (21) 
NED 6.59 (24) 4.50 (23) 8.00 (23) 7.30 (23) 7.82 (23) 
Proetica 5.39 (25) 3.91(24) 4.35 (24) 4.39 (24) 4.17 (24) 
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Table 5. 
 
QAP correlation coefficients of OPR measures with centrality scores 
  
Interaction network  
in-degree centrality 
 
Interaction network 
betweeness centrality 
 
 
Information exchange  
 
Information exchange 
flow betweeness 
 
Control mutuality 
 
.51* 
 
.81** 
 
.68** 
 
.78** 
Trust .49* .71** .66** .71** 
Satisfaction .49* .73** .66** .73** 
Commitment .48* .72** .66** .72** 
Communal Relationship .48* .73** .66** .72** 
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Table 6. 
 
Measures of structural holes 
  
Effective 
 
Efficiency 
 
Constraint 
 
Hierarchy 
Calandria 9.31 0.72 0.17 0.04 
CAD 8.85 0.68 0.19 0.02 
UNPD 7.50 0.63 0.20 0.02 
Defensoría del Pueblo 7.00 0.64 0.19 0.01 
Press Council 6.82 0.62 0.20 0.01 
OSI 6.82 0.62 0.20 0.01 
USAID 6.64 0.60 0.21 0.02 
IPYS 6.45 0.59 0.21 0.01 
Red de Periodistas del Perú 5.80 0.58 0.21 0.01 
Transparencia 5.67 0.63 0.22 0.02 
IDEA 5.00 0.56 0.24 0.02 
RedTV/TVCultura 4.71 0.67 0.22 0.01 
Catholic University 4.71 0.67 0.22 0.02 
Chemonics 4.25 0.53 0.27 0.03 
CNR 4.14 0.59 0.24 0.01 
British Embassy 3.40 0.68 0.27 0.00 
ANP 3.29 0.47 0.28 0.01 
APCI 3.00 0.50 0.28 0.02 
CEPES 3.00 0.75 0.31 0.02 
IDL 2.67 0.44 0.31 0.02 
ICD 2.50 0.63 0.33 0.01 
U.S. Embassy 1.50 0.38 0.38 0.00 
NED 1.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 
Proetica 1.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 
 
	   173 
 
Table 7. 
 
Correlation coefficients of structural holes, cooperation, flow betweeness 
 Effective Efficiency Constraint Hierarchy 
 
Cooperation 
 
.877** 
 
.533** 
 
-.808** 
 
.354 
Flow betweeness .875** .462* -.658** .455* 
 
Note. *p < .05, *p < .01, permutations = 5,000 
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 Table 8. 
 
QAP regression analysis for information exchange 
  
B 
 
SE 
 
β 
Intercept .77 0 - 
Control mutuality 1.43* .27 1.07 
Trust .84 .51 .66 
Satisfaction .22 .35 .17 
Commitment .23 .39 .18 
Communal -.03 .37 -.03 
 
 
Note. N = 552, R2 = .48, permutations = 10,000, *p < .001 
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Table 9. 
 
Stages and forms of relationships 
  
Antecedents 
 
Relationship/Maintenance strategy 
 
Consequences 
Broom et al. (1997) 
 
Social and cultural norms 
Expectations 
Need for resources 
Uncertainty 
Necessity 
 
Source of change from the 
environment 
 
Exchanges 
Transactions 
Communications 
Interconnected activities 
Adaptations 
Responses 
 
Pursuit of interdependent needs 
Goal achievement 
Dependency 
Routinized behavior 
Organizational efficiency 
 
Change in the environment 
 
 
Grunig & Huang (2000) 
Organization affects public 
Public affects organization 
 
 
Disclosure 
Assurances of legitimacy 
Shared tasks 
Cooperation/collaboration 
Unconditionally constructive 
 
 
Control mutuality 
Commitment 
Satisfaction 
Trust 
 
Organizational efficiency 
 
Organizational goal attainment 
 
Sommerfeldt (2011) Problem recognition Lack of social capital 
Social Capital 
Trust 
Cooperation 
Resources 
Information exchange 
 
Transactions 
 
Collective goal attainment 
 
Centrality 
Structural holes 
 
Social Capital 
175 
	  
	  176 
Figure 1. Interaction network by in-degree centrality 
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Figure 2. Interaction network by betweeness centrality 
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Figure 3. Trust network by in-degree centrality 
 
 
Note. Only relationships greater than 3.75 on a 5 point scale are shown. 
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Figure 4. Cooperation network by in-degree centrality 
 
 
Note. Only relationships greater than 3.75 on a 5 point scale are shown. 
 
 
	  180 
Figure 5. Information exchange network by flow-betweeness centrality 
 
Note. Only relationship values greater than 3.75 on a 5 point scale are shown. 
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Figure 6. Simmelian ties 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Guide 
 
Please nominate all those organizations who are influential in the area of media 
development in Peru (location in Peru is a requirement). 
 
Who are the main leaders in the media community of Peru? 
 (Probe formal and informal leadership) 
 
What are the groups, organizations, or associations that function in the media community 
of Peru? 
 (Talk about different types of organizations, for-profit, NPOs, NGOs, 
government) 
 
Which groups play the most active role in helping improve the well-being of media in 
Peru? 
 
How did this group or organization get started? 
 (Government assistance, NGO initiatives, grassroots initiative, etc.) 
 
Relationships between Organizations and the Community 
 
Of the organizations on this list (identified earlier), which are the most important? Least 
important? 
 
Of the organizations on this list, which ones are most accessible to the media community? 
Least accessible? 
 
Institutional Networks 
 
Which organizations work together?  
 
Are there any organizations that work against each other? (Compete or have some form of 
conflict?). Which ones and why? 
 
Are there organizations that share resources? 
 
Around what issues did this community of groups organize? 
 
What are the main problems or needs that the community must feel be addressed or 
solved? 
 
In the past year, how often have members gotten together and jointly addressed a 
common  issue? Was this action successful? 
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Do you think that these organizations generally trust one another? 
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APPENDIX B 
Organizational Profile Interview Guides 
 
Name of organization 
 
Type 
 
Membership 
 
Location 
 
Names of leaders 
 
Origins and Development 
 
How was your organization created? Who was responsible for its creation? 
 
What kinds of activities has the organization been involved in? 
 
In what ways has the organization changed its structures and purpose? What is the main 
purpose of your organization today? 
 
What sort of help has your organization received from the outside? (Funding, support 
from government, other NGO help) 
 
Membership 
 
Can you tell us about the people involved in your organization? Are they involved in 
other organizations as well?  
 
Why do people join or are willing to serve in the organization? 
 
Institutional Capacity 
 
How would you characterize the quality of leadership of this organization, in terms of : 
(stability, number of leaders, diversity, quality and skills) 
 
How would you characterize the ability of your organization to carry out specialized 
activities? (reacting to changing circumstances, developing specific plans for the future?) 
 
Institutional Linkages 
 
How would you characterize your organization’s relationship with other media groups 
and/or NGOs? When do you feel the need to establish collaboration/links with them? 
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Do you have links with organizations outside of your own? With which ones? What is the 
nature of those links? 
 
Do you feel sufficiently informed about other organizations’ programs and activities? 
What are your sources of information? 
 
Have you attempted to organize or work with other organizations to achieve a mutually 
beneficial goal? (Ask for which activities). Is this a common strategy among organizations 
(probe for reasons why or why not?) 
 
Have there been any efforts by the community to overcome a problem? Can you describe 
one such instance in detail? 
 
Links to/influence on government 
 
Could you describe your relationship with government? Which level of government do 
you feel is most cooperative? (local, district, national). Has the government made 
particular requests of your organization? 
 
Have you attempted to give inputs to the government? What were the circumstances? 
What have been the results? 
  
Is your organization linked to any government program? Which government program is 
your organization involved with? Why those programs? 
 
In general, how do you assess your organization’s actual influence on government decision 
making at the local, district and/or national level? 
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APPENDIX C 
Network Survey Questions 
 
Network Structure Based on Importance 
 
1. On a scale from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (very important), rate the value of 
your organization's communication relationship with each organization listed 
below. 
 
Single Name Generator 
 
2. From time to time most people discuss important matters with other people. 
Looking back over the last year—what are the organizations on this roster with 
which you discussed matters important to your organization? 
 
Intensity of Relationship (Adapted from Burt, 1998) 
 
 For each name generated, participants will be asked to rate them by intensity, 
assigning a  number based on the descriptions below. 
 
1. Are you especially close with this organization in the sense that this is one of 
your closest professional or personal contacts? 
 
2. Or are you merely close in the sense that you interact with the organization, but 
don’t count it among your closest professional or personal contacts? 
 
3. Or are you less than close in the sense that you don’t mind working with the 
organization, but you have no wish or need to develop a relationship? 
 
4. Or are you distant in the sense that you do not interact with the organization 
unless it is necessary? 
 
Frequency of Interaction (Adapted from Burt, 1998) 
 
 For each name generated, participants will be asked to identify the frequency of 
 interaction, using the descriptors below. 
 
1. On average, how often do you talk to each organization? (daily, weekly, monthly, 
less often) 
 
Trust (assessed via Hon & Grunig’s, 1999 measures below) 
 
Information Exchange (Adapted from Doerfel & Taylor, 2003; Haythornthwaite, 1996) 
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1. I trust the information I receive from this organization 
2. The information I receive from this organization is timely 
3. The information I receive from this organization is accurate 
4. What kind of information do you receive from each organization you named? 
 
Items 1–3 measured on 5 point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree, item 4 is 
open ended. 
 
5. How often do you receive information from each organization? 
(5 point scale, very rarely to very frequently) 
 
Cooperation/Competition (Adapted from Doerfel & Taylor, 2003) 
 
1. This organization helps my organization: 
 Accomplish our goals 
  Have access to useful information 
2. This organization: 
  Engages in respectful activities 
  Collaborates with my organization 
  Overall, provides important information 
3. My organization:  
  Relies on this organization for important information 
  Trusts information from this organization 
  Can be confidential with this organization 
4. Information from this organization is: 
  Accurate 
  Truthful 
5. This organization: 
  Hinders my organization’s access to funding 
  Should be achieving more than it is 
  Provides misleading information 
  Is deceptive 
6. This organization helps my organization: 
  Gain access to funding 
  Is a rival of my organization 
 
 All items measured on 5 point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree 
 
OPR  (Adapted from Hon & Grunig, 1999) 
 
 Control mutuality.  
1. This organization and mine are attentive to what each other say. 
2. This organization believes the opinions of my organization are legitimate. 
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3. In dealing with other organizations like mine, this organization has a tendency 
to throw its weight around. (reversed)  
4. This organization really listens to what people like me have to say. 
5. The management of this organization gives people like me enough to say in 
the decision-making process. 
 
 Trust. 
1. This organization treats people fairly and justly. 
2. Whenever this organization makes an important decision, I know it will be 
concerned with organizations like mine. 
3. This organization can be relied on to keep its promises. 
4. I believe this organization takes the opinions of other organizations when 
making decisions. 
5. I feel very confident about this organization’s skills. 
6. This organization has the ability to accomplish what it says it will do. 
 
 Commitment. 
1. I feel that this organization is trying to maintain a long-term commitment 
with me. 
2. I can see that this organization wants to maintain a relationship with 
organizations like mine. 
3. There is a long-lasting bond between this organization and mine. 
4. Compared to other organizations, I value my relationship with this 
organization more. 
5. I would rather work with this organization than not. 
  
 Satisfaction. 
1. I am happy with this organization. 
2. This organization and my own benefit from the relationship. 
3. Most organizations like mine are happy in their interactions with this 
organization. 
4. Generally speaking, I am pleased with the relationship this organization has 
established with people like me. 
5. Most people enjoy dealing with this organization. 
 
 Exchange/communal. 
1. This organization does not especially enjoy giving others aid. (reversed) 
2. This organization is very concerned with the welfare of organizations like 
mine. 
3. I feel that this organization takes advantage of other organizations who are 
vulnerable. (reversed) 
4. I think that this organization succeeds by stepping on other people. 
5. This organization helps organizations like mine without expecting anything in 
return. 
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All items measured on a 5 point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree 
  
Generalized Trust (Adapted from Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; GSS) 
1. Most people in Peru are basically honest and can be trusted.  
2. People are always interested only in their own welfare.  
 
 All items measured on 5 point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree 
 
Quality of Network (adapted from Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002) 
1. If my organization had a problem, there is another organization on this list that 
would help.  
2. I do not pay attention to the opinions of other organizations.  
3. Most of the other organizations on this list are willing to help if you need it.  
 
 Above items measured on 5 point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree 
 
4. In your opinion, is this community of organizations generally peaceful or 
conflictive?  
 (Generally peaceful/conflictive) 
5. Do organizations on this list contribute time and money toward development 
goals?  
  (The contribute some or a lot/They contribute very little or nothing) 
6. Are the relationships among the organizations in this list generally harmonious or 
disagreeable?  
 (Harmonious/conflictive) 
 
 
 	  
